

0-1

A  
DISCOURSE  
Concerning the  
DOCTRINE  
OF  
*Christ's Satisfaction;*  
OR,  
*The True Reasons of his Sufferings;*  
WITH  
An ANSWER  
TO THE  
SOCINIAN OBJECTIONS.

To which is added,  
*A Sermon concerning the Mysteries of the  
Christian Faith; Preached, April 7. 1691.*  
*With a Preface concerning the True State  
of the Controversie about Christ's Satisfaction.*

By the Right Reverend Father in God,  
*EDWARD* Lord Bishop of *Worcester.*

L O N D O N,  
Printed by *J. Heptinstall*, for *Henry Mortlock* at  
the *Phoenix* in *St. Paul's Church Yard*, 1696.

1770

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	----	-----



# THE PREFACE.

**T**HE Design of the following Discourse, is to vindicate the Doctrine of Christ's Satisfaction from the Socinian Objections.

Which, that I might do more Effectually, I set my self to consider the Force and Strength of all that Cressius had produced in his elaborate Answer to Grotius. For I have always endeavoured to understand the right state of a Question, before I undertook it; and when I had done that, I have taken as much Care, as I could, to represent it truly to others. Which made me not a little surprized, when I found our modern Socinians in their late Pamphlets to charge Me as well as others, with not reading their Books upon this Question, and wholly mistaking the State of the Question between the Church and them. Whereas, if I had not read their Books

Considerations on the Explanations of the Trinity in the Archbishop's Sermons, &c.  
p. 31.

Answ. to  
Serm. p. 12.

*I might peradventure have entertained a more favourable Opinion of them, than I now have. But it was upon a diligent Consideration of the utmost I could find was said by their best Writers, that I so long since satisfied my self, that if the Books of the New Testament are to be our Rule of Faith, they were extremely mistaken. Indeed, our Unitarians (as they call themselves) seem to go another way to work; which is, by undermining the Authority of these Books, and so to introduce Deism among us; (of which I hope to give an Account in another Discourse.) But my present business is to lay open the true state of this Controversie between us. In their Answer to my Sermon (which is here Re-printed) they say, That the Unitarians never denied, as I fancy, that Jesus Christ made himself a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation of the Sins of Mankind. If this be true, I confess, I have mistaken them; but if the contrary prove very true from their own Writings, what do these Men deserve, for denying that which they know to be true? For it is hardly possible to suppose such bold Undertakers, as they are, should be ignorant that Socinus absolutely denied, That Christ made himself a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation*

# The PREFACE.

V.

Expiation of the Sins of Mankind. *For in his Answer to Volanus, he saith, That he and most others are greatly mistaken when they say, that Christ offered up himself to God, when his Blood was shed upon the Cross: And he positively affirms, That the Sacrifice which Christ offered was not upon the Cross, but in Heaven. These Passages gave great offence to one Niemojevius, a Friend of his, who in his first Epistle to him, calls it, A horrid Paradox, and directly contrary to Scripture, and wonders what he meant to write so confidently against the plain Testimonies of Scripture. Socinus in answer to him, saith, It is no more than himself had asserted some Years before, in his Book De Servatore; and others of their Party before him. And he lays down, as his Conclusion, which he desires his Friend to bring his Arguments against, viz. That the Expiatory Sacrifice of Christ for our Sins was not performed on the Cross, but in Heaven. Niemojevius brings express places of Scripture against this Opinion; and saith, He could by no means excuse such plain Opposition to the words of Scripture. Socinus in his Reply persists in saying, That there was no Expiatory Sacrifice for Sin*

Socin. Op.  
T. 1. p. 391.

Socin. E-  
pist p. 196.  
Ed. Racov.

p. 204.

p. 224.

p. 226.

p. 254. in the Death of Christ; and that it ought to be considered as an Intervening Condition in order to the Expiation in Heaven, and not otherwise; *but he will by no means allow any Proof of any Sacrifice of the Expiation on the Cross. And so the Dispute ended. With what face can they now say, That the Unitarians never denied this, when Socinus not only doth it, but defends it, to the last, and saith, That others had done it before him: Which shews, that it was no singular Opinion of his own, but that which had been received among the Unitarians before him.*

*But say they, The Unitarians ever acknowledged that the Lord Christ was an Expiatory Sacrifice for our Sins, as may be seen in the Racovian Catechism. This is indeed a wonderfull Proof, they ever acknowledged it, as may be seen in the Racovian Catechism: Were there no Unitarians before the Racovian Catechism? And was that always the same? Suppose the Unitarians before, were of another Opinion; suppose the Racovian Catechism it self hath been altered in this matter: how can any Man of Sense be satisfied with such kind of Arguments as these? One would think, they wrote onely for such as would take their Words; they joyn so much Confidence with*  
so

## The PREFACE.

vij.

*so very little appearance of Reason. All that know any thing of these Matters, know very well, that the Racovian Catechism was first framed by Smalcius, a strict Follower and Defender of Socinus, from whose Opinions he did not vary at all as to this matter, as will appear from all the old Editions of it. In which the Question is put, What is the Reason of the Sufferings of Christ? The Answer is twofold;* Catech. Racov. c. 8. q. 4.

*1. To be an Example of Patience. 2. To confirm the Truth of God's Promises. And after these are explained, another Question is asked, Is there no other Cause* Q. 12.

*of the Death of Christ? The Answer is very short, Nulla prorsus, None at all. And in the Conclusion of that Chapter a Question is put about Sacrifices, and the* Q. 38.

*Answer is, That the Death of Christ was no Sacrifice, but only a Preparation to it, and a kind of Introduction to it, for the Sacrifice was offered in Heaven and not before. Have we not now great Evidence to believe from the Racovian Catechism, that Jesus Christ made himself a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation of the Sins of Mankind? But besides the Racovian Catechism, they refer me to Schlictingius and Ruarus. For what, I pray? For what the Unitarians always*

*A 4 held?*

Catech.  
Racov.  
Statuop.  
A.D. 1680.

P. 141.

*held? That is impossible, when there is such evident Proof to the contrary. I suppose their meaning is, That the Racovian Catechism, being reviewed by them speaks otherwise. And is this a good Proof, that they were always of that mind, because from hence it is evident they have changed it? And so it will appear to any one that will compare the latter Editions with the former. In the last Edition I have seen, as it is review'd by Schlictingius, Ruarus, and others, there is a Preface, wherein they confess it is changed in several things from what it was, when it was first published by Moscorovius, A. D. 1609, and yet the Unitarians were still of the same mind, although some more softning Expressions were for meer shame thought fit to be inserted. In this Correct Edition, the Question is put, Why was it necessary for Christ to suffer as he did? And the Answer is twofold; 1. That Christ suffered for our Sins by God's appointment, and underwent a cruel Death as a Sacrifice of Expiation. Who could imagin this to be the Racovian Catechism still? 2. Because those who are to be saved by him are subject to the like Sufferings. This is somewhat a dark Reason; but the former is that which we are to consider.*

Christ,

*Christ, say they, suffer'd for the sins of Mankind, and was a Sacrifice of Expiation by his Death. What can we desire more? shall we always maintain disputes about Words, when we agree in Sense? No, that is not the Case, but we may seem to agree in Words and differ in Sense. That therefore must be more strictly examin'd. But because they sometimes seem to be displeased that we take their Opinion from foreign Writers, (since they here set up for themselves and are so able to express their own Sense) and because they refer me to their own late Prints in the English Tongue, therefore I shall Ap- ply my self to them, to find out what their true Sense in this matter is. And they seem freely to tell us what they deny and what they affirm.*

Considerations on the Explanations of the Trinity by Dr. W. &c. p. 32.

Answer to my Sermon. p. 12.

1. They deny that this Sacrifice was by way of true and proper Satisfaction or full and adequate Payment to the Justice of God.

2. They affirm, that this Sacrifice was only an Oblation, or Application to the Mercy of God.

*In another Place they complain, that very few of their Adversaries have really understood what they affirm or deny concerning the Causes or Effects of our*

Answer to Milb. p. 58.

## The PREFACE.

our Saviour's death. *And they say, the Question is only this, Whether the Lord Christ offer'd himself as such a Sacrifice, Oblation or Price as might be made to the Justice of God, by way of Equivalent for what we should have suffer'd; or was an Oblation or Satisfaction as all former Sacrifices under the Law were, to the Mercy of God by way of Humble Suit and Deprecation? So that they will no longer Dispute with us, about the Death of Christ being an Expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of Mankind; and so this Point seems wholly gained. But we must have a Care of being deceived by them. For the Scripture was too clear and full to be torn down by the Authority or Evasions of Socinus; and therefore they found it necessary to comply in Terms, as long as they could keep to their own Notions under them. But what is the true Meaning of an Expiatory Sacrifice to the Mercy of God? If it be no more but as a Condition Intervening, Socinus would not allow that to make an Expiatory Sacrifice, and therein he was in the Right.*

*The main Point then between us seems to be whether the Death of Christ had Respect to the Justice or to the Mercy of God? And here we must consider what they under-*

Answ. to  
Milb. p. 53.



## The P R E F A C E.

xi.

*understand by the Justice of God.*

1. They say, that Almighty God as King and Proprietor of all Persons and Things, can forgive any Offence or all Offences, even without Repentance or Amendment, nor is it contrary to his Justice so to do.

2. That it is not the Justice of God, by which he is prompted to punish sinners, but his Holiness and Wisdom, and that Justice hath no other share or interest in Punishment, but only to see that Punishment be not misplaced, and that it do not exceed the Offence.

3. That God could not (justly or wisely) substitute an innocent and well deserving Person to undergo Punishment, properly so called in the Place of the unrighteous and worthless, because it is of the Nature of Justice not to misplace Punishments.

P. 54.

4. That Christ could not offer himself freely for us to undergo the Punishment due to us, nor could God accept of it, or allow it: because it is of the very Essence of Justice not to misplace Punishment and not to exceed the Desert of the Offence, which they say are the two things that constitute the Nature of Punitive Justice.

P. 55.

*In*

Trinitarian Scheme  
of Relig.  
p. 18.

*In an other place, they say, That Christ made himself an Oblation, an Expiatory Sacrifice on the Altar of the Cross for our Sins. But his Sufferings were not (as Trinitarians teach) designed as a Punishment laid on him in our stead, because Punishment is the evil of Suffering inflicted for the evil of Doing; but Christ having done no sin; what he underwent was only labour and suffering and no Punishment. And again they say, the Oblation was not made to the Justice, but to the Mercy of God. But*

p. 19.

*the Sufferings of Christ being graciously accepted by God, as an Intercession on our behalf, God was satisfied with them, and this, they say, is the proper Notion of Satisfaction. The same they repeat in other places. And if no more were to be regarded but meer Words, this Controversy were at an End; for they own Christ's Death to be an Expiatory Sacrifice for the Sins of Mankind, and that he made by his Sufferings Satisfaction to God.*

Answ. to  
the Arch-  
bishop p.  
32.

*But I shall now make it appear, that whatever they pretend, they do really own no such thing as the Death of Christ being an Expiatory Sacrifice for the Sins of Mankind. However, we have this Advantage by these Concessions, that the*  
Scrip-

*Scriptures are yielded to be on our side, and that they are forced to speak as we do, whatsoever their meaning be. But that they do not own any proper Expiatory Sacrifice in the Death of Christ, will best appear by an Account of the Rise and Progress of this Controversy, and of the true State of it.*

*The first Rise of it was from the Multitudes of Places of Scripture, which Attribute all the proper Effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice to the Death of Christ. And that by those who best understood for what End it was that Christ suffer'd, and had no Intention to Deceive or to Amuse Mankind, I mean our Saviour and his Apostles. Our Blessed Saviour himself saith, That the Son of Man came to give his Life a Ransom for many. A Ransom as to what? Surely not as to the Mercy of God. But Christ's Death was a Ransom as it was an Expiatory Sacrifice; and if the one respects the Mercy of God, the other must do so too. They may say, the Ransom is from the Punishment of Sin, but this Ransom might be made as to the Mercy of God, which delivers from it. But a Ransom is something which is paid or laid down as a Price of Redemption; and was very well understood in that Sense among the*

Matt. 20.

28.

Mark. 10.

45.

*the Jews ; who all knew that by their Law,*  
 Levit. 17. *the Blood of the Sacrifices was appointed to be a Ransom for their Souls. For it is the Blood that maketh an Atonement for the Soul. To which the Apostle*  
 11.  
 Heb. 9. 22. *refers, when he saith, that without shedding of Blood, there is no Remission. So that hereby the Jews understood these things. (1) That there was a Punishment due to their Sins, from which they could expect no Deliverance but by the Blood of Sacrifices as a Ransom or Price of Redemption for them. (2) That as the Punishment became due by the Law, and the Execution of it was by the Justice of God, so the Ransom or Price of Redemption must be by way of Satisfaction to the Law, in such a manner as it had appointed. (3) That they had no other Notion of an Expiatory Sacrifice, but the Offering the Blood of the Sacrifice for an Atonement in order to the Averting the just Displeasure of God against them for their Sins ; and this was that, which they understood by Expiation or Remission of Sins. (4) That the Expiation did not depend upon the Sacrifice, as an intervening Condition, as to the Party who thereby performed an Act of Obedience, but upon the Nature of the Sacrifice which was offer'd to God. For,*  
*what-*

*whatever had been required, the Obedience had been the same ; but here the great Force is laid on the Blood being offered for Expiation. (5) That however the Mercy of God was seen both in the Appointing and Accepting the Ransom ; yet the Expiatory Sacrifice was never understood by them to Respect the Mercy of God, but his Just Displeasure against their Sins. What strange Language would it have been thought among the Jews to offer an Expiatory Sacrifice to the Mercy of God ? But Men that bring in New Doctrines, must make a New Sense of Words and Phrases ; or else they can never reconcile them to each other. And it is a mighty Advantage to our Cause, that we understand the Expressions of the New Testament with Respect to these Matters, no otherwise than the Jews understood them, among whom they were spoken ; and who had their own Law to interpret them by. Our present Unitarians do not deny that the Sacrifices under the Law had an immediate Respect to God ; but they say, it was not by way of Satisfaction to the Justice of God, but by way of Application to the Mercy of God by way of humble Suit and Deprecation.*

*But if there were such a Sanction of the Law,*

*Law, whereby an Obligation to Punishment did follow the Offences forbidden by it ; If the Justice of God were concerned to see the Punishment executed , if the Law were not satisfied ; If the Sacrifice of Atonement or Expiation were designed for Satisfaction of the Law ; and God did accept it for that End, then it follows that these Sacrifices were intended not meerly as Rites of Intercession and Deprecation to the Mercy of God ; but by way of Satisfaction to his Justice. For was it not Justice in God to punish Offenders against his Law ? Was it not Justice in God to require a Satisfaction to his Law when it was broken ? Was it not Justice in God, when he had declared that he would accept a Sacrifice of Atonement, to require that instead of the Punishment of the Offenders, and to punish those who wilfully neglected or despised it ? How then, can they pretend that these Sacrifices had no Respect to the Justice of God ? We never read in Scripture any Expressions, as to the Methods of Supplication like this, That the Blood of the Sacrifices was to expiate for their Sins ; and that it was given for an Atonement for the Soul. Is it ever said, that Prayer and Supplication was to make a Sacrifice of Atonement, and that it was appointed for  
that*

## The PREFACE.

xvii.

*that End? Prayer is a Natural and Necessary Duty and a Condition in order to Pardon, but the Life and Force of that lies in a Man's own Breast, in the inward and fervent Desires of the Soul: but a Sacrifice of Atonement was a thing of another Nature, the Blood was to be shed and then offer'd up to God, as a Sacrifice of Atonement, which God himself had appointed for that End; and without which no Remission of Sins was to be expected. But was not this from the Mercy of God to appoint such a Sacrifice of Atonement? No doubt of it, and so it was that he would accept it for such an End. But that is by no means the present Question; for it is, Whether the Sacrifice, which God appointed for an Atonement, was only a Rite of Supplication to the Mercy of God? In one Sense a Sacrifice of Atonement is a way of Deprecation: but then it relates to the Wrath and Displeasure of God; for it is that which God hath appointed as the Means of Averting his Wrath, and Preventing the Execution of his Justice. But the main Question is, Whether the Sacrifice of Atonement as to God's just Wrath and Displeasure, be not a Real Satisfaction to his Justice? For if he be justly displeased, and might justly punish, but doth accept a*

b

Sacrifi-

*Sacrifice of Expiation in stead of it, although there be a Concurrence of Mercy, yet there is a Real Atonement to his Justice: unless they will say, the Justice of God is not concerned in preserving the Honour of his Laws. But of this more afterwards. If an Expiatory Sacrifice under the Law were nothing else but a Solemn Rite of Supplication to the Mercy of God it would take away the Typical Nature of those Sacrifices, and especially those on the Day of Expiation. For what doth a Rite of Supplication and Intercession represent as a Figure of something to come? Why were the Goat and the Bullock for the Sin-Offering to be presented alive before the Lord; then their Blood to be shed, and to be sprinkled before the Mercy-seat and upon the Altar? Why was the Scape-Goat to have the Sins of the People confessed over him and put upon his head? Why was the Flesh of the Bullock and Goat that were Sacrificed burnt without the Camp? Do these look like Applications to the Mercy of God, by way of humble Suit and Deprecation? But the Apostle to the Hebrews tells us, these things were a Figure representing Christ offering himself up to God by his own Blood who having obtained eternal Redemption for*

Levit. 16.  
10, 11,  
14, 15, 19.

v. 21.  
27.

Heb. 9. 9,  
12, 13, 14.



for us enter'd into the Holy Place (*in Heaven*) whose Blood was far more effectual for the Purging away of Sin, than the Blood of Bulls and Goats could be; and to Answer to the burning of the Flesh of the Sacrifices without the Camp, that he might Sanctify the People with his own Blood, he suffer'd without the Gate. Was all this nothing but an Oblation to the Mercy of God by way of Prayer and Intercession? Why all this Ceremony about an Oblation of Prayer, which depends on the hearty Devotion of him that makes it? Why did not the High-Priest enter without Blood into the Holy of Holies, if it were nothing but a Rite of Supplication? Why was the Blood sprinkled upon the Altar for Atonement, after he came out from the Mercy-Seat? Why was the Flesh burnt without the Camp? Was that for Intercession too? But saith the Correct Racovian Catechism, all this doth not prove that the whole Expiatory Sacrifice of Christ was performed on the Cross, but only that it was begun there and perfected in Heaven. This doth evidently prove, that the Blood of Christ was shed for the Expiation of Sins, and that as the High-Priest went into the Holy of Holies with the Blood of the Sacrifice of Atone-

ment *there to make Intercession ; so Christ as our High-Priest with his Blood shed enter'd in Heaven, where he ever lives to make Intercession for us. But say they, the Sacrifices under the Law did not make any proper Satisfaction for Sin, therefore neither did Christ's Sacrifice. So that at last they confess that Christ's death was no proper Expiatory Sacrifice ; for whatsoever is so, must make Satisfaction to the the Law and Justice of God. But say they, the Sacrifices were not offer'd for Payment but for Remission. I say, they were a Payment in order to Remission. I mean such a Payment as the Law appointed and God accepted, and that is true and proper Satisfaction. But we must distinguish a Legal Payment and Satisfaction, from Pecuniary Payment to a Creditor. And all the Confusion these Men have run into, hath been from want of distinguishing these ; of which I have treated at large in the following Discourse.*

*Thus far it appears that they have by no means allow'd the Death and Sufferings of Christ to have been an Expiatory Sacrifice in the Sense of the Jews, as it was a Ransom or Price of Redemption.*

*But there is something farther to be consider'd in an Expiatory Sacrifice, and that*

is a Substitution in place of the Offenders. For what the Jews and others understood by a Sacrifice of Expiation; when the Punishment of one was laid upon another in order to his Deliverance. Not that the very same was to be undergone, as appears by the Sacrifice of Atonement on the Day of Expiation; which was not that which the People of Israel were to have suffer'd without it, but it was what God Appointed and Accepted instead of their Punishment: and therefore the Scape-Goat is said to bear upon him all the Iniquities of the People, which was supposed to be so much charged with them, that he that let him go was to Purify himself before he could come into the Camp. So in the Sin-offering for the Congregation, the Elders were to lay their hands upon the head of the Bullock before the Lord: and in other Sacrifices the Rule among the Jews was, that none but the Owner was to lay on his hands; to shew on whose Account he was offer'd up as a Sacrifice of Atonement. For here the Right of Dominion was sufficient for Substitution; but in a Rational Agent, Consent is necessary to make it Just.

Having thus seen, what the true Nature of an Expiatory Sacrifice was, we must

Matt. 26,  
28.

Heb. 10.  
9, 10.

John 10.  
17, 18.

*now consider, how far this can agree with the Suffering of Christ for the Sins of Mankind. And we have already found our Saviour himself declaring that he gave his Life a Ransom for many. But that is not all; for, when he instituted his last Supper for a Commemoration of his Suffering, he said, For this is my Blood of the New Testament which is shed for many for the Remission of Sins. His Disciples, to whom he spake these words, must understand them as the Jews commonly did; when the Blood of a Sacrifice was offer'd for an Atonement in order to the Remission of Sins. And one great end of his Preaching was to declare that he came into the World with that Design; that it was the Will of God he should suffer, and that he came to do his Will. And therefore speaking of laying down his Life, he saith, No man taketh it away from me but I lay it down of my self. I have Power to lay it down and I have Power to take it again. This Commandment have I received of my Father. So that here we have God's Appointment of such a Sacrifice of Atonement for Mankind; Christ's free and voluntary Consent for the undertaking it, and a Translation of the Punishment of our Sins upon him;*

# The PREFACE.

xxiiij.

him; which St. Paul calls God's making <sup>2</sup> Cor. 5. him to be sin for us who knew no Sin; <sup>21.</sup> which shews that the Sufferings of Christ were on the Account of our Sins, being laid upon him by his own Consent as our Sin-offering; or a Sacrifice of Expiation for our Sins. And in another Place saith, that he hath redeemed us from the Curse of Gal. 3. 10. the Law, being made a Curse for us. How could he be made a Curse for us in order to the Redeeming us from the Curse of the Law; if his Sufferings were only a meer Voluntary Condition in order to his Exaltation, without bearing the Burden of our Sins? But St. Paul adds that we have Redemption through his Blood, the Eph. 1. 7. Forgiveness of Sins. That, God hath Coloss. 1. set him forth as a Propitiation through <sup>14.</sup> Faith in his blood, to declare his righte- Rom. 3. 25 ousness for the Remission of Sins. That, when we were enemies, we were recon- 5. 10. ciled to God by the Death of his Son. Eph. 5. 2: That he hath given himself for us, an Offering and Sacrifice to God. That, he Heb. 9. appeared to put away Sin by the Sacri- 26, 28. fice of himself; and that he was once offer'd to bear the Sins of many. That, <sup>1</sup> Timoth. 2. 6. he gave himself a Ransom for all.

Neither was it S. Paul only who speaks after this manner; but S. Peter saith, that

1 Pet. 2.

24.

3. 18.

1 John 1.

7.

2. 2.

4. 10.

his own Self bare our Sins in his own body on the Tree. *That* Christ also hath once suffere'd for Sins, the just for the unjust. *And* S. John, that the Blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin, and that God sent his Son to be the Propitiation for our Sins. *So that* Christ and his Apostles agree in the same manner of expression; and great weight is laid upon Christ's being a Propitiation for us, and our Hopes of Remission of Sins and the Favour of God depend upon it. *What now is to be said to all these Places of Scripture? Were they designed only to humor and impose upon the Credulity of Mankind by telling them of such an Expiatory Sacrifice in the Death of Christ, which never was, nor could be, being Repugnant to the Justice of God? For Christ, say they, being Innocent could not suffer the Punishment of our Sins, and God being Just could not Accept of it, although he freely offer'd himself as a Sacrifice for our Sins. Doth this Agree with the Force and Design of all these Expressions? Had not Christ the Power and Will to Offer up himself as a Sacrifice of Propitiation to God? And where lies the Injustice of accepting such a Sacrifice which he freely offer'd? But it could not be, say they, by way of Punishment for*

for our sins. *What then is the meaning of all those places, wherein he is said to bear our sins and to suffer in our stead, the just for the unjust? What is this but to contradict the Tenor and Scope of the New Testament with respect to the Death of Christ; and to turn their Sense quite another way from what they were thought to signify at that time? which is no reasonable way of interpreting Scripture.*

*Do they deny that Christ suffered, what we say he did? No; that they dare not do. But they say, What he underwent was only Labour and Suffering; but not the Punishment of our Iniquities. Then, I say, it could be no Expiatory Sacrifice, which implies a Substitution, and the contrary appears by the many places of Scripture already mentioned, wherein our Sins and the Sufferings of Christ are joined together.*

*Thus we see the true Rise of this Controversie was from the many places of Scripture, which seem very plain and clear in this matter; and therefore I shall now give an account of the Progress of it.*

*F. Socinus seeing the bent of the Scripture so much against him, sets himself to the finding out ways to avoid the force of them.*

I. To

Socin. de  
Serv. l. 2.  
c. 1. in fin.

I. *To those which speak of Christ's being a Ransom or Price of Redemption for us, he answers, That these Expressions are to be understood only Metaphorically, and Christ's Death being an Intervening Condition in order to our Deliverance, it is therefore called, a Price of Redemption. And to the same purpose, the Correct Racovian Catechism; only there it is added, That God did accept of the Death of Christ as a most Acceptable Sacrifice. But not by way of Satisfaction or Payment of our Debts, because he as a Sacrifice was given by God himself; but that he might give us the greater Assurance of Pardon and Eternal Life.*

*So that here we have the true state of this Matter before us; viz. Whether the Death of Christ, when it is said to be a Ransom or Price of Redemption for us, is only to be looked on as a hard Condition on his side Intervening, or as a proper Sacrifice of Atonement, which God had appointed, for the Expiation of Sins? The Question is not, Whether God Appointed or Accepted him, for that we have allowed in all Sacrifices of Atonement by the Law of Moses; but whether his Sufferings were not required in order to the Satisfaction of*  
Divine



*Divine Justice for the Sins of Mankind; not by way of strict Payment, as in case of Debts; but by a Legal Satisfaction to the Justice of God as it is concerned in the Honour of his Laws.*

Our Unitarians grant, That Christ was a Ransom and Price of Redemption for us; Answ. to Milb p. 58. but they deny, That he was an Adequate Price, or a Sacrifice to the Justice of God. But still they run upon the Notion of Debts and Payments, as though there were no other Notion of Justice and Satisfaction but between Creditors and Debtors; or as if their Notions of these things were rather taken from the Shops than the Schools. And the monstrous Contradiction they conclude the charge of our Doctrine with, is, That God freely Pardons whole Debt of Sin, and yet hath been infinitely over-paid for Both in the Death and other Sufferings of the Lord Christ.

But in the following Discourse, I have Ch. I. endeavoured to lay open this Mistake, by shewing, That Debts and Punishments are of a different Nature; and therefore the Satisfaction in one Case is not to be measured by the other. But I shall not here Anticipate the Reader, as to what follows; but I shall take notice of what they say,

*say, which seems to relate to this matter.*

Almighty God, *say they*, as King and Proprietor of all Persons and Things, can forgive any Offence or all Offences even without Repentance or Amendment, nor is it contrary to his Justice so to do.

*This is a very strange Assertion. For then there is no Obligation on God's Part in point of Justice to punish the most Impenitent and Incurable Offenders. But there is a great deal of difference, between making the Exercise of Punitive or Vindictive Justice necessary upon every Offence, and saying that the Justice of God doth not require that any Offences should be punished.*

*The former makes Justice in God to proceed by a natural Necessity, which would leave no place for Mercy, nor any Satisfaction by a Mediator, for that must suppose Liberty and Relaxation, as to the Executive Part of Justice. And if God must punish Sinners as they deserve, there can be no stop to the Execution of Justice short of Annihilation; for our very Beings are the Gift of God which we have deserved to be deprived of. But on the other side, to say, that the Justice of God doth not require the Punishment of any Offences without*

without Repentance or Amendment, is to overthrow any such thing as Punitive Justice in God; by which I do not mean, the actual execution of it, and the due measures which belong to it, but the Will to punish Obstinate and Impenitent Sinners. And that results from his Hatred and Abhorrency of Evil, and his just Government of the World. For how can any Men, who believe that God is really displeased with the Wickedness of Men, and that he is a Just and Righteous Governour, ever think that it is not Repugnant to his Justice to forgive all Offences without Repentance or Amendment? How can his Hatred of Sin and the Justice of his Government be reconciled with the Impunity of the most Obstinate Offenders? Is there no such thing as Justice to himself and to his Laws; which lies in a just Vindication of his Honour and of his Laws from Contempt? And who can be guilty of greater Contempt of him, than those who persist in their Wickedness without Repentance or Amendment? And after all, Is it not contrary to his Justice to forgive such as these, because he is absolute Lord and Proprietor of all Persons and Things? This might signifie something, if we could imagine God to be nothing but Almighty Power without Justice:

stice: *but if his Justice be as Essential an Attribute as his Omnipotency, we must not so much as suppose the Exercise of one without the other.*

Answ. to  
Milb. p. 53.

*But they do not deny, That it is inconsistent with the Wisdom and Holiness of God to let the Incorrigible and Impenitent escape unpunished, or to forgive Sin without Repentance or Amendment. But if the Wisdom and Holiness of God will not permit the Impunity of Impenitent Sinners, is it not just in God to punish them? Not barely as to the Degree and Desert of Punishment; but as to the Will of Punishing them according to their merits? Whence doth their Punishment come? Is it not from the Will of God? Is that Will just or not? If the Will to punish be just? whence comes it to be so? From the Wisdom and Holiness of God? Then Punitive Justice, when it is agreeable to God's Wisdom and Holiness, is a proper Divine Attribute as well as they. And they must have strange Notions of Punitive Justice, who would separate it from them.*

But Justice, *they say*, hath no other share or interest in Punishment, but only to see that Punishment be not misplaced, and that it do not exceed the Offence. *We are far*

*far from denying these things to belong to the Measures in the Exercise of Punitive Justice: But whence comes Punitive Justice to belong to God? Is it not because it is just in him to punish Offenders according to those Measures? And whence comes this, but from that Universal Justice in God, which is always joyned with his Wisdom and Holiness: and implies an Universal Rectitude in all he doth? And from thence it comes that all the Measures of Justice are observed by him in the Punishment of the greatest Offenders.*

*Now this Universal Justice in God is that, whereby he not only punishes Obstinate and Impenitent Sinners, but he takes care of preserving the Honour of his Laws. And therefore, although Almighty God out of his great Mercy were willing that Penitent Sinners should be forgiven; yet it was most agreeable thereto, that it should be done in such a manner as to discourage Mankind from the practice of Sin, by the same way by which he offers Forgiveness; and for this end, it pleased God in his Infinite Wisdom and Goodness to send his Son to become a Sacrifice of Propitiation for the Sins of Mankind; which being freely undertaken by him, there was no breach in the Measures of Punitive Justice with respect*

*spect to him ; and so by his Death he offered up himself as a full, perfect and sufficient Sacrifice, Oblation and Satisfaction for the Sins of Mankind. And this is that Doctrine of the Satisfaction of Christ which we own and defend.*

*But these bold Assertions, That God as absolute Lord may forgive all Offences without Repentance, and it is not contrary to his Justice so to do ; that, it is not the Justice of God which prompts him to punish Sinners, arise from too mean and narrow a Conception of Divine Justice ; as though it lay only in the manner of the Execution of it. But that there is an Essential Attribute of Justice belonging to the Divine Nature, appears from hence, that there are some things which are so disagreeable to the Divine Nature that he cannot do them ; he cannot break his Promises, nor deceive Mankind to their Destruction ; he cannot deny himself, nor pervert that Order, or due Respects of things to each other, which he hath established in the World. He cannot make it the Duty of Mankind to dishonour their Maker, or to violate the Rules of Good and Evil, so as to make Evil Good and Good Evil ; he cannot make Murder and Adultery to be Virtues, nor Impiety*

# The PREFACE.

xxxiiij.

*piety and Wickedness not to deserve Punishment. But whence comes all this? Is it that God wants Almighty Power to do what he pleases? No doubt, he is supreme Lord over all, and hath all things under his Will. But there is an Essential Justice in God, which is a supreme Rule of Righteousness, according to which he doth always exercise his Power and Will. And so Moses saith of him, All his ways are* Deut. 32. 4. *perfect, a God of Truth, and without Iniquity, just and right is he; and the Psalmist, The Lord is righteous in all* Psal. 145. *his ways and holy in all his works. He* 17. *not only is so, but he can be no otherwise, for this Universal Righteousness is as great a Perfection and Attribute of God, as his Wisdom, or Power. It is not one Name which stands for all; but it is a real and distinct Attribute of it self: It is as a Rule and Measure to the Exercise of the rest. And he particularly shews it in all the Acts of Punitive Justice: So Nehemiah; Howbeit thou art just in all* Neh. 9. 33. *that is brought upon us, for thou hast done right, but we have done wickedly. And Daniel; Righteousness belongeth unto thee, but unto us confusion of* Dan. 9. 7. *Face: For the Lord our God is righte-* 14.

c

ous

- ous in all his Works which he doth, for we obey'd not his Voice. *And Zeph-*  
 Zeph. 3. 5. *niah; The just Lord is in the midst thereof, he will not do Iniquity. From whence it appears that the Exercise of Punitive Justice is according to the Essential Justice or Righteousness of the Divine Nature. And so Abraham pleaded*  
 Gen. 18. *with God, Shall not the Judge of all the*  
 25. *Earth do right? i. e. Will he not punish according to the Righteousness of his Nature? And so Abimelech argues from the natural Notion he had of God's righteous Nature, Lord, wilt thou slay also a*  
 20. 4. *righteous Nation?*

*But here the main Difficulty which deserves to be cleared is this, How far Punitive Justice is founded on that Universal Justice which is an Essential Attribute of God. For the want of understanding this, hath been the great occasion of so much Confusion in the Discourses about this matter. And for the clearing of it, these things must be considered;*

1. *That there is a difference between that Justice in God, whereby he hates Sin, and that whereby he punishes the Sinner. The hatred of Sin doth necessarily follow the Perfection of his Nature. Therefore*  
 God



# The PREFACE.

XXXV.

*God is said, To hate the Wicked; and Evil to be an Abomination to him; to love Righteousness and to hate Wickedness. But if the Punishment of the Offender were as necessarily consequent as his Hatred of Sin, all Mankind must suffer as they offend, and there would be no place for Mercy in God, nor for Repentance in Men. But Sin in it self is perfectly hateful to God, there being nothing like God in it; but Man was God's Creature and made after his Image and Likeness; and however God be displeased with Mankind on the account of Sin, yet the Workmanship of God still remains; and we continually see that God doth not exercise his Punitive Justice according to the Measures of their Iniquities. And they who plead most for the necessity of Punitive Justice, are themselves a Demonstration to the contrary; for they cannot deny, that they are not punished as their Iniquities have deserved. And if Punitive Justice be necessary in it self it must reach the Persons that have deserved to be punished, if there be no Relaxation of the Severity of it.*

2. *That it is very agreeable to the Divine Justice, to exercise the Severity of Punitive Justice on obstinate and incorrigible*

*Psalm 11. 5.  
Prov. 6. 16.  
Eccl. 1. 7.  
Zech. 8. 17.*

*gible Offenders. And this is that whereon the Justice of the Punishments of Sinners in another World is founded; because God hath been so mercifull to them here, and used so many ways to reclaim them, and it is the Not exercising his Punitive Justice upon them in this World, which makes it so much more reasonable in another. For thereby they have shewed their Contempt of God and his Laws, of his offers of Mercy and their wilfull obstinacy in offending him. And the reasonableness of the Punishment of such Offenders is not denied by any of our more Learned Adversaries, as I have shewed in the following*

*Discourse from Socinus and Crellius, and might do from several others. But I need not mention any more, since in the late*

*Correct Edition of the Racovian Catechism there is this Note, That they have always asserted, that the Wicked shall be raised up at the great Day to undergo the Punishment of their Sins, and to be cast into the Fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels. And for this, besides their Publick Confessions, they quote Crellius, Schlictingius, Volkelius, Wolzogenius, &c. And Schlictingius saith, The Doctrine of future Punishments was necessary to be preached, as being part of the*

Ch.I. p.30.

Catech.  
Racov. P.  
179.

Schlicting.  
in Joh. 5.  
29.

the Christian Faith; and that God's Veracity is concerned in the Execution of his Threatnings. *Which is a part of Natural Justice. And those Learned Men, who have been thought most favourable to the Socinian Opinions have declared themselves very frankly as to the Justice of the Punishment of Impenitent Sinners.*

Curcellæus, *whom they often mention with respect*, saith, The Justice of God requires, that he should inflict the Punishments he hath threatned on Contumacious Sinners. *And Limborch (whom they sometimes appeal to)* saith, That the Justice of God doth not permit the Impunity of Refractory and Impenitent Contemners of his Grace. *Because, saith he*, God by his declared Will hath tied himself up from the Exercise of his Absolute Power; and his Laws would be trampled upon, and his Majesty slighted; nor would God's Hatred of Sin ever be fully discovered. *And therefore the Day of Wrath is called by St. Paul*, The Revelation of the Righteous Judgment of God. *Episcopus saith*, That although in such Punishments, which depend only on the Will of the Law-maker, he doth not think, that God in Justice is obliged to make good his Threatnings, as he is to perform

Curcel. Instit. 1. 2. c. 13. §. 5.

Limborch. Theol. Christ. 1. 2. c. 12. §. 35.

Rom. 2. 5.

Episcop. Instit. Theol. 1. 4. c. 29.

form his Promises; (but that in such Cases God is not bound in Justice to execute all that the Law threatens; but when he thinks fit to punish, then his Justice requires him not to punish beyond the Commination) yet in the Case of obstinate and incurable Offenders, *he doth not deny*, that the Justice of God requires the Rigour of the Law to be executed upon them. *And he adds*, That the Day of Judgment will fully manifest the Justice of God in the Threatnings he hath made to Impenitent Sinners. *Even Vorstius, who was supposed to be too much inclined to the Socinian Doctrine, owns it to be a part of God's Justice to punish wicked and impenitent Persons; that his Patience and Goodness may not be always contemned with Impunity. And afterwards*, That although God doth no Injury to the Offender, if he doth not execute his Threatnings; yet out of regard to the Justice of his Word, he doth not recede from what he hath declared: But all Threatnings under the Gospel are Conditional; and none are damned by it, but such as continue in Impenitency and Unbelief. *And in his Explication he saith*, That where God hath absolutely declared his Will to punish

Vo. II. de  
Attrib.  
Disp. 9. §.  
38.

§. 47.

§. 50. Not.  
ad §. 46.

punish in such a manner, he cannot forgive without Injustice.

*But our Unitarians speak without any Reserve, That it is not the Justice of God, which prompts him to punish Sinners, and so it is not contrary to his Justice to forgive all Offences without Repentance or Amendment. And thus the Justice of God is not concerned in the Punishments of the great Day, although the Apostle calls it The Revelation of the Righteous Judgment of God.*

*And by this the World may see how very far our Modern Unitarians are from handling this Subject more Carefully, Judiciously and Exactly than others; However one of their own Party hath lately affirmed it; with as much Confidence and as little Ground as they have done other things.*

Vindic. of  
S. R. H.  
p. 128.

3. *That it is very agreeable to Divine Justice to accept of a Satisfaction on behalf of the Sins of Mankind, who do not persist in their evil ways, so that their Sins shall be forgiven upon their Repentance and Amendment. For since the Exercise of Punitive Justice is not necessary on the Persons of the Offenders, and since God in this Life abates so much of his just*

*Severity against them ; he thereby shews, that he doth not proceed with Mankind here according to the Rigor of his Justice ; but yet, since God hath given to them very just and righteous Laws, since those Laws have been broken and his Authority contemned, it is very just for God to require a Sacrifice of Atonement for the Sins of the World, that Mankind may see that God was justly displeased at them, and that none take Incouragement to go on to commit them ; but yet, that upon their hearty Repentance and sincere Obedience, they may be assured of the Remission of Sins and the Promise of Eternal Life. All the Difficulty now remaining is about Christ's Suffering in our stead, of which the Scripture speaks so fully in the Places already mention'd. But we must consider what is Answered to them.*

*II. To those Places of Scripture which speak of Christ's Suffering the Punishment of our Sins ; all that Socinus saith, comes to these two things.*

Socin. de  
Servat.  
Part. 2. c.  
4. &c.

1. That Christ suffer'd on the occasion of our Sins, and with a Design to take away our Sins.

2. That by his Sufferings he came to have a Power to Forgive Sins ; and that this is the proper Expiation of Sin. But  
by

by no means that he suffer'd in our stead; *for he hath these Words ; Ut nihil aliud sit Christum pro nobis mortuum esse, quam vice seu loco nostro mortem subiisse, id adeo a veritate abhorret ut nihil magis. Which in plain English is, that nothing is more false than that Christ suffer'd in our stead.* C. 7.

*The old Editions of the Racovian Catechism follow Socinus, and there the Answer to the Places which speak of Christ's Dying for us, is that they do not signify in our stead ; but for our good. Which they are very Careful to distinguish, because they think that the latter implies no more than a Condition in Order to the Expiation in Heaven ; but the other makes him a true Propitiatory Sacrifice for our Sins. But if Christ did not suffer in our stead ; how can they possibly Reconcile his undergoing this Condition with their own Measures of Divine Justice ? All they pretend to say, is, that it was Labour and Suffering but not Punishment. Which is to speak against the Common Sense of Mankind ; and is a ridiculous piece of Stoicism. They say, it was a meer Act of Dominion as to Christ and not of Justice. But if there be such an Essential Attribute as Justice in God, then the Exercise of Dominion must be*

*be Regulated by it ; especially where there was nothing but perfect Innocency. The Case is very different as to the sinful Race of Mankind, who having the Guilt of Sin upon them, God may justly Exercise his Dominion over them as he sees Cause ; but he always doth it Justly, although the particular Reasons may not be within our reach. But here is no Guilt of Sin consider'd, either of his own, or others ; according to their Principles ; and yet they make him to undergo as great Sufferings, as we do, who assert that he suffer'd for our sakes in our stead ; which alone gives a Reasonable Account of it.*

*But in the late correct Edition of the Racovian Catechism they say, the Sense of Christ's Suffering for our Sins is two-fold, but both come to one at last. 1. That Christ suffer'd as a Sacrifice in our stead ; tanquam victima pro nobis Succedanea. How can Socinus and the Racovian Catechism agree ? 2. That he suffer'd for our good. But they deny any Commutation which they say, was not in the Expiatory Sacrifice among the Jews. What doth a Substitution differ from a Commutation in this Case ?*

*But how do suffering in our stead and for our good come all to one at last ?*  
*Either*



*Either it must be, that Christ did truly suffer in our stead, when he underwent the Punishment of our Sins in order to our Redemption and Expiation; and that is a very good and true Sense; which we readily embrace, and are very well content that they should come all to one: Or if the meaning be only, that Christ may be said to suffer in our stead, because we have Benefit by the Consequences of his Death; then his dying is only consider'd as a bare Condition and not as a Sacrifice in our stead. As to make it plain by an Instance; we all agree that Joseph's Suffering in Egypt was designed by the Wise Providence of God for the good of his Brethren, which they received after his Advancement, to which his Suffering was an Antecedent Condition. But can any Man say, that he suffer'd in stead of his Brethren? But now if Joseph's Brethren had been sold for Slaves in Egypt, and Joseph had gone down thither and offer'd himself a Prisoner for their Deliverance; this had been truly Suffering in their stead, as well as for their Advantage. And suppose the King of Egypt had agreed with Joseph, that if he would become Prisoner for his Brethren, he would advance him, and he should himself Deliver them by his own Power; this doth  
not*

*not at all hinder his Suffering in their stead. But if it had no Relation to their Deliverance by his being made Captive himself; but was only a step to his Advancement; then it cannot be said to be in their stead, although it might turn to their Advantage. And so much for the Sense of the Racovian Catechism.*

*But Our Unitarians fly higher, for they say,*

1. That God could not justly or wisely substitute an Innocent Person to undergo Punishment in place of the Guilty.

2. That Christ could not freely offer himself as a Sacrifice in our stead, nor could God accept of it, or allow it.

*So that here we have the true State of this Controversy between us, viz. whether Christ were a Real Expiatory Sacrifice for the Sins of Mankind. For, if he could not be Substituted in our stead, nor God accept of his offering up himself for us; all the other Expressions are meer Words given out on purpose to Amuse and Deceive us.*

*And this is that which I have undertaken to make out in the following Discourse, viz.*

1. That

1. *That the Scripture doth as plainly* Chap. II.  
*set forth that Christ suffer'd the Punish-*  
*ment of our Sins and in our stead, as it*  
*could do ; and that no Expressions could be*  
*thought of to that purpose, but might be*  
*answered in the same way that they do*  
*these. And therefore it is in vain to con-*  
*tend with such Men, who are resolved that*  
*Words and Phrases shall signify no other-*  
*wise, than they would have them. And*  
*yet at last they cannot deny but a kind of*  
*Substitution is implied as a Victima Suc-*  
*cedanea ; but how? That he suffer'd for our*  
*good and by the occasion of our Sins,*  
*but not the Punishment of them. Thus*  
*far then we have gained, that the Words*  
*of Scripture are for us ; but say they, what*  
*ever the Words are, they cannot mean*  
*any real Punishment, because he was*  
*an Innocent Person. Therefore I have*  
*shewd ;*

2. *That there is no Repugnancy in Rea-* Chap. III.  
*son, nor to the Justice of God for an Inno-*  
*cent Person to suffer by his own Consent and*  
*for so great an End, what the Scripture*  
*attributes to our Saviour. And I have*  
*fully answered the Arguments brought by*  
*our Adversaries to prove that God could*  
*not justly or wisely substitute an Inno-*  
*cent Person to suffer for the Guilty.*

3. *That*

Ch. IV.  
V. IV.

3. *That* Christ did offer up himself, as an Expiatory Sacrifice to God in our stead; and that God did accept and allow of it. *Which is the Design of the three last Chapters. And till an Answer be given to what I have there discoursed at large, I shall refer the Reader to what is already said; and shall suppose those Answers to be sufficient, till I see some better Reasons for their Opinion in this matter than I have yet met with, although I have been no stranger to their late Writings, as, God willing, they may see on another Occasion.*

E. W.

April 24. 1696.

---

ADVERTISEMENT.

There is in the Press, and will speedily be published, *Sermons* Preached upon Several Occasions, by the Right Reverend Father in God, *Edward* Lord Bishop of *Worcester*, Volume the *First*, in *Octavo* : Sold by *Henry Mortlock*, at the *Phoenix* in *St. Paul's Church-yard*.

---

---

## ERRATA.

### *In the Preface.*

**P**Age xxi. l. 2. for *what* r. *that*. p. xxv. l. 14. for  
*ony* r. *only*.

### *In the Book.*

P. 20. Marg. for *factio* r. *facto*. p. 27. l. 9. after *If* put  
in *God*. p. 29. l. 3. for *for unjust* r. *unjust for*. p. 56.  
l. 9. for *we* r. *with*. p. 153. l. 13. after *Sins* put in *and*.  
p. 256. marg. for *Lib. 4. r. Levit. 4.* p. 289. marg. r. *Ex-*  
*piation by Christ*. p. 359. l. 27. dele from *2et* to l. 3.  
p. 360.

---

---

A

# DISCOURSE

Concerning the  
*Sufferings of Christ.*

---

## CHAP. I.

- I. Of the Socinian way of interpreting Scripture; and of the uncertainty it leaves us in as to the main Articles of Faith, manifested by an Exposition of Gen. i. suitable to that way. II. The state of the Controversie in general concerning the Sufferings of Christ for us. He did not suffer the same we should have done. III. The grand mistake in making punishments of the nature of Debts. IV. The difference between
- B them

## Of the Sufferings

them at large discovered, from the different reason and ends of them. V. The right of punishment in God, proved against Crellius, not to arise from meer dominion. VI. The end of punishment not bare Compensation, as it is in Debts; what punishment due to an injured person by the right of Nature; proper punishment a result of Laws. VII. Crellius his great mistake about the end of Punishments. VIII. Not designed for satisfaction of Anger as it is a desire of Revenge. Seneca and Lactantius vindicated against Crellius. IX. The Magistrates interest in Punishment distinct from that of private persons. X. Of the nature of Anger in God, and the satisfaction to be made to it. Crellius his great arguments against satisfaction depend on a false Notion of God's anger. XI. Of the ends of divine Punishments. XII. The different nature of them in this and the future state.

S I R,



S I R,

**A**lthough the Letter I received from your hands contained in it so many mistakes of my meaning and design; that it seemed to be the greatest civility to the Writer of it, to give no answer at all to it; because that could not be done, without the discovery of far more weaknesses in him, than he pretends to find in my discourse: Yet the weight and importance of the matter may require a farther account from me, concerning *the true reason of the sufferings of Christ*. Wherein my design was so far from *representing old Errors to the best advantage, or to rack my wits to defend them*, as that person seems to suggest; that I aimed at nothing more than to give a true account of what upon a serious enquiry, I judged to be the most natural and genuine meaning of the Christian Doctrine contained in the Writings of the New Testament.

I. For finding therein such multitudes Of the *Socinian way* of expressions, which to an unprejudiced mind attribute all the mighty effects of the Love of God to us, to the *of interpreting Scripture* obedience and sufferings of Christ, I be-

gan to consider what reason there was why the plain and easie sense of those places must be forsaken, and a remote and Metaphorical meaning put upon them. Which I thought my self the more obliged to do, because I could not conceive if it had been the design of the Scripture, to have delivered the received Doctrine of the Christian Church, concerning the reason of the sufferings of Christ, that it could have been more clearly and fully expressed than it is already. So that supposing that to have been the true meaning of the several places of Scripture which we contend for; yet the same arts and subtilties might have been used to pervert it, which are employed to persuade men that is not the true meaning of them. And what is equally serviceable to truth and falsehood, can of it self, have no power on the minds of men to convince them it must be one, and not the other. Nay, if every unusual and improper acception of words in the Scripture, shall be thought sufficient to take away the natural and genuine sense, where the matter is capable of it, I know scarce any article of Faith can be long secure; and by these arts men may declare that they believe  
the

the Scriptures, and yet believe nothing of the Christian Faith. For if the improper, though unusual acception of those expressions of *Christ's dying for us*, of *redemption*, *propitiation*, *reconciliation by his blood*, of *his bearing our iniquities*, and *being made sin and a curse for us*, shall be enough to invalidate all the arguments taken from them to prove that which the proper sense of them doth imply, why may not the improper use of the terms of Creation and Resurrection, as well take away the natural sense of them in the great Articles of the Creation of the World, and Resurrection after death? For if it be enough to prove that *Christ's dying for us*, doth not imply *dying in our stead*; because sometimes *dying for others* imports no more than dying for some advantage to come to them; if *redemption* being sometimes used for *meer deliverance*, shall make our *redemption* by Christ, wholly *Metaphorical*; if the terms of *propitiation*, *reconciliation*, &c. shall lose their force, because they are sometimes used where all things cannot be supposed parallel with the sense we contend for: why shall I be bound to believe that the World was ever created in a proper sense, since those

John 1. 3,  
10.

persons against whom I argue, so earnestly contend that in those places in which it seems as proper as any, it is to be understood only in a metaphorical? If when *the World and all things are said to be made by Christ*, we are not to understand the production but the reformation of the World and all things in it, although the natural sense of the Words be quite otherwise; what argument can make it necessary for me to not understand the Creation of the World in a metaphorical sense, when *Moses* delivers to us the history of it? Why may not I understand *in the beginning*, Gen. 1. for the beginning of the *Mosaical* Dispensation, as well as *Socinus* doth *in the beginning*, John 1. for the beginning of the Evangelical? and that from the very same argument used by him, *viz.* that *in the beginning* is to be understood of the main subject concerning which the author intends to write, and that I am as sure it was in *Moses* concerning the *Law* given by him, as it was in *St. John* concerning the *Gospel* delivered by *Christ*. Why may not *the Creation of the Heavens and the Earth*, be no more than the erection of the Jewish Polity? since it is acknowledged, that by *New Heavens and New Earth* wherein

wherein dwelleth righteousness, no more is understood than a new state of things under the Gospel? Why may not the *confused Chaos* import no more than the state of Ignorance and darkness under which the World was before the Law of *Moses*? since it is confessed that it signifies in the New Testament such a state of the World before the Gospel appeared? and consequently, why may not the *light which made the first day* be the first tendencies to the Doctrine of *Moses*, which being at first divided and scattered, was united afterwards in one great Body of Laws, which was called the *Sun*, because it was the great Director of the Jewish Nation, and therefore said to rule the day; as the less considerable Laws of other Nations are called the *Moon*, because they were to govern those who were yet under the night of Ignorance? Why may not the *Firmament being in the midst of the Waters*, imply the erection of the Jewish State in the midst of a great deal of trouble, since it is confessed, that *Waters* are often taken in Scripture in a Metaphorical sense for troubles and afflictions? and the *Earth appearing out of the Waters*, be no more but the settlement of that State after its

troubles; and particularly with great elegancy after their passage through the Red Sea? And *the production of Herbs and living Creatures*, be the great encrease of the People of all sorts, as well those of a meaner rank (and therefore called herbs) as those of a higher, that were to live upon the other, and sometimes trample upon them, and therefore by way of excellency called *the Living Creatures*? And when these were multiplied and brought into order, (which being done by steps and degrees, is said to be finished, in several days) then the State and the Church flourished and enjoyed a great deal of pleasure, which was the production of Man and Woman, and their being placed in Paradise: (for a *perfect Man*, notes a high degree of perfection, and a *Woman* is taken for the *Church* in the *Revelations*) but when they followed the Customs of other Nations which were as a *forbidden tree* to them, then they lost all their happiness and pleasure, and were expell'd out of their own Country, and lived in great slavery and misery, which was the Curse pronounced against them, for violating the rules of Policy established among them. Thus you see how small a measure of wit, by  
the

the advantage of those ways of interpreting Scripture, which the subtillest of our adversaries make use of, will serve to pervert the clearest expressions of Scripture to quite another sense than was ever intended by the Writer of them. And I assure you, if that rule of interpreting Scripture be once allowed; that if words are ever used in a Metaphorical sense, there can be no necessity of understanding them any where in a proper; there is scarce any thing which you look on as the most necessary to be believed in Scripture, but it may be made appear not to be so upon those terms. For by reason of the paucity and therefore the ambiguity of the Original words of the Hebrew language, the strange Idioms of it, the different senses of the same word in several Conjugations, the want of several modes of expression which are used in other Languages, and above all the lofty and Metaphorical way of speaking used in all Eastern Countries, and the imitation of the Hebrew Idioms in the Greek translation of the Old Testament, and Original of the New, you can hardly affix a sense upon any words used therein, but a man who will be at the pains to search all possible significations  
and

and uses of those words, will put you hard to it, to make good that which you took to be the proper meaning of them. Wherefore although I will not deny to our adversaries the praise of subtilty and diligence; I cannot give them that (which is much more praise-worthy) of discretion and sound judgment. For while they use their utmost industry to search all the most remote and Metaphorical senses of words, with a design to take off the genuine and proper meaning of them, they do not attend to the ill consequence that may be made of this to the overthrowing those things, the belief of which themselves make necessary to salvation. For by this way the whole Gospel may be made an Allegory, and the Resurrection of Christ be thought as metaphorical as the Redemption by his Death, and the force of all the Precepts of the Gospel avoided by some unusual signification of the words wherein they are delivered. So that nothing can be more unreasonable than such a method of proceeding, unless it be first sufficiently proved that the matter is not capable of the proper sense, and therefore of necessity the improper only is to be allowed. And this is that which *Socinus* seems after all his



his pains to pervert the meaning of the Places in controverſie, to rely on moſt ; viz. *That the Doctrine of ſatisfaction doth Socin. de  
imply an impoſſibility in the thing it ſelf, Servat.  
and therefore muſt needs be falſe ; nay, he Part. 2.  
ſaith the infallibility of the Revealer had Cap. 4.  
not been enough in this Caſe, ſuppoſing that  
Chriſt had ſaid it, and riſen from the dead,  
to declare his own Veracity ; unleſs he had  
delivered it by its proper cauſes and ef-  
fects, and ſo ſhewed the poſſibility of the  
thing it ſelf. And the reaſon, he ſaith,  
why they believe their Doctrine true, is  
not barely becauſe God hath ſaid it, but  
they believe certainly that God hath ſaid it,  
becauſe they know it to be true ; by know-  
ing the contrary Doctrine to be impoſſi-  
ble. The controverſie then, concerning  
the meaning of the places in diſpute is to  
be reſolved from the nature and reaſona-  
bleneſs of the matter contained in them :  
for if Socinus his reaſon be answerable to  
his confidence, if the account we give  
of the ſufferings of Chriſt, be repug-  
nant not only to the Juſtice, Goodneſs  
and Grace of God, but to the nature of  
the thing ; if it appear impoſſible, that  
mankind ſhould be redeemed in a proper  
ſenſe, or that God ſhould be propitiated  
by the Death of his Son as a Sacrifice  
for*

*Of the Sufferings*

for sin ; if it enervate all the Precepts of Obedience, and tend rather to justify sins than those who do repent of them ; I shall then agree, that no industry can be too great in searching Authors, comparing places, examining Versions, to find out such a sense as may be agreeable to the nature of things, the Attributes of God, and the design of Christian Religion. But if on the contrary, the Scripture doth plainly assert those things, from whence our Doctrine follows, and without which no reasonable account can be given either of the expressions used therein, or of the sufferings of Christ ; if Christs death did immediately respect God as a sacrifice, and was paid as a price for our redemption ; if such a design of his death be so far from being repugnant to the nature of God, that it highly manifests his Wisdom, Justice and Mercy ; if it assert nothing but what is so far from being impossible, that it is very reconcileable to the common principles of Reason, as well as the Free-Grace of God in the pardon of sin ; if, being truly understood, it is so far from enervating, that it advances highly all the purposes of Christian Religion, then it can be no less than a betraying  
one

one of the grand Truths of the Christian Doctrine, not to believe ours to be the true sense of the places in controversy. And this is that which I now take upon me to maintain.

II. For our clearer proceeding herein, nothing will be more necessary, than to understand the true *state of the Controversie*; which hath been rendred more obscure by the mistakes of some, who have managed it with greater zeal than judgment; who have asserted more than they needed to have done, and made our Adversaries assert much less than they do: And by this means have shot over their Adversaries heads, and laid their own more open to assaults. It is easie to observe, that most of *Socinus* his Arguments are levelled against an opinion, which few who have considered these things do maintain, and none need to think themselves obliged to do it; which is, That Christ paid a proper and rigid satisfaction for the sins of men, considered under the notion of debts, and that he paid the very same, which we ought to have done; which in the sense of the Law, is never called Satisfaction, but strict Payment. Against this, *Socinus* disputes from the impossibility of Christ's

The state  
of the Con-  
troverſie  
in general.

Christ's paying the very same that we were to have paid; because our penalty was Eternal Death, and that as the consequent of inherent guilt, which Christ neither did nor could undergo. Neither is it enough to say, *That Christ had undergone Eternal Death, unless he had been able to free himself from it*; for the admission of one to pay for another, who could discharge the debt in much less time than the offenders could, was not the same which the Law required. For that takes no notice of any other than the persons who had sinned; and if a *Mediator* could have paid the same, the Original Law must have been disjunctive; *viz.* That either the Offender must suffer, or another for him; but then the Gospel had not been the bringing in of a better *Covenant*, but a performance of the old. But if there be a relaxation or dispensation of the first Law; then it necessarily follows, that what Christ paid, was not the very same which the first Law required: for what need of that, when the very same was paid that was in the obligation? But if it be said, *That the Dignity of the person makes up what wanted in the kind or degree of punishment*; this is a plain confession that

that it is not the same, but something equivalent, which answers the ends of the Sanction, as much as the same would have done, which is the thing we contend for. Besides, if the very same had been paid in the strict sense, there would have followed a deliverance *ipso facto*; for the release immediately follows the payment of the same: and it had been injustice to have required any thing further, in order to the discharge of the Offender, when strict and full payment had been made of what was in the obligation. But we see that Faith and Repentance, and the consequences of those two, are made conditions on our parts, in order to the enjoying the benefit of what Christ hath procured: So that the release is not immediate upon the payment, but depends on a new contract, made in consideration of what Christ hath done and suffered for us. If it be said, *That by Christ's payment we become his, and he requires these conditions of us*; besides the contrariety of it to the Scriptures, which make the conditions to be required by him to whom the payment was made; we are to consider, that these very persons assert, that Christ paid all for us, and in our name and stead;

stead; so that the payment by Christ was by a substitution in our room; and if he paid the same which the Law required, the benefit must immediately accrue to those in whose name the debt was paid. For what was done in the name of another, is all one to the Creditor, as if it had been done by the Debtor himself. But above all things, it is impossible to reconcile the freeness of remission, with the full payment of the very same which was in the obligation. Neither will it serve to say, *That though it was not free to Christ, yet it was to us.* For the satisfaction and remission must respect the same person; for Christ did not pay for himself, but for us, neither could the remission be to him. Christ therefore is not considered in his own name, but as acting in our stead; so that what was free to him, must be to us; what was exactly paid by him, it is all one as if it had been done by us: so that it is impossible the same debt should be fully paid and freely forgiven. Much less will it avoid the difficulty in this case to say, *That it was a refusable payment:* for it being supposed to be the very same, it was not in justice refusable; and however not in equity, if it answer the intention

tention of the Law, as much as the suffering of the offenders had done; and the more it doth that, the less refusable it is. And although *God himself found out the way*, that doth not make the pardon free; but the designation of the person who was to pay the debt. Thus when our Adversaries dispute against this opinion, no wonder if they do it successfully; but this whole opinion is built upon a mistake, that satisfaction must be the payment of the very same; which while they contend for, they give our Adversaries too great an advantage, and make them think they triumph over the Faith of the Church, when they do it only over the mistake of some particular persons. But the foundation of this mistake, lies in the consideration of punishment, under the notion of *debts*, and that satisfaction therefore must be by strict payment in rigor of Law; but how great that mistake is, will appear in the subsequent discourse. But it cannot but be wondrous at, that the very same persons who consider sins, as debts which must be strictly satisfied for, do withal contend for the absolute necessity of this satisfaction: whereas *Socinus* his Arguments would hold good, *if sins were only*

C

confi-

*considered as debts, and God as the meer Creditor of punishment ; he might as freely part with his own right without satisfaction, as any Creditor may forgive what sum he pleases, to a person indebted to him ; and no reason can be brought to the contrary, from that notion of sins, why he may not do it. But if they be considered, with a respect to God's Government of the world, and the honour of his Laws, then some further account may be given, why it may not be consistent with that, to pass by the sins of men, without satisfaction made to them.*

Of the difference of debts and punishments.

III. And because the mistake in this matter, hath been the foundation of most of the subsequent mistakes on both sides, and the discovery of the cause of errors, doth far more to the cure of them, than any Arguments brought against them ; and withal, the true understanding of the whole Doctrine of satisfaction depends upon it, I shall endeavour to make clear the notion under which our sins are considered ; for upon that, depends the nature of the satisfaction which is to be made for them. For while our Adversaries suppose, that sins are to be looked on under the notion of debts in this debate, they assert it to be wholly free for  
God



God to remit them, without any satisfaction. They make the right of punishment meerly to depend on God's absolute Dominion; and that all satisfaction must be considered under the notion of compensation, for the injuries done to him, to whom it is to be made. But if we can clearly shew a considerable difference between the notion of debts and punishments, if the right of punishment doth not depend upon meer Dominion, and that satisfaction by way of punishment, is not primarily intended for compensation, but for other ends, we shall make not only the state of the Controversie much clearer, but offer something considerable towards the resolution of it. The way I shall take for the proof of the difference between debts and punishments, shall be using the other for the Arguments for it. For besides, that those things are just in matter of debts, which are not so in the case of punishments; as, that it is lawful for a man to forgive all the debts which are owing him by all persons, though they never so contumaciously refuse payment, but our Adversaries will not say so in the case of sins; for although they assert, That the justice of God doth never

*Non respicientibus veniam non concedere, id demum natura divinae, & decretis ejus & propterea re-  
stitudini & aequitati debi-  
tum est ac consentaneum.  
Socin. de Servat. l. 1. c. 1.  
Non respicientes penam non  
liberare tum per se aequi-  
tati est admodum consenta-  
neum, & positis quibusdam  
finibus quos Deus sibi in re-  
gendis hominibus praefixit  
factio necessarium. Crell. c.  
Grot. c. 2. sect. 29.*

ver require punishment in case of repentance, yet with-  
al they assert, That in case  
of impenitency, it is not only  
agreeable, but due to the na-  
ture and decrees; and there-  
fore to the rectitude and e-  
quity of God not to give par-  
don. But if this be true,  
then there is an apparent  
difference between the no-  
tion of debts and punish-  
ments; for the Impeniten-  
cy doth but add to the greatness of the  
debt: And will they say, it is only in  
God's power to remit small debts, but  
he must punish the greatest? what be-  
comes then of God's absolute liberty to  
part with his own right? will not this  
shew more of his kindness to pardon the  
greater, rather than lesser offenders? But  
if there be something in the nature of the  
thing, which makes it not only just, but  
necessary for impenitent sinners to be pu-  
nished, as *Crellius* after *Socinus* frequent-  
ly acknowledges, then it is plain, that  
sins are not to be considered meerly as  
debts, for that obstinacy and impeni-  
tency is only punished as a greater de-  
gree of sin, and therefore as a greater  
debt.

debt. And withal, those things are lawful in the remission of debts, which are unjust in the matter of punishments ; as it is lawful for a Creditor, when two persons are considered in equal circumstances, to remit one, and not the other ; nay, to remit the greater debt, without any satisfaction, and to exact the lesser to the greatest extremity ; but it is unjust in matter of punishments, where the reason and circumstances are the same, for a person who hath committed a crime of very dangerous consequence, to escape unpunished, and another who hath been guilty of far less to be severely executed. Besides these considerations, I say, I shall now prove the difference of debts and punishments, from those two things whereby things are best differentiated from each other ; viz. The different Reason, and the different End of them.

IV. (1.) *The different Reason of debts and punishments :* The reason of debts is dominion and property, and the obligation of them, depends upon voluntary contracts between parties ; but the reason of punishments is Justice and Government, and depends not upon meer contracts, but the relation the person stands in to that Authority to which

The reason of humane punishment is the publick interest.

he is accountable for his actions. For if the obligation to punishment, did depend upon meer contract, then none could justly be punished, but such who have consented to it by an antecedent contract : If it be said, *That a contract is implied, by their being in society with others* ; that is as much as I desire to make the difference appear, for in case of debts, the obligation depends upon the voluntary contract of the person ; but in case of punishments, the very relation to Government, and living under Laws doth imply it. And the right of punishment depends upon the obligation of Laws, where the reason of them holds, without any express contract, or superiority of one over another ; as in the case of violation of the Law of Nations, that gives right to another Nation to punish the infringers of it. Otherwise Wars could never be lawful between two Nations, and none could be warrantable, but those of a Prince against his rebellious subjects, who have broken the Laws themselves consented expressly to. Besides, in case of debts every man is bound to pay, whether he be call'd upon or no ; but in case of punishments, no man is bound  
to

to betray or accuse himself. For the obligation to payment in case of debt; ariseth from the injury sustained by that particular person, if another detains what is his own from him; but the obligation to punishment, arises from the injury, the Publick sustains by the impunity of crimes, of which the Magistrates are to take Care; who by the dispensing of punishments, do shew that to be true which *Grotius* asserts, that if there be any Creditor to be assigned in punishment, it is the publick good: Which appears by this, that all punishments are proportioned, according to the influence the offences have upon the publick interest; for the reason of punishment is not because a Law is broken, but because the breach of a Law tends to dissolve the community, by infringing the Authority of the Laws, and the honour of those who are to take care of them. For if we consider it, the measure of punishments is in a well ordered State, taken from the influence which crimes have upon the peace and interest of the community. No man questions, but that Malice, Pride and Avarice, are things really as bad as many faults, that are severely punished by humane

Laws, but the reason these are not punished is, because they do not so much injury to the publick interest, as Theft and Robbery do. Besides, in those things wherein the Laws of a Nation are concerned, the utmost rigor is not used in the preventing of crimes, or the execution of them when committed, if such an execution may endanger the publick more than the impunity of the offenders may do. And there are some things which are thought fit to be forbidden, where the utmost means are not used to prevent them; as Merchants are forbidden to steal customs, but they are not put under an Oath not to do it. And when penalties have been deserved, the execution of them hath been deferred, till it may be most for the advantage of the publick: as *Joab's* punishment till *Solomon's* Reign, though he deserved it as much in *David's*. So that the rule commonly talked of, *Fiat justitia & pereat mundus*, is a piece of Pedantry, rather than true Wisdom; for whatever penalty inflicted brings a far greater detriment to the publick, than the forbearance of it, is no piece of Justice to the State, but the contrary; the greatest Law, being the safety and preservation of

of the whole Body. By which it appears, that in humane Laws, the reason of punishment is not, that such an action is done, but because the impunity in doing it, may have a bad influence on the publick interest ; but in debts, the right of Restitution depends upon the injury received by a particular person, who looks at no more than the reparation of his loss by it.

V. We are now to consider, how far these things will hold in Divine Laws, and what the right of punishment doth result from there. For *Crellius*, the subtlest of our Adversaries, knowing of how great consequence the resolution of this is, in the whole Controversie of Satisfaction, vehemently contends, *That the right of punishment doth result from Gods absolute Dominion, and therefore he is to be considered as the offended party, and not as Governor in the right of inflicting punishment ; for which his first Argument is, That our obedience is due to Gods Law, on the account of his Dominion ; but when that is not performed, the penalty succeeds in its room, and therefore that doth belong to God on the same account : His other arguments are, from the compensation of injuries due to the offended party, and from*

The right  
of Divine  
punish-  
ment  
not meet  
Dominion.  
*Crell. Respons. ad  
Grot. cap.  
2. sect. 1.  
&c.*

*from Gods anger against sin, in which he is to be considered as the offended party :* These two latter will be answered under the next head ; the first I am to examine here. He therefore tells us, that the right of punishment belongs to God's Dominion, because the reason of his Government of mankind is, because he is the Lord of them. But, for our better understanding this, we are to consider, although the original right of Government doth result from God's Dominion ; for therefore our obedience is due, because of his Sovereignty over us ; yet when God takes upon him the notion of a Governour, he enters into a new relation with his creatures, distinct from the first as meer Lord. For he is equally Lord of all to whom he gives a being, but he doth not require obedience upon equal terms, nor governs them by the same Laws : Dominion is properly shewed in the exercise of power ; but when God gives Laws according to which he will reward and punish, he so far restrains the exercise of his Dominion to a subserviency to the ends of Government. If we should suppose, that God governs the world meerly by his Dominion, we must take away all rewards and punishments ;



ments ; for then the actions of men, would be the meer effects of irresistible power, and so not capable of rewards and punishments ; for there could be neither of these, where mens actions are capable of the differences of good and evil, and that they cannot be, if they be the acts of God's Dominion, and not of their own. But if he doth not exercise his full Dominion over rational creatures, it is apparent that he doth govern them under another notion than as meer Lord, and the reason of punishment is not to be taken from an absolute right which God doth not make use of, but from the ends and designs of Government, which are his own Honour, the Authority of his Laws, and the good of those whom he doth govern. And *Crellius* is greatly mistaken, when he makes *punishment to succeed in the place of the right of obedience* ; for it is only the desert of punishment, which follows upon the violation of that right ; and as we assert, that the right of obedience is derived from God's Sovereignty, so we deny not, but the desert of punishment is from the violation of it ; but withal we say, that the obligation to punishment depends upon the Laws, and God's right to inflict

fiſt puniſhment (Laws being ſuppoſed) is immediatly from that Government which he hath over mankind : For otherwiſe, if the whole right of puniſhment did ſtill depend upon God's Dominion, and the firſt right of Sovereignty, then all ſins muſt have equal puniſhments, becauſe they are all equal violations of the fundamental right of obedience; then it were at liberty for God to puniſh a greater ſin, with a leſs puniſhment; and a leſſer ſin, with a greater: And laſtly, this would make the puniſhment of ſin, a meer Arbitrary thing in God; for there would be no reaſon of puniſhment, but what depended upon God's meer will; whereas the reaſon of puniſhment in Scripture is drawn from a repugnancy of ſin to the divine purity and holineſs, and not meerly from God's power or will to puniſh; but if that were all the reaſon of it, there would be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing for the moſt vicious perſon to be rewarded, and the moſt pious to be made everlaſtingly miſerable. But who ever yet durſt ſay or think ſo? From whence it appears that the relation between ſin and puniſhment is no reſult of God's arbitrary will; but it is founded in the nature

nature of the things; so that as it is just God to punish offenders, so it would be ~~for~~ unjust to punish the most innocent person without any respect to sin. But if the right of punishment depends meerly on God's Dominion, I cannot understand why God may not punish when, and whom, and in what manner he pleaseth; without any impeachment of his Justice, and therefore it is to be wonder'd at, that the same persons who assert the right of punishment to be meerly in God's Dominion, should yet cry out of the injustice of one person being punished for anothers faults; for why may not God exercise his Dominion in this case? yes, say they, *he may his dominion, but he cannot punish, because punishment supposes guilt, and cannot be just without it*; how far that reaches, will be examined afterwards; at present, we take notice of the contradiction to themselves which our Adversaries are guilty of, that they may serve their own *hypothesis*, for when we dispute with them, against absolute remission without satisfaction, then they contend that the right of punishment is a meer act of Dominion, and God may part with his right, if he please; but when they dispute with

us against the translation of punishment from one to another, then they no longer say that the right of punishment is an act of Dominion, but that it is a necessary consequent of inherent guilt, and cannot be removed from one to another. And then they utterly deny that punishment is of the nature of debts; for one mans money, they say, may become another, but one mans punishment cannot become another: Thus they give and take, deny, and grant, as it serves for their present purposes.

*Soc. de Ser-*  
*vat. l. 3.*  
*c. 3. Pra-*  
*let. c. 18.*

1. The end  
of punish-  
ments not  
bare com-  
pensation  
as it is in  
debts.

VI. (2.) The different and of debts and punishments, make it appear that there is a difference in the nature of them; for the intention of the obligation to payment in case of debt, is the compensation of the damage which the Creditor sustains; but the intention of punishment, is not bare compensation, but it is designed for greater and further ends. For which we are to consider the different nature of punishments, as they are inflicted by way of reparation of some injury done to private persons, and as they do respect the publick good. I grant, that private persons in case of injuries, seek for compensation of the damage they sustain, and so far they bear

bear the nature of debts; but if we con-  
 sider them as inflicted by those who  
 have a care of the publick, though they  
 are to see that no private person suffers  
 injury by another; yet the reason of  
 that is not meerly that he might enjoy  
 his own, but because the doing injuries  
 to others tends to the subversion of the  
 ends of Government. Therefore, I can  
 by no means admit that Position of *Crel-  
 lius*, that a Magistrate only punishes as he  
 assumes the person of the particular men  
 who have received injuries from others;  
 for he aims at other ends than meerly  
 the compensation of those injured per-  
 sons. Their great end is according to  
 the old Roman Formula, *ne quid Resp.  
 detrimenti capiat*; the reason of exact-  
 ing penalties upon private men is still  
 with a regard to the publick safety.  
 Supposing men in a state of nature no  
 punishment is due to the injured person,  
 but restitution of damage, and compen-  
 sation of the loss that accrues to him by  
 the injury sustained; and whatever goes  
 beyond this, is the effect of Govern-  
 ment, which constitutes penalties for  
 preservation of the Society which is un-  
 der Laws. But herein *Crellius* is our ad-  
 versary, but with no advantage at all to  
 his

*Crell. c.  
 Groc. cap.  
 2. Sect. 2.  
 p. 147. Sect.  
 17. p. 162.*

his Cause; for he offers to prove against Grotius, *that something more is due by an injury beyond bare compensation for what the other is supposed to lose by the right of nature*; for saith he, *in every injury there is not only the real damage which the person sustains, but there is a contempt of the person implied in it, for which as well as the former, he ought to have compensation.* To which I answer, 1. That this doth not prove what he designs, *viz.* that punishment doth belong to the injured person in a state of Nature, beyond bare restitution, but that it is necessary, that men should not continue in such a state, that so they may be vindicated from that contempt, and others compelled to restitution. Both which, as they are punishments, are not in the power of the offended party as such, but shew that it is very reasonable there should be Laws and Governours, that private persons may be preserved in their just rights, and offenders punished for the vindication not only of their honour, but of the Laws too. And Laws being established, the injured person hath right to no more, than the compensation of his loss; for that being forced upon the offending party, is a sufficient vindication

tion of his honour. 2. If the contempt of a private person makes a compensation necessary, how much more will this hold in a publick Magistrate; whose contempt by disobedience is of far worse consequence than that of a private person.

And by this argument *Crellius* overthrows his main *hypothesis*, viz. that God may pardon sin without satisfaction; for if it be not only necessary, that the loss be compensated but the dishonour too; then so much greater as the dishonour is; so much higher as the person is; so much more beneficial to the world as his Laws are; so much more necessary is it that in order to pardon there must be a satisfaction made to him, for the affronts he hath received from men.

And if the greatness of the injury be to be measured as *Crellius* asserts, from the worth and value of the thing, from the dignity and honour of the person, from the duplicency of the fact to him, which he makes the measure of punishment; this makes it still far more reasonable, that God should have satisfaction for the sins of men, than that men should have for the injuries done them by one another; especially considering what the same Author doth assert afterwards, that it is sometime repugnant

*Crell. c. Gret. cap 2. p. 174.*

*Seff. 29. p. 198.*

to justice, for one to part with his own right in case of injuries, and that either from the nature and circumstances of the things themselves, or a decree or determination to the contrary: for the first he instanceth in case of *notorious defamation*; in which he saith, it is a dishonest and unlawful thing for a man, not to make use of his own right for his vindication: and for the other, in case of *great obstinacy and malice*. By both which, it is most apparent, that *Crellius* puts a mighty difference between the nature of debts, and punishments, since in all cases he allows it lawful for a person free, to remit his debts; but in some cases he makes it utterly unlawful for a person not to make use of his right for punishment. And withal if a private person may not part with his own right in such cases, how unreasonable is it not to assert the same of the great Governour of the world? and that there may be a necessity for him upon supposition of the contempt of himself and his Laws, to vindicate himself and his honour to the world, by some remarkable testimony of his severity against sin.



VII. But *Crellius* yet urgeth another end of punishment, which though the most unreasonable of all others, yet sufficiently proves from himself the difference of debts and punishments, which is, *the delight which the injured person takes in seeing the offender punished*. This he so much insists upon, as though he made it the most natural end of punishment; for saith he, *among the Punishments which a Prince or any other free Person can inflict, revenge is in the first place, and the more there is of that in any thing, the more properly it is called a punishment*; and he tells what he means by this *ultio*; viz. *solatium ex alieno dolore, the contentment taken in anothers pain*. But saith he, *no man must object, that this is a thing evil in it self; for although it be forbidden us under the New Testament, yet in it self it is not unlawful for one that hath suffered pain from another to seek for the ease of his own pain, by the miseries of him that injured him: and for this purpose, saith he, we have the Passion of Anger in us, which being a desire of returning injuries, is then satisfied when it apprehends it done*. But how absurd and unreasonable this doctrine is, will be easily discovered, for this would make the primary intend-

Of *Crellius*  
his great  
mistake a-  
bout the  
end of pu-  
nishments.  
*Crell. cap.*  
*2. sect. 2.*  
*sect. 28.*

P. 191.

ment of punishment to be the evil of him that suffers it. Whereas the right of punishment is derived from an injury received, and therefore that which gives that right, is some damage sustained, the reparation of which is the first thing designed by the offended party : Though it take not up the whole nature of punishment. And on this account no man can justly propose any end to himself in anothers evil, but what comes under the notion of restitution. For the evil of another is only intended in punishment as it respects the good of him for whose sake that evil is undergone. When that good may be obtained without anothers evil, the desire of it is unjust and unreasonable : and therefore all that contentment that any one takes in the evil another undergoes, as it is evil to him, is a thing repugnant to humane nature, and which all persons condemn in others when they allow themselves in it. It will be hard for *Crellius* to make any difference between this end of punishment which he assigns, and the greatest cruelty ; for what can that be worse than taking delight in making others miserable, and seeing them so when he hath made them. If it be replied, *that*  
cruelty

*cruelty is without any cause, but here a just cause is supposed*: I answer, a just cause is only supposed for the punishment, but there can be no just cause for any to delight in the miseries of others, and to comfort themselves by inflicting or beholding them. For the evil of another is never intended, but when it is the only means left for compensation; and he must be guilty of great inhumanity, who desires anothers evil any further than that tends to his own good, *i. e.* the reparation of the damage sustained; which if it may be had without anothers evil, then that comes not by the right of nature within the reason of punishment; and consequently where it doth not serve for that end, the comfort that men take in it is no part of justice, but cruelty. For there can be no reason at all assigned for it; for that *lenimentum doloris* which *Crellius* insists on is meerly imaginary, and no other than the Dog hath in gnawing the stone that is thrown at him; and for all that I know, that propension in nature to the retribution of evil for evil any further than it tends to our security, and the preservation for the future, is one of the most unreasonable Passions in humane Nature.

Of the nature of anger and revenge in men, and whether punishments are designed to satisfy them.

VIII. And if we examine the nature of *Anger*, either considered Naturally or Morally, the intention of it is, not the returning evil to another, for the evil received, but the security and preservation of our selves; which we should not have so great a care of, unless we had a quick sense of injuries, and our blood were apt to be heated at the apprehension of them. But when this passion vents it self, in doing others injury to alleviate its own grief, it is a violent and unreasonable perturbation; but being governed by reason, it aims at no more, than the great end of our beings; *viz.* Self-Preservation. But when that cannot be obtained without anothers evil, so far the intendment of it is lawful, but no further. And I cannot therefore think those Philosophers, who have defined Anger to be *ἔργος ἀνιδιαιτησίας*, by whose Authority *Crellius* defends himself, when he makes anger to be *a desire of revenge*, did thoroughly consider what was just and reasonable in it, but barely what was natural, and would be the effect of that passion, if not governed by reason. For otherwise *Jul. Scaliger's* definition is much more true and justifiable, that it is *appetitus depulsionis*; *viz.* that whereby we are

*Crell. c. 2.  
sect. 22.  
p. 177.*

*Exerc. 313.*

are stirred up to drive away from us, any thing that is injurious to us. But because *Crellius* alledgeth a saying of *Seneca*, that would make *vindicta* of the nature of punishment, *duabus de causis punire princeps solet, si aut se vindicet aut alium*: We shall oppose to this the sense of the same Author in this matter, which may sufficiently clear the other passage: For, saith he, *Inhumanum verbum est, & quidem pro justo receptum, ultio, & à contumelia non differt nisi ordine: qui dolorem regerit, tantum excusatus peccat*. And no man speaks with greater vehemency against the delight in others punishments than he doth; for he always asserts, the only reason of punishment, to be some advantage which is to come by it, and not meerly to satisfie anger, or to allay their own griefs, by seeing anothers: For, saith he, the punishment is inflicted, *Non quia delectetur ullius pœna (procul est enim à sapiente tam inhumana feritas) sed ut documentum omnium sint*: So that it is only the usefulness of punishment according to him, which makes it become any wise man; and so far from a satisfaction of his grief by anothers punishment, that he makes that a piece of inhumanity, not inci-

*Seneca de Clem. l. 1. c. 20.*

*De Irâ, l. 2. c. 32.*

*De Irâ l. 1. c. 6.*

De Irâ, l. 1.

c. 9.

Cap. 12.

Cap. 13.

dent to any who pretend to wisdom. Nay, he denies, that a just punishment doth flow from *Anger*; for he that inflicts that, doth it *non ipsius pœnæ avidus, sed quia oportet*, not as desiring the punishment, but because there are great reasons for it: And elsewhere, *Exsequar quia oportet, non quia dolet*: he is far enough then from approving, that imaginary compensation of one mans grief by anothers. And he shews at large, that the weakest natures, and the least guided by reason, are the most subject to this anger and revenge. And although other things be pretended, the general cause of it is, a great infirmity of humane nature; and thence it is, that children and old men, and sick persons, are the most subject to it; and the better any are, the more they are freed from it:

——quippe minuti

*Semper & infirmi est animi, exiguique voluptas*

*Ultio*——

De Clem.

l. 2. c. 4.

He makes *Cruelty* to be nothing else, but the intemperance of the mind in exacting punishment; and the difference between

tween a Prince and a Tyrant to lie in this, *That one delights in punishing, the other never does it but in case of necessity*, when the publick good requires it. And this throughout his discourse, he makes the measure of punishment. Who then could imagine, that he should speak so contradictory to himself, as to allow punishment for meer revenge, or the easing ones own griefs, by the pains of another? In the places cited by *Crellius*, (if taken in his sense) he speaks what commonly is, not what ought to be in the world; for he disputes against it in that very place, therefore that cannot be the meaning which he contends for. *The common design of punishments by a Prince*, saith he, *is either to vindicate himself or others*. I so render his words, because *vindicare*, when it is joyned with the person injured, as here, *vindicare se aut alium*, doth properly relate to the end of punishment, which is asserting the right of the injured person; but when it is joyned with the persons who have done the injury, or the crimes whereby they did it, then it properly signifies to punish. Thus *Salust* useth, *Vindicatum in eos*; and *Cicero*, *In milites nostros vehementer vindicatum*, and for the fact ve-

*De Clem.*  
*l. i. c. 11, 12.*

*Salust. in*  
*Catalin.*  
*Cicero. 7. v.*

ry

ry frequently in him, *maleficia vindicare*; but when it relates to the injured person, as here it doth, it cannot signifie meerly to punish; for then *se vindicare* would be to punish ones self, but to assert his own right in case of injury, though it be with the punishment of another: For *Vindicatio*, as *Cicero* defines it, *est per quam vis & injuria & omnino quod obfuturum est defendendo aut ulciscendo propulsatur*. So that the security of our selves in case of force or injury, is that which is called *Vindication*; which sometimes may be done by defence, and othertimes by punishment. And that *Seneca* doth mean no more here, is apparent by what follows; for in case of private injuries, he saith, *pœnam si tutò poterit donet*, he would have the Prince forgive the punishment, if it may be done with safety; so that he would not have any one punished, to satisfie anothers desire of revenge, but to preserve his own safety: And afterwards he saith, *It is much beneath a Princes condition, to need that satisfaction which arises from anothers sufferings*: But for the punishments of others, he saith, *The Law hath established three ends, the amendment of the persons, or making others better by their punish-*

*Cicero de Invent. 2.*

*De Irâ, l. 1. c. 21.*



punishments, or the publick security, by taking away such evil members out of the body: So that in publick punishments, he never so much as supposes, that contentment which revenge fancies in others \* punishments, but makes them wholly designed for the publick advantage. For the Laws in punishment do not look backward but forward; for as \* Plato saith, No wise man ever punished, meerly because men had offended, but lest they should: For past things cannot be recalled, but future are therefore forbidden, that they may be prevented. So to the same purpose is the saying of Lactantius, produced by Grotius, *Surgimus ad vindictam non quia læsi sumus, sed ut disciplina servetur, mores corrigantur, licentia comprimatur: hæc est Ira justa.* To which Cressius answers, That this signifies nothing, unless it can be proved, that no man may justly punish another, meerly because he is wronged. If he means of the right to punish, we deny not that to be, because the person is wronged; but if he understands it of the design and end of punishment, then we deny, that it is an allowable end of punishments, any further than it can come under the notion of restitution, of which we have spoken already. When

\* Non praeterita sed futura intuebitur; nam ut Plato ait, nemo prudens punit quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur.  
Sen. de Ira, l. 1. c. 16.  
La t. de ira  
Dei. c. 17.

Cap. 2. sect. 13.

*a Master (which is the instance he produceth) punisheth his servants, because they have disobeyed him :* The reason of that punishment, is not the bare disobedience, but the injury which comes to him by it ; the reparation of which he seeks by punishment, either as to his authority, security or profit. But he adds, *That where punishment is designed, for preservation of discipline, and amendment of manners, and keeping persons in order, (which are the ends mentioned by Lactantius) it is where the interest of the persons lies, in the preservation of these, and is therefore offended at the neglect of them.* To which I answer, That the interest of such a one, is not barely the interest of an offended party, as such, but the interest of a Governour ; and nobody denies, but such a one may be an offended party : but the question is, Whether the design of punishment be meerly to satisfy him as the offended party, or to answer the ends of Government ? For *Crellius* hath already told us, what it is to satisfy one as an offended party, that is, to ease himself by the punishment of others ; but what ever is designed for the great ends of Government, is not to be considered under that notion,

notion, although the Governour may be  
 justly offended at the neglect of them.  
 And there is this considerable difference  
 between the punishment made to an of-  
 fended party, as such, and that which  
 is for the ends of Government; that the  
 former is a satisfaction to *Anger*, and  
 the latter to Laws and the publick inte-  
 rest. For *Crellius* disputes much for the  
 right of Anger in exacting punishments; *Cap. 2. sect.*  
*the satisfaction of which, in case of real* *1. P. 143.*  
*injury, he never makes unlawful, but in* *Sect. 13.*  
*case that it be prohibited us by one, whose* *p. 161.*  
*power is above our own: nay he makes it*  
*otherwise the primary end of punishment.*  
 So that *anger* is the main thing upon  
 these terms to be respected in punish-  
 ment: but where it is designed for the  
 ends before-mentioned, there is no ne-  
 cessity of any such passion as anger to  
 be satisfied, the ends of punishment may  
 be attained wholly without it: And pub- *Sen. de ira,*  
 lick punishment, according to *Seneca,* *l. 1. c. 14. &*  
*non ira sed ratio est,* is no effect of an- *15.*  
 ger, but reason; for, saith he, *nihil mi-*  
*nus quam irasci punientem decet:* nothing  
 less becomes one that punisheth, than  
 anger doth; for all punishments be-  
 ing considered as Medicines, no man  
 ought to give Physick in anger, or to  
 let

Cap. 16.

let himself blood in a fury : *A Magistrate*, saith he, *when he goes to punish, ought to appear only vultu legis quæ non irascitur, sed constituit*, with the countenance of the Law, which appoints punishments without passion : The reason of which is, because the Law aims not primarily at the evil of the man that suffers punishment, but at the good which comes to the publick by such sufferings. For the first design of the Law was to prevent any evil being done, and punishment coming in by way of Sanction to the force of the Law, must have the same primary end which the Law it self had ; which is not to satisfy barely the offended party for the breach, any further than that satisfaction tends to the security of the Law, and preventing the violation of it for the future. The substance of what I have said upon this subject, may be thus briefly comprized, That antecedently to Laws, the offended party hath right to no more than bare reparation of the damage sustained by the injury ; that the proper notion of punishment is consequent to Laws, and the inflicting of it is an act of Government, which is not designed for meer satisfaction of the anger of the injured person,

person, but for the publick good, which lies in preserving the authority of the Laws, the preventing all injuries by the security of mens just rights, and the vindication of the dignity and honour of him, who is to take care of the publick good. For these *Crellius* himself acknowledgeth, to be the just ends of punishments, only he would have the satisfaction a man takes in anothers evil, to come in the first place; wherein how much he is mistaken, I hope we have already manifested. Because the proper nature of punishment depending upon Laws, the Laws do not primarily design the benefit of private persons (supposing that were so) but the advantage of that community which they are made for.

*Quibus (sc. solatio & securitati) addi possint honoris ac dignitatis, per injuriam violata, & aliqua ratione imminuta vindicta, assertioque juris nostri.*  
Crel. cap. 2. sect. 28. p. 191.

IX. And in those cases wherein the Magistrate doth right to particular persons in the punishment of those who have injured them, he doth it not as taking their person upon him, for he aims at other things than they do; they look at a bare compensation for the injury received; but the Magistrate at the ill consequence the impunity of injuries may be of to the publick: they, it may be at the

The Interest of the Magistrate in punishment distinct from that of private persons.

the satisfaction of their displeasure; but he at the satisfaction of the Laws; they at their own private damage; he at the violation of the publick peace. And from hence among those Nations who valued all crimes at a certain rate, in matters of injury between man and man, the injured person was not only to receive compensation for his wrong; but a considerable fine was to be paid to the Exchequer for the violation of the publick peace. Thus *Tacitus* observes among the old Germans, *Grotius* of the old Gothick Laws, and from them (as most of our modern Laws and Customs are derived) *Lindenbrogius* of the *Salick*, *Alemannick*, *Lombardick*, *Spelman* of the *Saxon*, who tells us in case of murder there were three payments, one to the Kindred, which was called *Megbote*; the second to the Lord, called *Manbote*, the third to the King, called *Freda*, from the German *Frid*, which signifies peace, it being the consideration paid to the King for the breach of the publick peace. And this, saith he, in all actions, was anciently paid to the King, because the peace was supposed to be broken, not by meer force, but by any injuries; and if the action was unjust, the Plaintiff paid it; if just, the defendant. And the

*De morib.*  
*German.*  
 c. 12.  
*Grot. de leg.*  
*Goth. in*  
*Proleg. ad*  
*hist. Goth.*  
 p. 67. *Lindenbrog.*  
*Gloss. ad*  
*Cod. Leg.*  
*Antiq. v.*  
*Freda. Spelman.*  
*Gloss.*  
 v. *Freda.*

the measure of it, saith *Bignoni*us, was the tenth part of the value of the thing as *Bignon. not in Maccul phi form. cap. 20.* estimated by Law which by the Customs of the ancient *Romans* was deposited at the commencing of a suit by both, and only taken up again by him who overcame; and was by them called *Sacramentum*, as *Varro* tells us. And the same custom was observed among the Greeks too, as appears by *Julius Pollux*, who tells us it was called *πενταβολή* among them, and in publick actions was the fifth part, in private the tenth. But that which was paid to the publick in case of murder, was among the Greeks called *ποινή*, the same with *pæna*, for *Hesychius* tells us that is *ἀντίτισις ἢ ὑπὲρ τῶν δεδομένην*, and to the same purpose the Scholiast on *Homer* on those words, *Iliad. ἰκίωκα ποινῆς Ἀνδρὸς ἀπορθιμένε*, by which the Original of the name *pæna*, comes from a payment made to the publick, according to that known rule, *interest reip. delicta puniri*, that persons may see how much the publick safety is concerned, that crimes be punished. From which and many other things which might be insisted on, *Crellius* his Hypothesis will appear to be false, viz. that when the Magistrate doth judge in the affairs of particular

cular men, he doth it only as assuming the person of those men; whereas it appears from the reason of the thing, and the Custom of Nations, that the interest of the Magistrate is considered as distinct from that of private persons, when he doth most appear in vindication of injuries. But all this is managed with a respect to the grand hypothesis, viz. that the right of punishing doth belong only to the offended party as such, that the punishment is of the nature of debts, and the satisfaction by compensation to the anger of him who is offended. The fallacy of which this discourse was designed to discover.

Having thus considered the nature of punishments among men, we come more closely to our matter, by examining how far this will hold in the punishments which God inflicts on the account of sin. For which two things must be enquired into, 1. In what sense we attribute anger to God. 2. What are the great ends of those punishments God inflicts on men on the account of sin.

Of the nature of Anger in God; the satisfaction to be made to it.

X. For the first, though our Adversaries are very unwilling to allow the term of *punitive justice*, yet they contend for a *punitive anger* in God, and that



that in the worst sense as it is *appetitus vindictæ*: for after *Crellius* hath con-<sup>*Crell. cap. sect. 1. p. 145. p. 177.*</sup>tended that this is the proper notion of anger in general; neither ought any one to say, he adds, that anger as other passions is attributed improperly to God; for setting aside the imperfections, which those passions are subject to in us, all the rest is to be attributed to him; taking away then that perturbation, and pain, and grief we find in our selves in anger, to which the abhorrency of sin answers in God, all the rest doth agree to him. I would he had a little more plainly told us what he means by all the rest, but we are to guess at his meaning by what went before, where he allows of *Cicero*, and *Aristotle's* definition of Anger, whereof the one is, that it is *libido*, or (as *Crellius* would rather have it,) *cupiditas puniendi*, the other <sup>*Cicer. Tul. cul. 4. Arist. Rhet. 1. 2. c. 2.*</sup>*ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας*, &c. and himself calls it *pænæ appetitio*, and in another place, that it may be as properly defined *cupiditas vindictæ* as *cupiditas pænæ* or *affectus vindicandi*, as well as *puniendi*: <sup>*Crell. c. 2. sect. 22. p. 177.*</sup>in all which places, he doth assert such an anger in God as supposes such a motion, or desire, or inclination to punish sin when it is committed, as there is in us when an injury is done us, on-

ly the perturbation and pain excluded. But he hath not thought fit to explain how such new motions or inclinations in the divine nature every time sin is committed, are consistent with the immutability and perfection of it; nor what such a kind of desire to punish in God imports, whether a meer inclination without the effect, or an inclination with the effect following: if *without the effect*, then either because the sin was not great enough, or Gods honour was not concerned to do it, and in this case the same reasons which make the effect not to follow, make the desire of it inconsistent with the divine wisdom and perfection: or else because the effect is hindred by the repentance of the person, or some other way which may make it not necessary to do it; then upon the same reason the effect is suspended, the inclination to do it should be so too; for that must be supposed to be governed by an eternal reason and counsel as well as his actions; unless some natural passions in *God* be supposed antecedent to his own wisdom and counsel, which is derogatory to the infinite perfection of God, since those are judged imperfections in our selves: if it be taken only  
*with*

with the effect following it, then God can never be said to be angry but when he doth punish, whereas his *wrath is said to be kindled* in Scripture, where the effect hath not followed; which if it implies any more than the high provocation of God to punish (as I suppose it doth not) then this inclination to punish is to be conceived distinct from the effect following it. But that conception of *anger in God* seems most agreeable to the divine nature, as well as to the *Scriptures*, which makes it either *the punishment it self*, as *Crellius* elsewhere acknowledges it is often taken so; or *God's declaration of his will to punish*, which is called *the revelation of the wrath of God against all unrighteousness of men*, God thereby discovering the just displeasure he hath against sin; or *the great provocation of God to punish*, by the sins of men; as when *his wrath is said, to be kindled, &c.* By this sense we may easily reconcile all that the Scripture saith concerning the *wrath of God*; we make it agreeable to infinite perfection, we make no such alterations in God, as the appeasing of his anger must imply, if that imply any kind of commotion in him. And thus the grand difficulty of *Crellius*

*Crell. de ve-  
rà Relig. l.  
1. c. 30.*

*Crell. cap. 7.  
sect. 3.  
p. 350.*

pears to be none at all, against all those passages of Scripture which speak of *appeasing God*, of *atonement*, and *reconciliation*, viz. *that if they prove satisfaction, they must prove that God being actually angry with mankind before the sufferings of his Son, he must be presently appeased upon his undergoing them.* For no more need to be said, than that God being justly provoked to punish the sins of mankind, was pleased to accept of the sufferings of his Son, as a sufficient sacrifice of Atonement for the sins of the world, on consideration of which he was pleased to offer those terms of pardon, which upon mens performance of the conditions required on their part, shall be sufficient to discharge them from that obligation to punishment which they were under by their sins. And what absurdity, or incongruity there is in this to any principle of reason, I cannot imagine. But our Adversaries first make opinions for us, and then shew they are unreasonable. They first suppose that anger in God is to be considered as a passion, and that passion a desire of revenge for satisfaction of it; and then tell us, that if we do not prove, that this desire of revenge can be satisfied

fied by the sufferings of Christ, then we can never prove the doctrine of satisfaction to be true; whereas we do not mean by God's anger any such passion, but the just declaration of God's will to punish upon our provocation of him by our sins; we do not make the design of satisfaction to be, that God may please himself in the revenging the sins of the guilty upon the most innocent person; because we make the design of punishment, not to be the satisfaction of anger as a desire of revenge, but to be the vindication of the honour and rights of the injured person, by such a way as himself shall judge most satisfactory to the ends of his Government.

XI. (2.) Which is the next thing we are to clear: For which end we shall make use of the Concession of *Crellius*, *That God hath prefixed some ends to himself in the Government of mankind; which being supposed, it is necessary, that impatient sinners should be punished.* What these ends of God are, he before tells us, when he enquires into the ends of Divine punishments, which he makes to be, *security for the future, by mens avoiding sins, and a kind ἡδονία, or pleasure which God takes in the destruction of his*

Of the  
ends of  
divine  
punish-  
ments.  
*Crell. c. 2.  
sect. 29.  
p. 129.*

P. 195.

*implacable enemies, and the asserting and vindicating his own right by punishing, and shewing men thereby, with what care and fear they ought to serve him; and so attains the ends of punishment proposed by Lactantius, and manifestation of the Divine Honour and Majesty, which hath been violated by the sins of men.* All these we accept of, we this caution, That the delight which God takes in the punishing his implacable enemies, be not understood of any pleasure in their misery, as such, by way of meer revenge; but as it tends to the vindication of his Right, and Honour, and Majesty; which is an end suitable to the Divine Nature: but the other cannot in it self have the notion of an end; for an end doth suppose something desirable for it self; which surely the miseries of others cannot have to us, much less to the Divine Nature. And that place which *Crellius* insists on to prove the contrary, *Deut. 28. 63. The Lord will rejoyce over you, to destroy you*; imports no more, than the satisfaction God takes in the execution of his Justice, when it makes most for his honor, as certainly it doth in the punishment of his greatest enemies. And this is to understood in a sense agreeable to those  
other

other places, where God is said *not to delight in the death of sinners*; which doth not (as *Crellius* would have it) meerly express *God's benignity and mercy*, but such an agreeableness of the exercise of those attributes to God's nature, that he neither doth nor can delight in the miseries of his creatures in themselves, but as they are subservient to the ends of his Government; and yet such is his kindness in that respect too, that he useth all means agreeable thereto, to make them avoid being miserable, to advance his own glory. And I cannot but wonder that *Grotius*, who had asserted the contrary in his Book of *Satisfaction*, should in his Books *De Jure ac pacis*, assert, *That when God punisheth wicked men, he doth it for no other end, but that he might punish them*: For which he makes use of no other arguments, than those which *Crellius* had objected against him; viz. *The delight God takes in punishing, and the judgments of the life to come, when no amendment can be expected*; the former hath been already answered, the latter is objected by *Crellius* against him, when he makes the ends of punishment, meerly to respect the community, which cannot be asserted of the punishments

Ezek. 18.  
v. 23, 32.  
c. 33. 11.

*Grot. de satisfact. c. 2.  
p. 43. Ed.  
1617.  
Grot. de jure belli, &c.  
l. 2. c. 20.  
sect. 4.*

ments of another Life, which must chiefly respect the vindication of God's glory, in the punishment of unreclaimable sinners. And this we do not deny to be a just punishment, since our Adversaries themselves, as well as we, make it necessary. But we are not to understand, that the end of Divine punishments doth so respect the community, as though God himself were to be excluded out of it; for we are so to understand it, as made up of God as the Governour, and mankind as the persons governed, whatever then tends to the vindication of the rights of God's Honour and Sovereignty, tends to the good of the whole, because the manifestation of that end is so great an end of the whole.

The ends of Divine punishments different in this and the future state.

XII. But withal, though we assert in the life to come, the ends of punishment not to be the reclaiming of sinners, who had never undergone them, unless they had been unreclaimable; yet a vast difference must be made between the ends of punishments in that, and in this present state. For the other is the *Reserve*, when nothing else will do, and therefore was not primarily intended; but the proper ends of punishment, as a part of Government, are



are to be taken from the design of them in this life. And here we assert, that God's end in punishing, is the advancing his Honour, not by the meer miseries of his creatures, but that men by beholding his severity against sin, should break off the practice of it, that they may escape the punishments of the future state. So that the ends of punishment here, are quite of another kind, from those of another life ; for those are inflicted, because persons have been unreclaimable by either the mercies or punishments of this life ; but these are intended, that men should so far take notice of this severity of God, as to avoid the sins which will expose them to the wrath to come. And from hence it follows, That whatsoever sufferings, do answer all these ends of Divine punishments, and are inflicted on the account of sin, have the proper notion of punishments in them, and God may accept of the undergoing them as a full *satisfaction* to his Law, if they be such as tend to break men off from sin, and assert God's right, and vindicate his Honour to the world ; which are the ends assigned by *Crellius*, and will be of great consequence to us in the following Discourse.

## C H A P. II.

- I. *The particular state of the Controversie, concerning the sufferings of Christ. The Concessions of our Adversaries.*
- II. *The debate reduced to two heads: The first concerning Christ's sufferings, being a punishment for sin, entred upon. In what sense Crellius acknowledgeth the sins of men, to have been the impulsive cause of the death of Christ.*
- III. *The sufferings of Christ proved to be a punishment, from Scripture. The importance of the phrase of bearing sins.*
- IV. *Of the Scape-Goats bearing the sins of the people into the Wilderness.*
- V. *Grotius his sense of, 1 Pet. 2. 24. vindicated against Crellius and himself. Ἀναπέμειν never used for the taking away a thing by the destruction of it.*
- VI. *Crellius his sense examined.*
- VII. *Isa. 53. 11. vindicated. The argument from Matt. 8. 17. answered. Grotius constant to himself in his notes on that place.*
- VIII. *Isa. 53. 5, 6, 7. cleared.*
- IX. *Whether Christ's death be a proper παρόδευμα, and whether that doth imply, that it was a punishment of sin? How far*

far the punishments of Children for their Fathers faults, are exemplary among men. The distinction of calamities and punishments, holds not here. X. That God's hatred of sin could not be seen in the sufferings of Christ, unless they were a punishment of sin, proved against Crellius. XI. Grotius his Arguments from Christ being made sin and a curse for us, defended. The liberty our Adversaries take in Changing the sense of Words. XII. The particles *διὰ, ὧν, καὶ*, being joyned to sins and relating to sufferings do imply those sufferings to be a punishment for sin. According to their way of interpreting Scripture, it had been impossible for our doctrine to be clearly expressed therein.

I. **T**H E S E things being thus far cleared concerning the nature and ends of punishments, and how far they are of the nature of debts, and consequently what kind of satisfaction is due for them, the resolution of the grand Question concerning the sufferings of Christ will appear much more ease; but that we may proceed with all possible clearness in a debate of this consequence, we must yet a little

The particular state of the controversy concerning the sufferings of Christ for us.

little more narrowly examine the difference between our Adversaries and us in this matter; for their concessions are in terms sometimes so fair, as though the difference were meerly about words without any considerable difference in the thing it self. If we charge them with denying satisfaction, *Crellius* answers in the name of them, *that we do it unjustly; for they do acknowledge a satisfaction worthy of God, and agreeable to the Scriptures.* If we charge them with denying that our salvation is obtained by the death of Christ, they assert the contrary, as appears by the same Author. Nay, *Ruarus* attributes merit to the death of Christ too. They acknowledge, *that Christ dyed for us, nay, that there was a commutation between Christ and us, both of one person for another, and of a price for a person; and that the death of Christ may be said to move God to redeem us; they acknowledge reconciliation, and expiation of sins to be by the death of Christ.* Nay, they assert, *that Christ's death was by reason of our sins, and that God designed by that to shew his severity against sin.* And what could we desire more, if they meant the same thing by these words, which we do? They assert a *satisfaction*, but

*Crell. pref.*  
p. 7.

*Ruarus in*  
*Epistol.*

*Crell cap. 9.*

*sect. 2.*

*Cap. 10.*

*sect. 10.*

*Cap. 7, 8,*

*&c.*

*Cap. 1. sect.*

57.

but it is such a one as is *meerly fulfilling the desire of another*; in which sense all that obey God may be said to satisfy him. They attribute our salvation to the death of Christ, but only *as a condition intervening*, upon the performance of which the Covenant was confirmed, and himself taken into Glory, that he might free men from the punishment of their sins. They attribute *merit* to Christ's death but in the same sense that *we may merit* too, when we do what is pleasing to God. They acknowledge, that *Christ died for us*, but *not in our stead*, but *for our advantage*; that there was a *commutation*; but not such a one, as that the Son of God did lay down his blood as a *proper price* in order to our redemption as the *purchase* of it; when they speak of a *moving cause*, they tell us, they mean no more than *the performance of any condition* may be said to move, or as our prayers and repentance do. The *reconciliation* they speak of, doth not at all respect *God* but *us*; they assert *an expiation of sins* consequent upon the death of Christ, but not depending upon it any otherwise, than as a *condition* necessary for his admission to the office of a High Priest in Heaven, there

to

to expiate our sins by his power, and not by his blood ; but they utterly deny, that the death of Christ is to be considered as a *proper expiatory sacrifice for sin* ; or that it hath any further influence upon it, than as it is considered as a means of the confirmation of the truth of his Doctrine, and particularly the promise of remission of sins, on which, and not on the death of Christ they say our remission depends ; but so far as the death of Christ may be an argument to us to believe his Doctrine, and that faith may incline us to obedience, and that obedience being the condition in order to pardon, at so many removes they make the death of Christ to have influence on the remission of our sins. They assert, *that God took occasion by the sins of men to exercise an act of dominion upon Christ in his sufferings, and that the sufferings of Christ were intended for the taking away the sins of men* ; but they utterly deny, *that the sufferings of Christ were to be considered as a punishment for sin ; or that Christ did suffer in our place and stead* ; nay, they contend with great vehemency, *that it is wholly inconsistent with the justice of God to make one mans sins the meritorious cause of anothers punishment ; especially one wholly*

ly

y innocent, and so that the guilty shall be freed on the account of his sufferings. Thus I have endeavoured to give the true state of the controversie with all clearness and brevity. And the substance of it will be reduced to these two debates.

1. Whether the sufferings of Christ in general are to be considered as a punishment of sin, or as a meer act of dominion?

2. Whether the death of Christ in particular were a proper expiatory sacrifice for sin, or only an antecedent condition to his exercise of the Office of Priesthood in Heaven?

II. (1.) Whether the sufferings of Christ in general are to be considered as a punishment of sin, or as a meer act of dominion? for that it must be one or the other of these two, cannot be denied by our Adversaries; for the inflicting those sufferings upon Christ, must either proceed from an antecedent meritorious cause, or not. If they do, they are then punishments; if not, they are meer exercises of power and dominion; whatever ends they are intended for, and whatever recompence be made for them. So *Cressius* asserts, that God as absolute Lord of all, had a right of absolute dominion upon the life and body of Christ, and

Whether the sufferings of Christ are to be considered as a punishment of sin.

*Cress. cap. 2. sect. 1. p. 142.*

F

there-

therefore might justly deliver him up to death, and give his body to the Cross ; and although Christ by the ordinary force of the Law of Moses, had a right to escape so painful and accursed death, yet God by the right of dominion had the power of disposal of him, because he intended to compensate his torments with a reward infinitely greater than they were : but because he saith, for great ends the consent of Christ was necessary, therefore God did not use his utmost dominion in delivering him up by force as he might have done, but he dealt with him by way of command, and rewards proposed for obedience, and in this sence he did act as a righteous Governour, and indulgent Father, who encouraged his Son to undergo hard, but great things. In which we see, that he makes the sufferings of Christ an act of *meer dominion* in God, without any *antecedent cause* as the *reason* of them ; only he qualifies this act of dominion with the proposal of a reward for it. But we must yet further enquire into their meaning, for though here *Crellius* attributes the sufferings of Christ meerly to God's *dominion*, without any respect to sin, yet elsewhere he will allow a respect that was had to sin antecedently to the sufferings



ferings of Christ, and that the sins of  
 men were *the impulsive cause* of them. Crell. cap.  
1. sect. 7.  
&c. Socin.  
de Christo  
servat. l. 3.  
c. 10.  
Crell. cap.  
1. sect. 16.  
Socin. l. 2.  
c. 7.  
 And although Socinus in one place utter-  
 ly denies *any lawful antecedent cause of the*  
*death of Christ, besides the will of God*  
*and Christ*, yet Crellius in his Vindication  
 saith, *by lawful cause*, he meant *meritori-*  
*ous*, or such upon supposition of which  
*he ought to die*; for elsewhere he makes  
*Christ to die for the cause, or by the occa-*  
*sion of our sins*; which is the same that  
 Crellius means by an *impulsive, or pro-*  
*catartick cause*. Which he thus explains,  
 we are now to suppose a decree of God not  
 only to give salvation to Mankind, but to  
 give us a firm hope of it in this present  
 state, now our sins by deserving eternal pu-  
 nishment, do hinder the effect of that decree  
 upon us, and therefore they were an *impulsive*  
*cause of the death of Christ*, by which it was  
 effected, that this decree should obtain not-  
 withstanding our sins. But we are not to un-  
 derstand as tho' this were done by any expia-  
 tion of the guilt of sin by the death of Christ;  
 but this effect is hindered by three things, by  
 taking away their sins, by assuring men that  
 their former sins, and present infirmities  
 upon their sincere obedience shall not be im-  
 puted to them, and that the effect of that  
 decree shall obtain, all which, saith he, is  
 F 2 effected

Crell. c. 1.  
 sect. 11.

*effected morte Christi interveniente, the death of Christ intervening, but not as the procuring cause.* So that after all these words he means no more by making our sins *an impulsive cause of the death of Christ*, but that the death of Christ was an argument to confirm to us the truth of his Doctrine, which doctrine of his doth give us assurance of these things: and that our sins when they are said to be *the impulsive cause*, are not to be considered with a respect to *their guilt*, but to that *distrust of God* which our sins do raise in us; which distrust is in truth according to this sense of *Crellius the impulsive cause*, and not the *sins* which were the cause or occasion of it. For that was it which the doctrine was designed to remove, and our sins only as the causes of that. But if it be said, *that he speaks not only of the distrust, but of the punishment of sin as an impediment which must be removed too, and therefore may be called an impulsive cause*, we are to consider that the removal of this is not attributed to the death of Christ, but to the leaving of our sins by the belief of his Doctrine; therefore the punishment of our sins cannot, unless in a very remote sense, be said to be an *impulsive cause* of that, which  
for

for all that we can observe by *Crellius*, might as well have been done without it; if any other way could be thought sufficient to confirm his Doctrine, and Christ, without dying, might have had power to save all them that obey him. But we understand not an impulsive cause in so remote a sense, as though our sins were a *meer occasion of Christ's dying*, because the death of Christ was one argument among many others to believe his Doctrine, the belief of which would make men leave their sins; but we contend for a nearer and more proper sense, *viz.* that the death of Christ was primarily intended for the *expiation of our sins*, with a respect to God and not to us, and therefore our sins as an *impulsive cause* are to be considered as they are so displeasing to God; that it was necessary for the Vindication of God's Honour, and the deterring the world from sin, that no less a Sacrifice of Atonement should be offered, than the blood of the Son of God. So that we understand an *impulsive cause* here in the sense, that the sins of the people were, under the Law, the cause of the offering up those Sacrifices, which were appointed for the expiation of them. And as in those Sacrifices

there were two things to be considered, viz. the maceration, and the oblation of them, the former as a *punishment* by a substitution of them in place of the persons who had offended ; the latter as the proper Sacrifice of Atonement, although the maceration it self, considered with the design of it, was a Sacrificial act too : So we consider the sufferings of Christ with a two-fold respect, either as *to our sins*, as the impulsive cause of them, so they are to be considered as a *punishment*, or as *to God*, with a design to expiate the guilt of them, so they are a *Sacrifice of Atonement*. The first consideration is that we are now upon, and upon which the present debate depends, for if the sufferings of Christ be to be taken under the notion of *punishment*, then our Adversaries grant, that our sins must be an impulsive cause of them in another sense than they understand it. For the clearing of this, I shall prove these two things.

1. That no other sense ought to be admitted of the places of *Scripture* which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to sin, but this.

2. That this *Account* of the sufferings of Christ, is no ways repugnant to the *Justice* of God.

III. That

III. That no other sense ought to be admitted of the places of Scripture, which speak of the sufferings of Christ with a respect to our sins, but that they are to be considered as a punishment for them. Such are those which speak of *Christ bearing our sins, of our iniquities being laid upon him, of his making himself an offering for sin, and being made sin and a curse for us, and of his dying for our sins.* All which I shall so far consider, as to vindicate them from all the exceptions which *Socinus* and *Crellius* have offered against them.

The sufferings of Christ proved to be a punishment from Scripture.  
1 Pet. 2.  
24. Isa. 53.  
4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11.  
2 Cor. 5.  
21. Gal. 3.  
13. Rom.  
4. 25.

I. Those which speak of *Christ's bearing our sins.* As to which we shall consider, First, The importance of the phrase in general of bearing sin, and then the circumstances of the particular places in dispute. For the importance of the phrase, *Socinus* acknowledges, that it generally signifies bearing the punishment of sin in Scripture: but that sometimes it signifies taking away. The same is confessed by *Crellius*, but he saith, it doth not always signify bearing proper punishment, but it is enough (he says) that one bears something burdensome on the occasion of others sins: and so Christ by undergoing his sufferings by occasion of sins, may be said to bear our

Soc. de servat. l. 2.  
cap. 4.  
Crell. cap. 1.  
sect. 32.

*sins.* And for this sense he quotes Numb. 14. 33. *And your Children shall wander in the Wilderness forty years, and bear your whoredoms, until your carcasses be wasted in the Wilderness. Whereby, saith he, it is not meant that God would punish the Children of the Israelites, but that by the occasion of their parents sins, they should undergo that trouble, in wandering in the Wilderness, and being deprived of the possession of the promised Land.* But could *Crellius* think that any thing else could have been imagined, (setting aside a total destruction) a greater instance of God's severity, than that was to the Children of *Israel* all their circumstances being considered? Is it not said, that *God did swear in his wrath, they should not enter into his rest?* Surely then the debarring them so long of that rest, was an instance of God's wrath, and so according to his own principles must have something of *Vindicta* in it, and therefore be a proper punishment. The truth is, our Adversaries allow themselves in speaking things most repugnant to Humane Nature in this matter of punishments, that they may justify their own *hypothesis*. For a whole Nation to be for forty years debarred from the greatest blessings

Psal. 95.

11.

Heb. 3. 11.

blessings were ever promised them ; and instead of enjoying them, to endure the miseries and hardships of forty years travels in a barren wilderness, must not be thought a punishment, and only because occasioned by their Parents sins. But whatever is inflicted on the account of sin, and with a design to shew God's severity against it, and thereby to deter others from the practice of it, hath the proper notion of punishment in it ; and all these things did concur in this instance, besides the general sense of mankind in the matter of their punishment, which was such, that supposing them preserved in their liberty , could not have been imagined greater. And therefore *Vatablus*, whom *Socinus* and *Crellius* highly commend , thus renders those words, *dabunt pœnas pro fornicationibus vestris quibus defecistis à Deo vestro*: they shall suffer the punishment of your fornications. And that bearing the sins of Parents doth imply properly bearing the punishment of them , methinks they should not so earnestly deny, who contend that to be the meaning of the words in *Ezekiel*, *The Son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father ; viz. that he shall not bear the punishment of his Fathers sins.*

*Doctissimè & elegantissimè Vatablus ut ferè solet. Soc. de serv. l. 1. c. 8. Crell cap. 1. Sect. 31.*

*Ezek. 18. 20.*

*Crell. cap. 4.  
Sect. 15.*

Of the  
Scape-  
Goats  
bearing  
away the  
sins of the  
people.

*Socin. 2. c. 4.  
Lev. 16.  
22. Grot.  
de sat. cap.  
1.*

*Crell. cap. 1.  
Sect. 56.*

*sins.* Where in bearing iniquity with a respect to their Parents sins, by their own confession, must be taken for the proper punishment; for otherwise they do not deny, but Children, notwithstanding that sentence, may undergo much affliction on the occasion of their Parents sins.

IV. But Socinus further objects, that bearing sins doth not imply the punishment of them, because the Scape-Goat under the Law, is said to bear upon him the iniquities of the people, and yet could not be said to be punished for them. To which Grotius answers, that Socinus takes it for granted without reason, that the Scape-Goat could not be said to be punished for the sins of the people; for punishment in general, may fall upon beasts for the sins of men, Gen. 9. 5. Exod. 21. 28. Lev. 20. 15. Gen. 8. 21. and Socinus hath no cause to say, that the Scape-Goat was not slain; for the Jewish Interpreters do all agree that he was, and however the sending him into the Wilderness was intended as a punishment, and most probably by an unnatural death. To which Crellius replies, That in the general, he denies not but punishment may fall upon beasts as well as men; but (that he might shew himself true



true to his principle, that one cannot be punished for anothers faults,) he falls into a very pleasant discourse, *That the Beasts are not said to be punished for mens sins, but for their own, and therefore when it is said, before the flood, that all flesh had corrupted his way; he will by no means* Gen. 6. 12.  
*have it understood only of men, but that the sins of the beasts at that time, were greater than ordinary, as well as mens. But he hath not told us what they were, whether by eating some forbidden herbs; or entring into conspiracies against mankind their lawful Sovereigns, or unlawful mixtures; and therefore we have yet reason to believe, that when God saith, the ground was cursed for mans sake, that the beasts were punished for mans sin.* Gen. 8. 21.  
*And if all flesh, must comprehend beasts* Isa. 40. 5.  
*in this place, why shall not all flesh seeing the glory of the Lord, take in the beasts there too? for Vatablus parallels this place with the other. But if, saith Crel- lius, any shall contend that some beasts at least were innocent, then, he saith, that those though they were destroyed by the flood, yet did not suffer punishment, but only a calamity by occasion of the sins of men. I wonder he did not rather say, that the innocent beasts were taken into the Ark,*  
 for

for the propagation of a better kind afterwards. But by this solemn distinction of *calamities* and *punishments*, there is nothing so miserable, that either men or beasts can undergo, but when it serves their turn, it shall be only a calamity and no punishment, though it be said to be on purpose to shew God's severity against the sins of the world. And this excellent notion of the *beasts being punished for their own sins*, is improved by him to the vindication of the *Scape-Goat* from being *punished*, because then, saith he, *the most wicked and corrupt Goat should have been made choice of*. As though all the design of that great day of expiation had been only to call the Children of *Israel* together with great solemnity; to let them see, how a poor Goat must be punished for breaking the Laws which we do not know were ever made for them. I had thought our Adversaries had maintained that the Sacrifices (on the day of expiation at least) had represented and typified the Sacrifice which was to be offered up by Christ; and so *Socinus* and *Crellius* elsewhere contend: he needed not therefore have troubled himself concerning the sins of the Goat, when it is expressly said, *That the sins of*  
*the*

*the people were put on the head of the Goat; Whatever then the punishment were, it was on the account of the sins of the people, and not his own. But Crellius urgeth against Grotius, that if the Scape-Goat had been punished for the expiation of the sins of the people, that should have been particularly expressed in Scripture, whereas nothing is said there at all of it, and that the throwing down the Scape-Goat from the top of the rock, was no part of the Primitive Institution, but one of the superstitions taken up by the Jews in after-times, because of the Ominousness of the return of it; and although we should suppose (which is not probable) that it should die by famine in the Wilderness, yet this was not the death for expiation, which was to be by the shedding of blood. To this therefore I answer. 1. I do not insist on the customs of the later Jews to prove from thence any punishment designed by the primitive institution. For I shall easily yield, that many superstitions obtained among them afterwards about the Scape-Goat; as the stories of the red list turning white upon the head of it, the booths and the causey made on purpose, and several other things mentioned in the Rabbinical Writers*

*Cod. Joma.*  
*tit. 6.*

*Liev. 16.*  
*12.*

Writers do manifest. But yet it seems very probable from the Text it self, that the Scape-Goat was not carried into the Wilderness at large, but to a steep mountain there. For although we have commonly rendered *Azazel* by the *Scape Goat*, yet according to the best of the Jewish writers, as *P. Fagius* tells us, עִזָּאזֵל doth not come from עִז a Goat, and אָזֵל *abiit*; but is the name of a Mountain very steep and rocky near Mount *Sinai*, and therefore probably called by the later Jews, צֶוֶר the name of a *Rock*: and to this purpose, it is observable that where we render it, *and let him go for a Scape-Goat into the Wilderness* in the *Hebrew* it is, לְשַׁלְּחָה אֹתוֹ לְעִזָּאזֵל תְּפִיבְרָה *to send him to Azazel in the Wilderness*: as the joyning the preposition לְ doth import, and the *Arabick* Version wherever *Azazel* is mentioned, renders it by Mount *Azaz*: and the *Chaldee* and *Syriack* to *Azazel*; so that from hence, a carrying the *Scape-Goat* to a certain place may be inferred; but I see no foundation in the Text for the throwing it down from the rock when it was there; and therefore I cannot think, but that if the punishment intended did lie in that, it would have been expressly mentioned in the solemnities

lemnities of that day, which had so great an influence on the expiation of the sins of the people. 2. I answer, that the *Scape-Goat* was to denote rather the effect of the expiation, than the manner of obtaining it. For the proper expiation was *by the shedding of blood*, as the *Apostle* Heb. 9. 22. tells us; and thence the live Goat was not to have the sins of the people to bear away into the desert, till the High-Priest had made an end of reconciling the Holy Place, Lev. 16. 20. and the Tabernacle of the Congregation, and the Altar; and by the sprinkling of the blood of the other Goat which was the *sin-offering for the people*; which being V. 15. done, he was to bring the live Goat, and to lay his hands upon the head of it, and confess over it all the iniquities of the Children of Israel, and all their trans- V. 21. gressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the Goat, and shall send him away by the hand of a fit man into the Wil- V. 22. derness; and so the Goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited, and he shall let go the Goat in the Wilderness. So that the former Goat noted the way of expiation by the shedding of blood, and the latter the effect of it, viz. that the sins of the people were declared to be expiated by the sending the

the Goat charged with their sins into a desert place ; and that their sins would not appear in the presence of God against them, any more than they expected, that the Goat which was sent into the Wilderness should return among them. Which was the reason that afterwards they took so much care that it should not, by causing it to be thrown off from a steep rock ; which was no sooner done ; but notice was given of it very suddenly by the sounding of horns all over the Land. But the force of *Socinus* his argument from the Scape-Goat's bearing the sins of the people, that therefore that phrase doth not always imply the bearing of punishment, is taken off by *Crellius* himself, who tells us, *that the Scape-Goat is not said to bear the sins of the people in the Wilderness ; but only that it carried the sins of the people into the Wilderness*, which is a phrase of another importance from that we are now discoursing of. As will now further appear from the places where it is spoken of concerning our Saviour, which we now come particularly to examine.

*Crell. c. 1.  
Sect. 56.*

V. The first place insisted on by *Grotius* with a respect to Christ, is *1 Pet.* *Grotius* his sense of *1 Pet. 2. 24.*  
 2. 24. *Who his own self bare our sins, in his own body on the tree, which, saith Crel- lius, is so far from proving that Christ did bear the punishment of our sins, that it doth not imply any sufferings that he underwent on the occasion of them. He grants that ἀναπέσω doth signifie to carry up, but with- all ( he saith ) it signifies to take away; be- cause that which is taken up, is taken away from the place where it was. Besides, he observes, that ἀναπέσω doth answer to the Hebrew העלה, he hath made to ascend, which is frequently rendred by it in the LXX. and sometimes by ἀνάγειν; but that Hebrew word doth often signifie to take a- way, where it is rendred in the Greek by one of those two words, 2 Sam. 21. 13. Josh. 24. 32. Psal. 102. 25. Ezra 1. 11. To which I answer, 1. That the signification of ἀναπέσω in this place, must not be taken from every sense the word is ever used for, but in that which the words out of which these are taken do imply; and in Isa. 53. 11. it doth not answer העלה but to סבל, a word which by the confession of all is never properly used for taking away, but for bearing of a burden, and is used with a respect to the*  
 G punish-

punishment of sin, *Lament.* 5. 7. *Our fathers have sinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities*, where the same word is used ; so that the signification of the word ἀνατίθεν here, must depend upon that in *Isaiah*, of which more afterward. 2. Granting that ἀνατίθεν doth answer sometimes to the *Hebrew* הִלִּיךְ yet it makes nothing to *Crellius* his purpose, unless he can prove that ἀνατίθεν doth ever signifie the taking away a thing by the destruction of it ; for where it answers to that word, it is either for the offering up of a Sacrifice, in which sense ἀνατίθεν is very frequently used, as is confessed by *Crellius* ; and in that sense it is no prejudice at all to our cause ; for then it must be granted, that Christ upon the Cross is to be considered as a *sacrifice* for the sins of men ; and so our sins were laid upon him as they were supposed to be on the Sacrifices under the Law, in order to the expiation of them, by the shedding their blood ; and if our Adversaries would acknowledge this, the difference would not be so great between us ; or else it is used for the removal of a thing from one place to another, the thing it self still remaining in being, as 2 *Sam.* 21. 13. *And he made Saul's bones to ascend,*  
ἀνι-



ἀνέβησαν ἐκ τῆς γῆς, he took them away, saith *Crellius*; true, but it is such a taking away, as is a bare removal, the thing still remaining; the same is to be said of *Joseph's* bones, *Josh.* 24. 32. which are all the places where ἀναβέβηται is used; and although ἀνέβηται may be sometimes taken in another sense, as *Psal.* 102. 25. yet nothing can be more unreasonable than such a way of arguing as this is; ἀναβέβηται, saith *Crellius*, signifies taking away; we demand his proof of it; is it that the word signifies so much of it self? No; that he grants it doth not. Is it that it is frequently used in the *Greek Version* to render a word that properly doth signifie so? No; nor that neither. But how is it then? *Crellius* tells us, that it sometimes answers to a word that signifies to make to ascend: well, but doth that word signifie taking away? No; not constantly, for it is frequently used for a sacrifice: but doth it at any time signifie so? Yes; it signifies the removal of a thing from one place to another. Is that the sense then he contends for here? No; but how then? why ἀναβέβηται is used to render the same word that ἀνέβηται doth, and ἀνέβηται, though it signifies too a bare removal, as *Ezra* 1. 11. yet *Psal.* 102.

25. it is used for cutting off, *μὴ ἀναζῶ-  
γης με*, the Hebr. is, *make me not to a-  
scend in the midst of my days*. But doth it  
here signifie utter destruction? I suppose  
not; but grant it, what is this to ἀνα-  
φῆγειν, when the LXX. useth not that  
word here, which for all that we know  
was purposely altered; so that at last  
ἀναφῆγειν is far enough from any such sig-  
nification as *Crellius* would fix upon it,  
unless he will assert, that Christ taking  
away our sins, was only a removal of  
them from Earth to Heaven. But here  
*Grotius* comes in to the relief of *Crellius*  
against himself; for in his Notes upon  
this place, though he had before said,  
that the word was never used in the New  
Testament in that sense, yet he there  
saith, ἀνῆκεν is *abstulit*, for which he  
referrs us to *Heb.* 9. 28. where he pro-  
ceeds altogether as subtilly as *Crellius*  
had done before him, for he tells us ἀνα-  
φῆγειν is put for φῆγειν, *שׁוּב*, *Numb.* 14. 33.  
*Deut.* 14. 24. *Isa.* 53. 12. but φῆγειν, i. e.  
*שׁוּב* is put for ἀπαρῆγειν, *Lev.* 10. 17. *Numb.*  
14. 18. A most excellent way of inter-  
preting Scripture? considering the vari-  
ous significations of the Hebrew words,  
and above all of that *שׁוּב* which is here  
mentioned. For according to this way of  
arguing, ἀπαρῆγειν shall signifie the same  
with

with λαμβάνειν, ὑπέχειν, and βραβεύειν, for נשנ signifies all these, and is rendred by them in the *Greek Version*, so that by the same way that *Grotius* proves that ἀναρῆσαι signifies ἀρῆσαι, we can prove that ἀρῆσαι doth not signifie to take away, but to bear punishment; nay, נשנ signifies the bearing punishment in the strictest sense, *Ezek.* 16. 52, 54. and bearing sin in that sense, *Ezek.* 16. 58. Thou hast born thy lewdness, and thy abominations, עֲוֹנוֹתַי. So that when נשנ is more frequently used in this than in the other sense, why shall its signifying ἀρῆσαι at any time make ἀναρῆσαι be taken in the same sense with that? Nay, I do not remember in any place where נשנ is joyned with sin, but it signifies the punishment of it, so ἀμαρτίαν λαμβάνειν, *Lev.* 19. 8. to bear his iniquity, *Lev.* 20. 17. ἀμαρτίαν κουέναι, bearing their iniquity, in one verse, is explained by being cut off from among their people, in the next. And in the places cited by *Grotius*, that *Numb.* 14. 33. hath been already shewed to signifie bearing the punishment of sin, and that *Deut.* 14. 24. is plainly understood of a Sacrifice, the other, *Isa.* 53. 12. will be afterwards made appear by other places in the same

Chapter, to signifie nothing to this purpose. So that for all we can yet see, *ἀναίρεσις* must be taken either for *bearing our sins* as a sacrifice did under the Law, or the *punishment* of them; in either sense it serves our purpose, but is far enough from our Adversaries meaning.

*Crell. his  
sense exa-  
mined.*

VI. But supposing we should grant them, that *ἀναίρεσις* may signifie *to take away*, let us see what excellent sense they make of these words of St. Peter. Do they then say, that Christ did take away our sins upon the Cross? No; they have a great care of that, for that would make the expiation of sins to have been performed there; which they utterly deny, and say, that Christ only took the Cross in his way to his Ascension to Heaven, that there he might expiate sins. But doth not St. Peter say, that what was done by him here, was *in his body on the tree*; and they will not say, he carryed that with him to Heaven too. Well, but what then was the taking away of sin which belonged to Christ upon the Cross? is it only to perswade men to live virtuously, and leave off their sins? This Socinus would have, and Crellius is "contented that it should be understood barely of taking away sins, and not of the punishment

*Soc. de serv.  
l. 2. cap. 6. "  
Crell. cap. 1. "  
Self. 39. "*

“ nishment of them, but only by way of  
 “ accession and consequence: but if it be  
 “ taken (*which he inclines more to*) for the  
 “ punishment, then (*he saith*) it is to be Sect. 44.  
 “ understood not of the vertue and effica-  
 “ cy of the death of Christ, but of the ef-  
 “ fect: *and yet a little after he saith*, those  
 “ words of Christ bearing our sins, are to  
 “ be understood of the force and efficacy  
 “ of Christs death to do it, not including  
 “ the effect of it in us; not as though  
 “ Christ did deliver us from sins by his  
 “ death, but that he did that by dying,  
 “ upon which the taking away of sin  
 “ would follow, or which had a great  
 “ power for the doing it. So uncertain  
 are our Adversaries, in affixing any sense  
 upon these words, which may attribute  
 any effect at all, to the death of Christ  
 upon the Cross. For if they be under-  
 stood of taking away sins, then they are  
 only to be meant of the power that was  
 in the death of Christ, to perswade men  
 to leave their sins; which we must have  
 a care of understanding so, as to attri-  
 bute any effect to the death of Christ in  
 order to it; but only that the death of  
 Christ was an argument for us to believe  
 what he said, and the believing what he  
 said would incline us to obey him, and

## Of the Sufferings

if we obey him, we shall leave off our sins whether Christ had died or no: supposing his miracles had the same effect on us, which those of *Moses* had upon the *Jews*, which were sufficient to persuade them to believe and obey without his death. But if this be all that was meant by Christ's *bearing our sins in his body on the tree*; why might not St. *Peter* himself be said to bear them upon his cross too? for his death was an excellent example of patience, and a great argument to persuade men he spake truth, and that doctrine which he preached, was repentance and remission of sins: So that by this sense, there is nothing peculiar attributed to the *death of Christ*. But taking the other sense for the *taking away the punishment of sins*, we must see how this belongs to the death of Christ: Do they then attribute our delivery from the punishment of sin, to the death of Christ on the *Cross*? yes, just as we may attribute *Cæsar's* subduing *Rome*, to his passing over *Rubicon*, because he took that in his way to the doing of it: so they make the death of Christ only as a passage, in order to expiation of sins, by taking away the punishment of them. For that shall not be actually perfected,  
they

they say, till his full deliverance of all those that obey him, from hell and the grave, which will not be till his second coming. So that if we only take *the body of Christ* for his *second coming*, and the *Cross of Christ*, or the *tree*, for his *Throne of Glory*, then they will acknowledge, that Christ may very well be said to take away sins in his own body on the tree: but if you take it in any sense that doth imply any peculiar efficacy to the death of Christ, for all the plainness of St. Peter's words, they by no means will admit of it.

VII. But because *Crellius* urgeth *Grotius* with the sense of that place, *Isa. 53.* *Isa. 53. 11. vindicated. Crell. c. 1. sect. 35.*  
 I I. out of which he contends these words are taken, and *Crellius* conceives he can prove there, *that bearing is the same with taking away sin*: We now come to consider, what force he can find from thence, for the justifying his assertion, *That the bearing of sins, when attributed to Christ, doth not imply the punishment of them, but the taking them away.* The words are, *for he shall bear their iniquities.* As to which *Grotius* observes, *That the word* וְיִשָּׁא *which signifies iniquity, is sometimes taken for the punishment of sin,* 2 King. 7. 9. and the verb לָבַא *is to bear,*  
 and

and whenever it is joyned with sin or iniquity, in all languages, and especially the Hebrew, it signifies to suffer punishment; for although *לָקַח* may sometimes signifie to take away, *לָקַח* never does: so that this phrase can receive no other interpretation. Notwithstanding all which Crellius at-

Crell. c. 1.  
sect. 44.

tempts to prove, That *לָקַח* here, must be taken in a sense contrary to the natural and perpetual use of the word; for which his first argument is very infirm, viz. because it is mentioned after the death of Christ, and is therefore to be considered as the reward of the other. Whereas it appears: 1. By the Prophets discourse, that he doth not insist on an exact methodical order, but dilates and amplifies things as he sees occasion: for Verse 9. he saith, *He made his grave with the wicked, and with the rich in his death;* and Verse 10. he said, *Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him, he hath put him to grief:* Will Crellius therefore say, that this must be consequent to his death and burial? 2. The particle *וְ* may be here taken causally, as we render it, very agreeably to the sense; and so it gives an account of the fore-going clause, *By his knowledge, shall my righteous servant justifie many, for he shall bear their iniquities.*



quities. And that this is no unusual ac-  
 ception of that particle, might be easi-  
 ly cleared from many places of *Scripture*  
 if it were necessary; and from this very  
*Prophet*, as *Isa.* 39. 1. where *וְשׁוּן* is the  
 same with *וְשׁוּן* *2 King.* 20. 12. and *Isa.*  
 64. 5. *Thou art wroth, for we have sinned,*  
*וְשׁוּן* where the same particle is made  
 the causal of what went before. But  
 we need not insist upon this to answer  
*Crellius*, who elsewhere makes use of it *Crell. c. 9.*  
 himself, and says, *They must be very ig-* *sect. 7. p.*  
*norant of the Hebrew Tongue, who do not* *463.*  
*know, that the conjunction copulative is of-* *Soc. Pral.*  
*ten taken causally; and so much is con-* *c. 14 sect. 6.*  
*fessed by Socinus also, where he explains*  
*that particle in one sense in the begin-*  
*ning, and causally in the middle of the*  
*verse: And the Lord's anger was kindled* *2 Sam. 21. i.*  
*against Israel, וַיִּסַּח, for he moved, &c. but*  
*if this will not do, he attempts to prove,*  
*That וַיִּסַּח in this very Chapter, hath the*  
*signification of taking away, v. 4. For he*  
*hath born our griefs, and carried our sor-*  
*rows, which is applied by St. Matth. 8.*  
*17. to bodily diseases, which our Saviour*  
*did not bear, but took away, as it is*  
*said in the fore-going Verse; he healed*  
*all that were sick, on which those words*  
*came in, That it might be fulfilled which*  
*was*

was spoken by *Esaías*, &c. To which I answer : 1. It is granted by our Adversaries, that *St. Matthew* in those words, doth not give the full sense of the *Prophet*, but only applies that by way of accommodation, to bodily diseases, which was chiefly intended for the sins of men. And in a way of accommodation it is not unusual to strain words beyond their genuine and natural signification, or what was intended primarily by the person who spake them. Would it be reasonable for any to say that  $\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\varsigma$  signifies *to give*, because that place, *Psal.* 68. 18. where the word by all is acknowledged to signify *to receive*, is rendered *to give*, *Eph.* 4. 8. so that admitting another sense of the word here, as applied to the cure of bodily diseases, it doth not from thence follow, that this should be the meaning of the word in the primary sense intended by the *Prophet*. 2. The word as used by *St. Matthew*, is very capable of the primary and natural sense ; for *St. Matthew* retains words of the same signification, with that which we contend for,  $\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\varsigma$  and  $\epsilon\beta\alpha\lambda\lambda\alpha\sigma\epsilon$ , neither of which doth signify taking away, by causing a thing not to be. So that all that is implied hereby,

is the *pains* and *trouble* which our Saviour took in the healing of the sick. For to that end, as *Grotius* well observes upon that place, the circumstances are mentioned, *That it was at even, and multitudes were brought to him in St. Matthew*, *Mat. 8. 16.* that *after Sun set all that were diseased were brought, and all the City was gathered together at the door, in St. Mark*; *Mar. 1. 32.* *That he departed not till it was day, in* *St. Luke*; that we might the better understand how our Saviour did *bear our griefs*, because the pains he took in healing them were so great. And here I cannot but observe, that *Grotius* in his notes on that place, continued still in the same mind he was in, when he writ against *Socinus*; for he saith, “ Those words may either refer to the diseases of the body, and so they note the pains he took in the cure of them; or to our sins, and so they were fulfilled when Christ by suffering upon the cross, did obtain remission of sins for us, as *St. Peter* saith, *1 Pet. 2. 24.* But upon what reason the *Annotations* on that place come to be so different from his sense expressed here, long after *Crellius* his answer, I do not understand. But we are sure he declared his mind, as to the

the main of that Controversie, to be the same, that it was when he writ his Book which *Crellius* answered; as appears by two Letters of his to *Vossius*, not long since published; and he utterly disowns the charge of *Socinianism*, as a calumny in his *discussion*, the last Book he ever writ.

*Epist. Eccl.*  
p. 747, 748.  
*Discuss. p.*  
16, 17.

VIII. But we are no further obliged to vindicate *Grotius*, than he did the truth; which we are sure he did in the vindication of the 53 of *Isaiah*, from *Socinus* his interpretations, notwithstanding what *Crellius* hath objected against him. We therefore proceed to other Verses in the same Chapter insisted on by *Grotius*, to prove, That Christ did bear the punishments of our sins, v. 6, 7. The Lord hath laid on him the iniquities of us all: It is required, and he was afflicted, as *Grotius* renders those words. *Socinus* makes a two-fold sense of the former clause; the first is, That God by or with Christ did meet with our iniquities; the latter, That God did make our iniquities to meet with Christ. The words saith *Grotius*, will not bear the former interpretation; for the verb *יָסַד* being in *Hiphil*, must import a double action, and so it must not be, That God by him did meet with our sins, but

*Isa. 53. 5.*  
6, 7. vin-  
dicated.

*De Servat.*  
l. 2. c. 5.

*but that God did make our sins to meet upon him.* To which *Crellius* replies, *That* Crell. c. 1. sect. 52. *words in Hiphil are sometimes used intransitively; but can he produce any instance in Scripture, where this word joyned with א and נא is so taken? for in the last verse of the Chapter, the construction is different: And what an uncertain way of interpreting Scripture will this be, if every Anomalous signification, and rare use of a word, shall be made use of to take away such a sense as is most agreeable to the design of the place. For that sense we contend for, is not only enforced upon the most natural importance of these words, but upon the agreeableness of them with so many other expressions of this Chapter, that Christ did bear our iniquities, and was wounded for our transgressions, and that his soul was made an offering for sin: to which it is very suitable, that as the iniquities of the people were (as it were) laid upon the head of the Sacrifice; so it should be said of Christ, who was to offer up himself for the sins of the world. And the Jews themselves by this phrase do understand the punishment either for the sins of the people, which *Josias* underwent, or which the*  
people

people themselves suffered, by those who interpret this prophecy of them. To which purpose, *Aben Ezra* observes, that *iniquity is here put for the punishment of it*, as 1 *Sam.* 28. 10. and *Lam.* 4. 6. But *Socinus* mistrusting the incongruity of this Interpretation, flies to another; viz. *That God did make our iniquities to meet with Christ*: And this we are willing to admit of, if by that they mean, That *Christ* underwent the punishment of them; as that phrase must naturally import, for what otherwise can *our iniquities meeting with him* signifie? For the word פגע taken properly (as *Socinus* acknowledgeth it ought to be, when he rejects *Pagnin's* Interpretation of making *Christ* to interceed for our iniquities) signifies, either to meet with one by chance, or out of kindness, or else for an encounter, with an intention to destroy that which it meets with. So *Judg.* 8. 21. Rise thou ופגע בני, ἡ πᾶν Ἰσραὴλ ἐμὴν, LXX. *irruē in nos, fall upon us*; i. e. run upon us with thy sword, and kill us, *Judg.* 15. 12. Swear unto me, that ye will not fall upon me your selves; where the same word is used, and they explain the meaning of it in the next words, v. 13. We will not kill thee, *Amos* 5. 19. as if  
a man

a man did flee from a Lyon, and a Bear met him, *וּפְגַעוּ* i. e. with a design to kill him. Now I suppose they will not say that our sins met with Christ by Chance, since it is said, that God laid on him, &c. nor out of kindness; it must be therefore out of enmity, and with a design to destroy him; and so our sins cannot be understood as Socinus and Crellius would have them, as the meer occasions of Christ death: but as the proper impulsive cause of it. Whether the following word *בְּגִשׁ* be taken with a respect to sin, and so it properly signifies *It is required*, or with a respect to the person, and so it may signifie *he was oppressed*, is not a matter of that consequence, which we ought to contend about; if it be proved that Christ's oppression had only a respect to sin, as the punishment of it. Which will yet further appear from another expression in the same Chapter, v. 5. *The chastisement of our peace was upon him, and by his stripes we are healed.* In which Grotius saith " the word *מִסֵּר* doth " not signifie any kind of affliction, but " such as hath the nature of punishment, " either for example or instruction; but " since the latter cannot be intended in " Christ, the former must. *Crellius* Crell. c. 1. Sect. 57. thinks

thinks to escape from this, by acknowledging, *that the sufferings of Christ have some respect to sin*; but if it be such a respect to sin, which makes what Christ underwent a punishment ( which is only proper in this case ) it is as much as we contend for. This therefore he is loth to abide by; and saith *that chastisement imports no more than bare affliction without any respect to sin*, which he thinks to prove from St. Paul's words, 2 Cor. 6. 9. *We are chastised, but not given over to death*; but how far this is from proving his purpose will easily appear, 1. Because those by whom they were said *to be chastened*, did not think they did it without any respect to a fault; but they supposed them to be justly punished; and this is that we plead for, that the chastisement considered with a respect to him that inflicts it, doth suppose some fault as the reason of inflicting it. 2. This is far from the present purpose, for the *chastisement* there mentioned is opposed to death, *as chastened, but not killed*; whereas *Grotius* expressly speaks of such *chastisements as include death*, that these cannot be supposed to be meerly designed for instruction, and therefore must be conceived under the notion of punishment.



ment. The other place, *Psal.* 73. 14. is yet more remote from the business; for though the Psalmist accounts himself innocent in respect of the great enormities of others; yet he could not account himself so innocent with a respect to God, as not to deserve chastisement from him.

IX. But *Crellius* offers further to prove that Christ's death must be considered as a bare affliction, and not as a *παράδειγμα*, or exemplary punishment, because "in such a punishment the guilty themselves are to be punished, and the benefit comes to those who were not guilty, but in Christ's sufferings it was quite contrary, for the innocent was punished, and the guilty have the benefit of it: and yet (*he saith*) if we should grant that Christ's sufferings were a *παράδειγμα*, that will not prove that his death was a proper punishment. To which I answer, That whatever answers to the ends of an *exemplary punishment*, may properly be called so: but supposing that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, those sufferings will answer to all the ends of an exemplary punishment. For the ends of such a punishment

Whether Christ's death be a proper *παράδειγμα*, and whether that doth imply that it was a punishment of sin.

ment assigned by *Crellius* himself; are;  
 “ That others observing such a punish-  
 “ ment, may abstain from those sins  
 “ which have brought it upon the per-  
 “ son who suffers. Now the question  
 is, whether supposing Christ did suffer  
 on the account of our sins, these suffer-  
 ings of his may deterr us from the pra-  
 ctice of sin or no? And therefore in  
 opposition to *Crellius*, I shall prove these  
 two things: 1. That supposing Christ  
 suffered for our sins, there was a suffici-  
 ent argument to deterr us from the pra-  
 ctice of sin. 2. Supposing that his suf-  
 ferings had no respect to our sins, they  
 could not have that force to deterr men  
 from the practice of it: for he after as-  
 serts, *That Christ's sufferings might be a*  
*παράδειγμα to us, though they were no*  
*punishment of sin.* 1. That the death of  
 Christ considered as a punishment of sin,  
 is a proper *παράδειγμα*, or hath a great  
 force to deterr men from the practice of  
 sin: and that because the same reason  
 of punishment is supposed in Christ  
 and in our selves, and because the  
 example is much more considerable,  
 than if we had suffered our selves.  
 1. The same reason of punishment is  
 supposed. For why are men deterred  
 from

from sin, by seeing others punished; but because they look upon the sin as the reason of the punishment; and therefore where the same reason holds, the same ends may be as properly obtained. If we said that Christ suffered death merely as an innocent person out of God's dominion over his life; what imaginable force could this have to deter men from sin, which is asserted to have no relation to it as the cause of it? But when we say, that *God laid our iniquities upon him*, that he suffered not upon his own account but ours, that the sins we commit against God were the cause of all those bitter Agonies which the Son of God underwent, what argument can be more proper to deter men from sin than this is? For hereby they see the great abhorrency of sin which is in God, that he will not pardon the sins of men without a compensation made to his Honour, and a demonstration to the world of his hatred of it. Hereby they see what a value God hath for his Laws, which he will not relax as to the punishment of offenders, without so valuable a consideration as the blood of his own Son. Hereby they see, that the punishment of sin is

no meer arbitrary thing depending barely upon the will of God; but that there is such a connexion between sin and punishment as to the ends of Government, that unless the Honour and Majesty of God, as to his Laws and Government may be preserved, the violation of his Laws must expect *a just recompence of reward.* Hereby they see what those are to expect who neglect or despise these sufferings of the Son of God for them; for nothing can then remain, but a *certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation which shall devour the Adversaries.* So that, here all the weighty arguments concur which may be most apt to prevail upon men to deterr them from their sins. For *if God did thus by the green tree, what will he do by the dry?* If he who was so innocent in himself, so perfectly holy, suffered so much on the account of our sins; what then may those expect to suffer, who have no innocency at all to plead, and add wilfulness and impenitency to their sins? But if it be replied by *Crellius*, *that it is otherwise among men:* I answer, that we do not pretend in all things to parallel the sufferings of Christ for us, with any sufferings of men for one another. But yet

yet we add, that even among men the punishments inflicted on those who were themselves innocent as to the cause of them, may be as exemplary as any other. And the greater appearance of severity there is in them, the greater terror they strike into all offenders. As Children's losing their estates and honours, or being banished for their Parents treasons in which they had no part themselves. Which is a proper punishment on them of their Father's faults, whether they be guilty or no? and if this may be just in men, why not in God? If any say, *that the Parents are only punished in the Children*, he speaks that which is contradictory to the common sense of mankind; for punishment doth suppose sense or feeling of it; and in this case the Parents are said to be punished, who are supposed to be dead and past feeling of it, and the Children who undergo the smart of it must not be said to be punished; though all things are so like it, that no person can imagine himself in that condition, but would think himself punished, and severely too. If it be said, *that these are calamities indeed, but they are no proper punishments*, it may easily be shewed that distinction

will not hold here. Because these punishments were within the design of the Law, and were intended for all the ends of punishments, and therefore must have the nature of them. For therefore the Children are involved in the Father's punishment on purpose to deter others from the like actions. There are some things indeed that Children may fall into by occasion of their Father's guilt, which may be only *calamities* to them, because they are necessary consequents in the nature of the thing, and not purposely design'd as a punishment to them. Thus, being deprived of the comfort and assistance of their Parents, when the Law hath taken them off by the hand of justice: this was designed by the Law as a punishment to the Parents, and as to the Children it is only a necessary consequent of their punishment. For otherwise the Parents would have been punished for the Childrens faults, and not the Children only involved in that which unavoidably follows upon the Parents punishment. So that *Crellius* is very much mistaken either in the present case of our Saviour's punishment, or in the general reason of exemplary punishments, as among men. But the  
case

case of our Saviour is more exemplary, when we consider the excellency of his person, though appearing in our nature, when no meaner sufferings would satisfy, than of so transcendent a nature as he underwent, though he were the Eternal Son of God, this must make the punishment much more exemplary, than if he were considered only as our Adversaries do, as *a mere man*. So that the dignity of his person under all his sufferings may justly add a greater consideration to deter us from the practice of sin, which was so severely punished in him, when he was pleased to be a Sacrifice for our sins. From whence we see that the ends of a *παιδείμα* are very agreeable with the sufferings of Christ considered as a punishment for sin.

X. We now consider whether as *Crel-  
lius* asserts, supposing Christ's death were no punishment, it could have these effects upon mens minds or no? *Yes*, he saith, *it might, because by his sufferings we might see how severely God would punish wicked and obstinate persons*. Which being a strange riddle at the first hearing it, *viz.* that by the sufferings of an innocent person without any respect to sin as the cause of them: we should discern

God's hatred of sin could not be seen in the sufferings of Christ, if they were no punishment of sin.

*Crell. c. 1. p. 69.*

cern

cern God's severity against those who are obstinate in sin; we ought the more diligently to attend to what is said for the clearing of it. " *First*, saith he, If  
 " God spared not his own most innocent  
 " and holy and only Son, than whom  
 " nothing was more dear to him in Hea-  
 " ven or Earth, but exposed him to so  
 " cruel and ignominious a death; how  
 " great and severe sufferings may we  
 " think God will inflict on wicked men,  
 " who are at open defiance with him?  
 I confess my self not subtle enough to apprehend the force of this argument, *viz.* If God dealt so severely with him who had no sin either of his own or others to answer for; therefore he will deal much more severely with those that have. For God's severity considered without any respect to sin, gives rather encouragement to sinners, than any argument to deterr them from it. For the natural consequence of it is, that God doth act arbitrarily, without any regard to the good or evil of mens actions; and therefore it is to no purpose to be solicitous about them. For upon the same account that the most innocent person suffers most severely from him, for all that we know, the more we strive to be  
 inno-



innocent, the more severely we may be dealt with, and let men sin, they can be but dealt severely with, all the difference then is, one shall be called *punishments*, and the other *calamities*, but the severity may be the same in both. And who would leave off his sins meerly to change the name of *punishments* into that of *calamities*? And from hence it will follow, that the differences of good and evil, and the respects of them to punishment and reward, are but airy and empty things; but that God really in the dispensation of things to men, hath no regard to what men are or do, but acts therein according to his own Dominion, whereby he may dispose of men how or which way he pleases. If a Prince had many of his Subjects in open rebellion against him, and he should at that time make his most obedient and beloved Son to be publickly exposed to all manner of indignities, and be dishonoured and put to death by the hands of those rebels; could any one imagine that this was designed as an exemplary punishment to all rebels, to let them see the danger of rebellion? No, but would it not rather make them think him a cruel Prince, one that would punish innocency

nocency as much as rebellion; and that it was rather better to stand at defiance, and become desperate, for it was more dangerous to be beloved than hated by him, to be his Son than his declared Enemy? so that insisting on the death of Christ as it is considered as a *ῥυπαρία*, (for of that we speak now) there is no comparison between our Adversaries hypothesis and ours; but, saith *Crellius*, the consequence is not good on our side, if Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, therefore they shall suffer much more who continue in sin, for Christ suffered for the sins of the whole world; but they suffer only for their own, and what they have deserved themselves. To which I answer, that the argument is of very good force upon our hypothesis, though it would not be upon theirs. For if we suppose him to be a meer man that suffered, then there could be no argument drawn from his sufferings to ours, but according to the exact proportion of sins and punishments: but supposing that he had a divine as well as humane nature, there may not be so great a proportion of the sins of the world to the sufferings of Christ, as of the sins of a particular person to his own sufferings; and therefore the argument

gument from one to the other doth still hold. For the measure of punishments must be taken with a proportion to the dignity of the person who suffers them. And *Crellius* himself confesseth elsewhere, *Crell. c. 8. sect. 43.* that the dignity of the person is to be considered in exemplary punishment, and that a lesser punishment of one that is very great, may do much more to deter men from sin, than a greater punishment of one much less. But he yet further urgeth, *Crell. c. 1. sect. 57, 70.* that the severity of God against sinners may be discovered in the sufferings of Christ, because God's hatred against sin is discovered therein. But if we ask how God's hatred against sin is seen in the sufferings of one perfectly innocent and free from sin, and not rather his hatred of innocency, if no respect to sin were had therein: he answers, *That God's hatred against sin was manifested, in that he would not spare his only Son to draw men off from sin.* For answer to which, we are to consider the sufferings of Christ as an innocent person, designed as an exemplary cause to draw men off from sin; and let any one tell me, what hatred of sin can possibly be discovered, in proposing the sufferings of a most innocent person to them without any consideration

deration of sin as the cause of those sufferings? If it be said, *That the Doctrine of Christ was designed to draw men off from sin; and that God suffered his Son to die to confirm this Doctrine, and thereby shewed his hatred to sin.* I answer, 1. This is carrying the dispute off from the present business, for we are not now arguing about the design of Christ's Doctrine, nor the death of Christ as a means to confirm that, but as a *δεδειγμα*, and what power that hath without respect to our sins as the cause of them, to draw us from sin, by discovering God's hatred to it. 2. The Doctrine of Christ according to their *hypothesis*, discovers much less of God's hatred to sin than ours doth. For if God may pardon sin without any compensation made to his Laws or Honour, if repentance be in its own nature a sufficient satisfaction for all the sins past of our Lives; if there be no such a Justice in God which requires punishment of sin committed; if the punishment of sin depend barely upon God's will; and the most innocent person may suffer as much from God without respect to sin as the cause of suffering, as the most guilty; let any rational man judge whether this Doctrine discovers as much God's abhor-  
 rency

rency of sin, as asserting the necessity of vindicating God's honour to the World, upon the breach of his Laws, if not by the suffering of the offenders themselves, yet of the Son of God as a sacrifice for the expiation of sin, by undergoing the punishment of our iniquities, so as upon consideration of his sufferings, he is pleased to accept of repentance and sincere obedience, as the conditions upon which he will grant remission of sins, and eternal life. So that if the discovery of God's hatred to sin be the means to reclaim men from it, we assert upon the former reasons, that much more is done upon our Doctrine concerning the sufferings of Christ, than can be upon theirs. So much shall suffice to manifest in what sense Christ's death may be a *ῥύσις*, and that this doth imply, that his sufferings are to be considered as a punishment of sin.

XI. The next Series of places which makes Christ's sufferings to be a punishment for sin, are those which assert Christ to be made *sin and a curse for us*: which we now design to make clear, ought to be understood in no other sense; for as *Grotius* saith, As the *Jews* sometimes " use sin, for the punishment of sin; " as

*Grotius* his arguments from Christ's being made sin and a curse for us defended against *Cresc.*

*Crell. c. 1.  
sect. 60.*

“ as appears, besides other places, by  
 “ *Zach. 14. 19. Gen. 4. 13.* so they call  
 “ him that suffers the punishment of  
 “ sin ; by the name of sin ; as the Latins  
 “ use the word *Piaculum*, both for the  
 “ fault, and for him that suffers for it.  
 “ Thence under the Law, an expiatory  
 “ Sacrifice for sin, was called sin, *Lev. 4. 3,*  
 “ *29—5, 6. Psal. 40. 7.* Which way of  
 “ speaking *Esaias* followed, speaking of  
 “ Christ, *Isai. 53. 10.* נֶפֶשׁ אִשׁוּם נִשְׁפָּט  
 “ he made his soul sin, *i. e.* liable to the  
 “ punishment of it. To the same pur-  
 “ pose *St. Paul, 2 Cor. 5. 21.* He made  
 “ him to be sin for us, who knew no  
 “ sin, that we might be made the right-  
 “ teousness of God in him. To which  
 “ *Crellius* replies, That as there is no  
 “ necessity, that by the name of sin,  
 “ when applied to sufferings, any more  
 “ should be implied, than that those  
 “ sufferings were occasioned by sin, no  
 “ more is there when it is applied to  
 “ the person ; nay, much less, for he  
 “ saith, No more is required to this,  
 “ but that he should be handled as sin-  
 “ ners use to be, and undergo the mat-  
 “ ter of punishment, without any re-  
 “ spect to sin, either as the cause or oc-  
 “ casion of it. So he saith, The name  
 “ *Sinner*

“ *Sinner* is used, 1 *King.* 1. 21. and in  
 “ *St. Paul*, the name of sin in the first  
 “ clause is to be understood, as of righ-  
 “ teousness in the latter; and as we are  
 “ said to be righteousness in him, when  
 “ God deals with us as with righteous  
 “ persons, so Christ was said to be sin  
 “ for us, when he was dealt with as a  
 “ sinner. And the Sacrifices for sin un-  
 “ der the Law were so called, not with  
 “ a respect to the punishment of sin, but  
 “ because they were offered upon the  
 “ account of sin, and were used for ta-  
 “ king away the guilt of it, or because  
 “ men were bound to offer them, so that  
 “ they sinned if they neglected it. So  
 “ that all that is meant by *Esaias* and  
 “ *St. Paul* is, That Christ was made an  
 “ expiatory Sacrifice, or that he exposed  
 “ himself for those afflictions which sin-  
 “ ners only by right undergo. But let  
*Cressius* or any others of them tell me,  
 if the *Scripture* had intended to express,  
 that the sufferings of Christ were a pu-  
 nishment of our sins, how was it possible  
 to do it more Emphatically than it is done  
 by these Expressions (the custom of the  
*Hebrew Language* being considered) not  
 only by saying, that *Christ did bear our*  
*sins*, but, *that himself was made sin for*

us? those phrases being so commonly used for the punishment of sin. Let them produce any one instance in Scripture, where those expressions are applied to any without the consideration of sin: that place, 1 *King.* 1. 21. is very far from it; for in all probability, the design of *Bathsheba* in making *Solomon King* was already discovered, which was the reason that *Adonijah* his elder Brother declaring himself *King*, invited not him with the rest of the *King's* sons: All that she had for *Solomon's* succession, was a secret promise and oath of *David*; and therefore she urgeth him now to *declare the succession*, v. 20. *Otherwise*, she saith, *when David should die, I and my son Solomon shall be accounted offenders; i. e. saith Cressius, we shall be handled as offenders, we shall be destroyed*: But surely not without the supposition of a fault; by them which should inflict that punishment upon them: The plain meaning is, they should be accused of Treason, and then punished accordingly. But we are to consider, that still with a respect to them, who were the inflictors, a fault or sin is supposed as the reason of their punishment, either of their own or others. But of our Saviour it is not said,  
*That*



*That he should be counted as an offender by the Jews ; for although that doth not take away his innocency, yet it supposeth an accusation of something , which in it self deserves punishment. But in Esai. 53. 10. it is said, He made his soul sin ; and 2 Cor. 5. 21. That God made him sin for us, which must therefore imply, not being dealt with by men only as a sinner, but that with a respect to him who inflicted the punishment , there was a consideration of sin as the reason of it. We do not deny but God's suffering him to be dealt with as a sinner by men, is implied in it, for that was the method of his punishment designed ; but we say further, that the reason of that permission in God, doth suppose some antecedent cause of it : For God would never have suffered his only Son, to be so dealt with by the hands of cruel men, unless he had made himself an offering for sin ; being willing to undergo those sufferings, that he might be an expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of the world. And although Socinus will not yield, That by Soc. l. 1 c. 8. being made sin for us should be understood Christ's being an expiatory Sacrifice for sin ; yet Crellius is contented it should be so taken in both places : Which if he*

will grant, so as by vertue of that Sacrifice, the guilt of sin is expiated, we shall not contend with him about the reasons, why those Sacrifices were called *sins*, although the most proper and genuine must needs be that, which is assigned by the Law, that the sins of the people were supposed to be laid upon them, and therefore they were intended for the expiation of them: But it is very unreasonable to say, *That Expiatory Sacrifices were called sins, because it would have been a sin to neglect them*: For on the same account, all the other Sacrifices must have been called so too; for it was a sin to neglect any where God required them, and so there had been no difference between Sacrifices for sin and others: To that reason of *Crellius*, from our being made righteous, because dealt with as such, to Christ's being made sin only; because dealt with as a sinner, we need no more than what this parallel will afford us; For as *Crellius* would never say, that any are dealt with as righteous persons, who are not antecedently supposed to be so by his own Argument, Christ being dealt with as a sinner, must suppose guilt antecedent to it; and since the Apostle declares

clares it was not his own, in those words, *Who knew no sin*, it follows that it must be the consideration of ours, which must make him be dealt with as a sinner by him, who made him to be sin for us. But to suppose that Christ should be said to be *made sin*, without any respect to *sin*, is as much as if the *Latins* should call any one *Scelus*, and mean thereby a very honest man; or a *Piaculum*, without any supposition of his own or others guilt. But we are to consider, that the sufferings of Christ, seeming at first so inconsistent with that relation to God as his only Son, which the Apostles assert concerning him, they were obliged to vindicate his innocency, as to men, and yet withal to shew, that with a respect to God, there was sufficient reason for his permission of his undergoing these sufferings. That *he knew no sin*, was enough to clear his innocency as to men; but then the question will be asked, If he were so innocent, why did God suffer all those things to come upon him? Did not *Abraham* plead of old with God, *That he would not slay the righteous with the wicked*, because it was repugnant to the righteousness of his nature to do so; *That be far from thee to*

Gen. 18.  
25.

*do after this manner, to stay the righteous with the wicked, and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be so far from thee; shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? How then comes God to suffer the most perfect innocency to be dealt with so, as the greatest sins could not have deserved worse from men? Was not his righteousness the same still? And Abraham did not think the distinction of calamities and punishments, enough to vindicate God's proceedings, if the righteous should have been dealt withal as the wicked. And if that would hold for such a measure of righteousness as might be supposed in such who were not guilty of the great abominations of those places, that it should be enough, not only to deliver themselves, but the wicked too; how comes it that the most perfect obedience of the Son of God, is not sufficient to excuse him from the greatest sufferings of Malefactors? But if his sufferings had been meerly from men, God had been accountable only for the bare permission; but it is said, that he fore-ordained and determined these things to be, that Christ himself complained, that God had forsaken him; and here, that he made him*

him *fin* for us : and can we imagine all this to be without any respect to the guilt of sin, as the cause of it ? Why should such an expression be used of *being made fin* ? might not many others have served sufficiently to declare the indignities and sufferings he underwent, without such a phrase as seems to reflect upon Christ's innocency ? If there had been no more in these expressions than our Adversaries imagine, the Apostles were so careful of Christ's honour, they would have avoided such ill-sounding expressions as these were ; and not have affected *Hebraisms*, and uncouth forms of speech, to the disparagement of their Religion. But this is all which our Adversaries have to say, where words are used by them out of their proper sense, *that the Prophets and Apostles affected tricks of wit, playing with words, using them sometimes in one sense, and presently quite in another.* So Crellius saith Crell c. 1. sect. 57. of Isaiah, *That he affects little elegancies of words and verbal allusions, which makes him use words sometimes out of their proper and natural sense ;* thence he tells us, *The sufferings of Christ are called chastisements, though they have nothing of the nature of chastisements in them :* And from

Socin. ex-  
plicat. 1.  
cap. Joh.  
v. 10.

this liberty of interpreting, they make words (without any other reason, than that they serve for their purpose) be taken in several senses in the same verse: For *Socinus* in one verse of *St. John's Gospel*, makes the *World* to be taken in three several senses: *He was in the World*, there it is taken, saith he, for the men of the world in general: *The world was made by him*, there it must be understood only of the reformation of things by the Gospel: and, *the world knew him not*, there it must be taken in neither of the former senses, but for the wicked of the world: What may not one make of the *Scripture*, by such a way of interpreting it? But by this we have the less reason to wonder, that *Socinus* should put such an Interpretation upon *Gal. 3. 13. Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree:* In which he doth acknowledge *by the curse*, in the first clause to be meant, *the punishment of sin*, but not in the second: And the reason he gives for it is, *amavit enim Paulus in execrationis verbo argutus esse.* *St. Paul* affected playing with the word *curse*, understanding it first in a proper, and then a Metaphorical sense.

Socin. de  
Christo ser-  
uat. l. 2.  
c. 1.

But

But it is plain that the design of *S. Paul* and *Socinus* are very different in these words: *Socinus* thinks he speaks only Metaphorically, when he saith, that *Christ was made a curse for us*; i. e. by a bare allusion of the name, without a correspondency in the thing it self; and so that the death of *Christ* might be called a curse, but was not so: But *St. Paul* speaks of this not by way of extenuation, but to set forth the greatness and weight of the punishment he underwent for us. He therefore tells us, what it was which *Christ* did redeem us from, *The curse of the Law*; and how he did it, *by being not only made a curse, but a curse for us*; i. e. not by being hateful to God, or undergoing the very same curse, which we should have done; which are the two things objected by *Crellius* against our sense; but that the death of *Christ* was to be considered, not as a bare separation of soul and body, but as *properly pœnal*, being such a kind of death, which none but *Malefactors* by the *Law* were to suffer; by the undergoing of which punishment in our stead, he redeemed us from that curse which we were liable to by the violation of the *Law of God*. And there can be no reason to appropriate this only

ly to the Jews, unless the death of Christ did extend only to the deliverance of them from the punishment of their sins; or because the curse of the Law did make that death pœnal, therefore the intention of the punishment, could reach no further than the Law did; but the Apostle in the very next words speaks of the farther extension of the great blessing promised to Abraham, *That it should come upon the Gentiles also*; and withal those whom the Apostle speaks to, were not Jews, but such as thought they ought to joyn the Law and Gospel together: that St. Paul doth not mean as *Crellius* would have it, *that Christ by his death did confirm the New Covenant, and so take away the obligation of the Law*; (for to what end was the curse mentioned for that? What did the *accursedness* of his death add to the confirmation of the truth of his Doctrine? and when was ever the curse taken for the continuance of the Law of *Moses*?) but that Christ by the efficacy of his death as a punishment for sin hath redeemed all that believe and obey him from the curse deserved by their sins, whether enforced by the *Law of Moses*, or the Law written in their hearts, which tells the  
con-

*Crell. Answer. in loc.*



XII. We come now to the force of the particles which being joyned with our sins as referring to the death of Christ, do imply that his death is to be considered as a punishment of sin. Not that we insist on the force of those particles διὰ, μετὰ and ὑπὲρ, as though of themselves they did imply this. (for we know they are of various significations according to the nature of the matter they are joyned with) but that these being joyned with sins and suffering together, do signifie that those sufferings are the punishment of those sins. Thus it is said of Christ, that he dyed, διὰ τὰ πειρασμὰ ἡμῶν for our sins, ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, that he suffered once ὡς ἁμαρτιῶν, that he gave himself ὡς ἁμαρτιῶν, that he offered a Sacrifice μετὰ ἁμαρτιῶν. To which Crel-  
lius replies, That if the force of these  
“ particles not being joyned with suffer-  
“ ings, may be taken for the final and  
“ not for the impulsive cause, they  
“ may retain the same sense when joyn-  
“ ed with sufferings, if those sufferings  
“ may be designed in order to an end ;  
“ but

The par-  
ticles διὰ,  
μετὰ, ὑπὲρ  
being  
joyned to  
sins, and  
relating  
to suffer-  
ings, do  
imply  
those suf-  
ferings to  
be the pu-  
nishment  
of sin.

Rom 4.25.  
1 Cor. 15.3.  
1 Pet 3.18.  
Heb. 10. 12.

Crel. c. 7.  
Sect. 6.

Set. 14. p.  
17.

“ but if it should be granted, that those  
 “ phrases being joyned with sufferings,  
 “ do always imply a meritorious cause,  
 “ yet it doth not follow, it should be  
 “ here so understood because the matter  
 “ will not bear it. To this a short answer will at present serve: for, It is not possible a meritorious cause can be expressed more emphatically than by these words beings joyned to sufferings: so that we have as clear a testimony from these expressions as words can give; and by the same arts by which these may be avoided any other might; so that it had not been possible for our Doctrine to have been expressed in such a manner, but such kind of answers might have been given as our Adversaries now give. If it had been said in the plainest terms, *that Christ's death was a punishment for our sins*, they would as easily have avoided the force of them as they do of these;  
 “ they would have told us the Apostles  
 “ delighted in an Antanacsis, and had  
 “ expressed things different from the natural use of the words by them; and  
 “ though punishment were sometimes  
 “ used properly, yet here it must be used  
 “ only metaphorically because the matter would bear no other sense. And there-

therefore I commend the ingenuity of Socinus after all the pains he had taken to enervate the force of those places which are brought against his Doctrine; he “ tells us plainly, That if our Doctrine “ were not only once, but frequently “ mentioned in Scripture? yet he would “ not therefore believe the thing to be “ so as we suppose. For, *saith he*, seeing the thing it self cannot be, I take “ the least inconvenient interpretation “ of the words; and draw forth such a “ sense from them, as is most consistent “ with it self and the tenor of the Scripture. But for all his talking of the tenor of the *Scripture*; by the same reason he interprets one place upon these terms, he will do many, and so the tenor of the *Scripture* shall be never against him: and by this we find, that the main strength of our Adversaries is not pretended to lie in the *Scriptures*; all the care they have of them is only to reconcile them if possible with their *hypothesis*; for they do not deny but that the natural force of the words doth imply what we contend for; but because they say the Doctrine we assert is inconsistent with reason, therefore all their design is to find out any other possible meaning which they there-

Socin. de  
Servat. l. 3.  
c. 6.

therefore assert to be true, because more agreeable to the common reason of mankind. This therefore is enough for our present purpose, that if it had been the design of Scripture to have expressed our sense, it could not have done it in plainer expressions than it hath done, that no expressions could have been used, but the same arts of our Adversaries might have been used to take off their force, which they have used to those we now urge against them, and that setting aside the possibility of the thing, the Scripture doth very fairly deliver the Doctrine we contend for ; or, supposing in point of reason there may be arguments enough to make it appear possible, there are *Scriptures* enough to make it appear true.

---

## C H A P III.

- I. *The words of Scripture being at last acknowledged by our Adversaries to make for us, the only pretence remaining is that our Doctrine is repugnant to reason. The debate managed upon point of reason. The grand difficulty enquired into, and manifested by our Adversaries concessions, not to lie in the greatness of Christ's sufferings, or that our sins were the impulsive cause of them, or that it is impossible that one should be punished for anothers faults: or in all cases unjust.* II. *The cases wherein Crellius allows it, instanced. From whence it is proved that he yields the main cause.* III. *The arguments propounded whereby he attempts to prove it unjust for Christ to be punished for our sins. Crellius his principles of the justice of punishments examined. Of the relation between desert and punishment.* IV. *That a person by his own consent may be punished beyond the desert of his own actions.* V. *An answer to Crellius his Objections. What it is to suffer undeservedly. Crellius his mistake in the state*  
of

## Of the Sufferings

of the question. VI. *The instances of Scripture considered. In what sense Children are punished for their Parents sins.*

VII. *Ezek. 18. 20. explained at large.*

VIII. *Whether the guilty being freed from the sufferings of an innocent person makes that punishment unjust or no? Crellius his shifts and evasions in this matter discovered. Why among men the offenders are not freed in criminal matters though the sureties be punished. The release of the party depends on the terms of the sureties suffering, therefore deliverance not ipso facto. No necessity of such a translation in criminal, as is in pecuniary matters.*

The matter debated in point of reason.

I. **H**AVING gained so considerable concessions from our *Adversaries* concerning the places of *Scripture*, we come now to debate the matter in point of reason. And if there appear to be nothing repugnant in the nature of the thing, or to the justice of God, then all their loud clamours will come to nothing; for on that they fix, when they talk the most of our Doctrine being contrary to reason. This therefore we now come more closely to examine, in order

der to which we must carefully enquire what it is they lay the charge of injustice in God upon, according to our belief of Christ's sufferings being a punishment for our sins.

1. It is not, *That the offenders themselves do not undergo the full punishment of their sins.* For they assert, that there is no necessity at all that the offenders should be punished from any punitive justice in God: for they eagerly contend that God may freely pardon the sins of men: if so, then it can be no injustice in God not to punish the offenders according to the full desert of their sins.

2. It is not, *That God upon the sufferings of Christ doth pardon the sins of men:* for they yield that God may do this without any charge of injustice, and with the greatest demonstration of his kindness. For they acknowledge, that the sufferings of Christ are not to be considered as a bare antecedent condition to pardon, but that they were a *moving cause* as far as the obedience of Christ in suffering was very acceptable to God.

3. It is not, *in the greatness or matter of the sufferings of Christ.* For

*Certum est Christum innocentissimum à Deo gravissimis cruciatibus, ipsaque morte fuisse affectum; cum non in materiâ pœnæ absolute & per se consideratâ, adeoque etiam in eâ afflictione à quâ pœna forma abest, injuria residere à nobis dicatur. Crel. c. 4. Sect. 3. Potuit autem id Deus facere, atque adeo fecit, jure dominii, quod in Christi vitam ac corpus habebat; accedente præsertim ipsius Christi consensu. Id. Ib. Sect. 4.*

they assert the same which we do. And therefore I cannot but wonder to meet sometimes with those strange out-crys of our making God cruel in the punishing of his Son for us: for what do we assert that Christ suffered, which they do not assert too? Nay, doth it not look much more like cruelty in God to lay those sufferings upon him without any consideration of sin? as upon their hypo-

*thesis* he doth; than to do it supposing he bears the punishment of our iniquities, which is the thing we plead for. They assert all those sufferings to be lawful on the account of *God's dominion*, which according to them must cease to be so on the supposition of a *meritorious cause*. But however from this it appears, that it was not unjust that Christ should suffer those things which he did for us: the question then is, whether it were unjust that he should suffer the same things, which he might lawfully do on the account of dominion with a respect to our sins as the cause of them.

4. As



4. As to this, they acknowledge, that it is not, *that the sufferings of Christ were occasioned by our sins*, or that our sins were the bare *impulsive cause* of those sufferings. For they both confess in general, that one mans sins may be the occasion of anothers punishment, so far that he might have escaped punishment, if the others sins had not been the *impulsive cause* of it. And therefore *Crellius* in the general state of this question, would not have it, *whether it be unjust to punish one for anothers sins*; for that he acknowledges it is not, but whether, *for any cause whatsoever it be just to punish an innocent person*? And likewise in particular of Christ, they confess, *that our sins were the impulsive cause, and the occasion of his sufferings*.

Quod si ex thesi speciale  
facere velis generalem, ea  
hæc erit, injustum esse pun-  
nirè innocentem, quacunque  
tandem de causâ id fiat;  
non vero simpliciter, punire  
quempiam ob aliena deli-  
cta; id enim concedi potest  
non semper esse injustum.  
Crel. c. 4. Sect. 3.

5. It is not, *that there is so necessary a relation, between guilt and punishment, that it can not be called a punishment which is inflicted on an innocent person*. For *Crellius*, after a long discourse of the difference of afflictions and punishments, doth acknowledge, "That it is not of

*Cum ne il-* “ the nature of punishment, that the  
*lud quidem* “ person who is to be punished, should  
*ad natu-* “ really deserve the punishment; and  
*ram pœ-* “ afterwards when Grotius *urgeth*, that  
*na requi-* “ though it be essential to punishment,  
*ratur, ut is* “ that it be inflicted for sin, yet it  
*ipse, qui ph-* “ is not, that it be inflicted upon  
*niendus est,* “ him who hath himself sinned, *which*  
*panam re-* “ *he shews*, by the similitude of rewards,  
*vera sue-* “ which though necessary to be given  
*rit comme-* “ in consideration of service, may yet  
*ritus, Id.* “ be given to others besides the person  
 Sect. 5. “ himself upon his account. All this *Crel-*  
           “ *lius* acknowledgeth; who saith, “ They  
           “ do not make it necessary to the na-  
           “ ture, but to the justice of punish-  
           “ ment, that it be inflicted upon none  
           “ but the person who hath offended. *So*  
*Pœna qui-* “ *by his own Confession*, it is not against  
*dem simpli-* “ the nature of punishment, that no  
*citer in in-* “ one man suffer for anothers faults.  
*nocentem* “ From whence it follows, that all *Socinus*  
*cedit, iusta* “ his arguments signifie nothing, which  
*non cadit.* “ are drawn from the impossibility of the  
 Crel. c. 4- thing, *that one man should be punished*  
 Sect. 28. “ *for anothers faults*; for *Crellius* grants  
           “ the thing to be possible, but denies it to  
           “ be just; yet not absolutely neither, but  
           “ with some restrictions and limitations.  
           For,

II. 6. It is not, *but that there may be sufficient causes assigned in some particular cases; wherein it may be just for God to punish some for the sins of others.* For *Crellius* himself hath assigned divers.

In what cases *Crellius* grants some may be lawfully punished for the sins of others.

“When there is such a near conjunction between them, that one may be said to be punished in the punishment of another: as Parents in their Children and Posterity, Kings in their Subjects, or the body of a State in its Members, either in the most, or the most principal, though the fewest: but we are to consider, how far he doth extend this way of punishment of some in others.

*Quia Deus hunc puniendo illum quoque alterum ob cuius peccati eum dicitur punire, simul punire possit, ob arduioremque inter illos intercedat conjunctionem.*  
*Crell. ib. Sect. 5. Crell. p. 242.*

1. *At the greatest distance of time, if they have been of the same Nation;* for he extends it to the utmost degree of God's patience towards a people; “For, saith he, God doth not presently punish as soon as they have sinned; but spares for a great while, and forbears, in expectation of their repentance, in the mean while a great many guilty persons die, and seem to have escaped punishment. But at last the time of God's patience being past, he punisheth their Posterity by exacting the full punishment of their sins upon them, and by this means punisheth their Ance-

“ stors too, and punisheth their sins in  
 “ their punishment ; for, *saith he*, all  
 “ that people are reckoned for one man  
 “ of several Ages, and that punishment  
 “ which is taken of the last, may be for  
 “ the sins of the first, for the conjun-  
 “ ction and succession of them : of  
 “ which we have an example, *saith he*,  
 “ in the destruction of *Jerusalem*. By  
 which we see a very remote conjunction,  
 and a meer similitude in comparing a  
 succession of Ages in a people with those  
 in a man, may (when occasion serves)  
 be made use of to justify God’s punish-  
 ing one Generation of men for the sins  
 of others that have been long before.  
*2. When sins are more secret, or less remarka-*  
*ble which God might not punish, unless an*  
*occasion were given from others sins impel-*  
*ling him to it ;* but because God would  
 punish one very near them, he therefore  
 punisheth them, that in their punishment  
 he might punish the other. Or in case  
 sins spread through a Family or a peo-  
 ple, or they are committed by divers  
 persons at sundry times, which God doth  
 not severally punish, but sometimes then,  
 when the Head of a People or Family  
 hath done something which remarkably  
 deserves punishment, whom he will pu-  
 nish

nish in those he is related to, and therefore generally punisheth the whole Family or People. 3. *That which may be a meer exercise of dominion as to some, may be a proper punishment to others*; as in the case of *Infants*, being taken away for their *Parents* sins; For *God*, as to the *Children*, he saith, useth only an act of dominion, but the punishment only redounds to the *Parents*, who lose them; and though this be done for the very end of punishment, yet he denies, that it hath the nature of Punishment in any but the *Parents*. *Crell. ib.*

4. *That punishment may be intended for* <sup>sect. 11.</sup> *those who can have no sense at all of it*; as <sup>sect. 19.</sup> *Crellius* asserts in the case of *Saul's sons*, 2 Sam. 21. 8, 14. that the punishment was mainly intended for *Saul*, who was already dead. From these concessions of *Crellius* in this case, we may take notice, 1. That a remote conjunction may be sufficient for a translation of penalty, viz. from one Generation to another. 2. That sins may be truly said to be punished in others, when the offenders themselves may escape punishment, thus the sins of *Parents* in their *Children*, and *Princes* in their *Subjects*. 3. That an act of dominion in some may be designed as a proper punishment to others.

4. That the nature of punishment is not to be measured by the sense of it. Now upon these concessions, though our Adversaries will not grant, that Christ was properly punished for our sins, yet they cannot deny but that we may very properly be said to be *punished* for our sins in *Christ*, and if they will yield us this, the other may be a strife about words. For surely there may be easily imagined as great a conjunction between Christ and us, as between the several Generations of the *Jews*, and that last which was punished in the destruction of *Jerusalem*: and though we escape that punishment which Christ did undergo, yet we might have our sins punished in him, as well as Princes theirs in their Subjects, when they escape themselves; or rather as Subjects in an innocent Prince, who may suffer for the faults of his people; if it be said, *that these are acts of meer dominion as to such a one*, that nothing hinders but granting it, yet our sins may be said to be punished in him; as well as Parents sins are punished properly in meer acts of dominion upon their Children; if it be said, *that can be no punishment where there is no sense at all of it*, that is fully taken off by *Crellius*; for  
surely

surely we have as great a sense of the sufferings of Christ, as the first Generation of the Jews had of the sufferings of the last, before the fatal destruction of the City, or as *Saul* had of the punishment of his Sons after his death. So that from *Crellius* his own concessions, we have proved, that *our sins may very properly be said to be punished in Christ*, although he will not say, that Christ could be properly punished for our sins; nay he and the rest of our Adversaries not only deny it, but earnestly contend, that it is very unjust to suppose it, and repugnant to the rectitude of God's nature to do it.

III. And so we come to consider the mighty arguments that are insisted on for the proof of this, which may be reduced to these three; viz. 1. *That there can be no punishment but what is deserved, but no man can deserve that another should be punished.* 2. *That punishment flows from revenge, but there can be no revenge where there hath been no fault.* 3. *That the punishment of one, cannot any ways be made the punishment of another; and in case it be supposed possible, then those in whose stead the other is punished, must be actually delivered upon the pay-*

*Crellius his arguments propounded.*

payment of that Debt which was owing to God.

1. That one man cannot deserve anothers punishment, and therefore one cannot be punished for another ; for there is no just punishment, but what is deserved. This being the main Argument insisted on by *Crellius*, must be more carefully considered ; but before an answer be made to it, it is necessary that a clear account be given in what sense it is he understands it, which will be best done, by laying down his principles, as to the justice of punishments, in a more distinct method than himself hath done ; which are these following : 1. That no person can be justly punished, either for his own or anothers faults, but he that hath deserved to be punished by some sin of his own : For he still asserts, “ That the justice of  
 “ punishment ariseth from a mans own  
 “ fault, though the actual punishment  
 “ may be from anothers : But he that is  
 “ punished without respect to his own  
 “ guilt, is punished undeservedly ; and  
 “ he that is punished undeservedly, is punished unjustly. 2. That personal guilt being supposed one mans sin may be the *impulsive cause* of anothers punishment, but they cannot be the *meritori-*

*Crell. c. 4.  
 sect. 3.  
 p. 239,  
 240.*

*ous.*



ons. The difference between them he  
 thus explains, "The cause, is that which  
 "makes a thing to be; the impulsive,  
 "that which moves one to do a thing,  
 "without any consideration of right that  
 "one hath to do it: Merit, is that which  
 "makes a man worthy of a thing, ei-  
 "ther good or bad, and so gives a right  
 "to it; if it be good, to himself; if  
 "bad, to him at whose hands he hath  
 "deserved it. Now he tells us, that it is  
 impossible, "That one mans sins should  
 "make any other deserve punishment,  
 "but the person who committed them;  
 "but they may impel one to punish ano-  
 "ther, and that justly, if the person hath  
 "otherwise deserved to be punished, un-  
 "justly if he hath not. The reason he  
 gives of it is, "That the vitiosity of the  
 "act, which is the proper cause of pu-  
 "nishment, cannot go beyond the per-  
 "son of the offender; and therefore can  
 "oblige none to punishment, but him  
 "that hath committed the fault. And  
 therefore he asserts, "That no man can  
 "be justly punished beyond the desert  
 "of his own sins, but there may some-  
 "times be a double impulsive cause of  
 "that punishment; viz. His own and  
 "other mens, whereof one made that  
 "they

Crell. id.  
 sect. 18.

“ they might be justly punished, the o-  
 “ ther that they should be actually : but  
 “ the latter, *he saith*, always supposeth  
 “ the former, as the foundation of just  
 “ punishment ; so that no part of pu-  
 “ nishment could be executed upon him,  
 “ wherein his own sins were not suppo-  
 “ sed as the meritorious cause of it.  
 These are his two main principles which  
 we must now thoroughly examine, the  
 main force of his Book lying in them.  
 But if we can prove, that it hath been  
 generally received by the consent of  
 mankind, that a person may be punish-  
 ed beyond the desert of his own actions ;  
 if God hath justly punished some for the  
 sins of others, and there be no injustice  
 in one mans suffering by his own con-  
 sent for another, then these principles of  
*Crellius* will be found not so firm as he  
 imagines them.

That a  
 person by  
 his own  
 consent  
 may be  
 punished  
 beyond  
 the desert  
 of his own  
 actions.  
*Grot. de Sa-  
 tisf. c. 4.*

IV. 1. That it hath been generally  
 received by the consent of mankind, that  
 a person may be justly punished beyond  
 the desert of his own actions. For which  
 purpose *Grotius* objected against *Socinus*  
 (who appealed to the consent of Nations,  
 about one being punished for anothers  
 fault) “ That the Heathens did agree,  
 “ that Children might be punished for  
 “ their

“ their Parents faults, and people for  
 “ their Princes, and that corporal pu-  
 “ nishment might be born by one for  
 “ another, did appear by the *Persians*  
 “ punishing the whole family for the  
 “ fault of one. The *Macedonians* the  
 “ near kindred in the case of Treason;  
 “ some Cities of *Greece*, destroying the  
 “ Children of Tyrants together with  
 “ them; in all which, the meer con-  
 “ junction was supposed a sufficient  
 “ reason without consent; but in case  
 “ of consent, *he saith*, They all a-  
 “ greed in the Justice of some being  
 “ punished for the faults of others.  
 “ Thence the right of killing hostages  
 “ among the most civilized nations;  
 “ and of sureties being punished in Ca-  
 “ pital matters, if the guilty appear not,  
 “ who were thence called *ἀντιδοχοί*, who  
 “ were bound to answer body for body.

In which cases, the punishment did ex-  
 tend beyond the desert of the person who  
 suffered it; for no other reason is assign-  
 ed of these sufferings, besides the con-  
 junction of the person, or his consent;  
 but no antecedent guilt is supposed as  
 necessary, to make the punishment just.

We are now to consider what *Crellius*  
 doth answer to this: 1. As to their ac-  
 knowledgments

knowledgments of God's punishing Children for their Parents faults, he gives the same answer which he doth to the examples recorded in *Scripture* to that purpose, *That either they were punished for the sins of others, but their own sins deserved the punishment; or that the Parents were punished in the Children, but the Children were not properly punished.* 2. As to punishments among men, he answers two

*Crell. c. 4.  
sect. 5. p.  
244.*

things; 1. That such persons were truly punished, but not justly: for he acknowledges, That in such a case it is a proper punishment, and that it is enough in order to that, that any fault be charged upon a person, whether his own or anothers, whether true or false, on the account of which he is supposed worthy to be punished: And that such a conjunction is sufficient for cruel, angry, or imprudent men; for where ever there is a place, *saith he*, for anger, there is likewise for punishment. So that he confesseth, there may be a true punishment, and that which answers all the reason and ends of punishment assigned by him where there is *no desert* at all of it in the person who undergoes it. But then he adds, *that this is an unjust punishment*, to which I reply, That

That then the reason of punishment assigned by *Crellius* before is insufficient; for if this answers all the ends of punishments assigned by him, and yet be unjust, then it necessarily follows, that those ends of punishment are consistent with the greatest injustice. For he before made punishment to have a natural respect to anger, and makes the ordinary end of punishment to be a satisfaction of the desire of revenge in men, yet now grants, that these may be in an unjust punishment. Neither can it be said, *that he considered punishment only naturally, and not morally*; for he tells us, *that this is the nature of divine punishments*, which are therefore just, because designed for these ends; but in case there be no supposal of a fault at all, then he denies that it is a punishment, but only an affliction, and an exercise of dominion. So that according to him, where-ever there is a proper punishment, it must be just, when-ever God doth punish men: and the only difference between God and man supposable in this case is, that we have assurance God will never use his dominion unjustly; but that men do so when they make one to suffer for anothers fault, notwithstanding a consent and conjunction

junction between the man that committed the fault, and the person that suffers for him. But this is begging the thing in question, for we are debating, whether it be an unlawfull exercise of power or no? for we have this presumption, that it is not unlawfull, because it may answer all the ends of punishments, and what way can we better judge, whether a punishment be just or no, than by that?

Objections answered.

V. But we are to consider, that we do not here take the person we speak of, abstractly *as an innocent person*, for then there is no question, but anger and punishment of one as such is unjust; but of an innocent person as supposed under an obligation by his own consent to suffer for another. And in this case we assert, since according to *Crellius* the natural and proper ends of punishments may be obtained, and the consent of the person takes away the wrong done to him in the matter of his sufferings, so far as he hath power over himself, that such a punishment is not unjust. For if it be, it must suppose some *injury* to be done; but in this case let them assign where the injury lies; it cannot be to the *publick*, if the ends of punishments may be obtained  
by

by such a suffering of one for another by a valid consent of the suffering party, it cannot be to the *person in whose room* the other suffers, for what injury is that to escape punishment by anothers suffering; it cannot be to *the suffering person*, supposing that to be true, which the Heathens still supposed, *viz.* that every man had a power over his own life. If it be said still, that the unjustice lies in this; *that such a one suffers undeservedly, and therefore unjustly.* I answer; if be meant by *undeservedly* without *sufficient cause or reason* of punishment, then we deny that such a one doth suffer *undeservedly*. *Immerito* in the Greek Glosses is rendred by ἄλῶως, and *Merito* by ἐν ὀνόματι and ἐν λόγῳ, and in *Cicero*, *jure & merito* are most commonly joyned together. So that where there is a right to punish, and sufficient reason for it, such a one doth not suffer *immerito*, i. e. *undeservedly*. If it be said, *that such a one is not dignus pœna*, that implies no more than the other, for *dignus*, or as the Ancients writ it *dicnus*, comes from the Greek δίκον *jus*, as *Vossius* tells us, *ut dignus sit cui tribui aliquid æquum est*: so that where there is an equity in the thing, there is a dignity in the person, or he

*Immerito  
quenquam  
punire est  
injuste pu-  
nire. Crell.  
p. 240.*

L may

may be said to be *worthy* to undergo it. *But doth not this lay open the greatest innocency to as great a desert of sufferings, as the highest guilt?* By no means. For we make a lyableness to punishment, the natural consequent of guilt: and he that hath committed a fault, cannot but *deserve* to be punished, so that no sufferings of others can take away the natural consequence of a bad action, which is a *desert of punishment*; So that as we say, a wicked action cannot but deserve to be punished, *i. e.* there is an agreeableness in reason and nature, that he who hath done ill, should suffer ill; so we say likewise there is necessity in nature and reason, that he that hath thus deserved it, must unavoidably suffer it. And on the other side, we say, *no man by his innocency can deserve to be punished*, *i. e.* no man's innocency makes him by vertue of that obnoxious to punishment; but yet we add, that *notwithstanding his innocency*, the circumstances may be such that he may be *justly* punished, and in that sense *deservedly*. So that the Question is strangely mistaken, when it is thus put, *Whether an innocent person considered as such, may be justly punished*; for no one asserts that, or is bound to do it;



it; but the true question is, *whether a person notwithstanding his innocency may not by some act of his own will oblige himself to undergo that punishment which otherwise he did not deserve? which punishment, in that case is just and agreeable to reason.* And this is that which we assert and plead for. So that innocency here is not considered any other ways, than whether that alone makes it an unlawfull punishment, which otherwise would be lawfull, *i. e.* whether the Magistrate in such cases, where substitution is admittable by the Laws of Nations (as in the cases we are now upon) be bound to regard any more than that the obligation to punishment now lies upon the person, who by his own act hath substituted himself in the others room; and if he proceeds upon this, his action is justifiable and agreeable to reason. If it be said, *that the substitution is unjust, unless the substituted person hath beforehand deserved to be punished;* it is easily answered, that this makes not the matter at all clearer; for either the person is punished for the former fault; and then there is no substitution; or if he be punished by way of substitution; then there is no regard at all had to his for-

The instances of  
Scripture  
considered.

mer fault, and so it is all one as if he were perfectly innocent.

VI. And by this *Crellius* his answer to the instances both in *Scripture* and elsewhere concerning Childrens being punished for their Parents faults, will appear to be insufficient, viz. That  
 “ God doth never punish them for their  
 “ Parents faults beyond the desert of  
 “ their own sins, and therefore no argument can be drawn from thence, that  
 “ God may punish an innocent person  
 “ for the sins of others, because he hath  
 “ punished some for what they were  
 “ innocent: For the force of the argument doth not lie in the supposition of their innocency, as to the ground of punishment in general, for we do not deny, but that they may deserve to be punished for their own faults: but the argument lies in this, whether their own guilt were then considered as the reason of punishment, when God did punish them for their fathers faults? And whether they by their own sins did deserve to be punished not only with the punishment due to their own miscarriages, but with the punishment due to their fathers too? If not, then some persons are justly punished, who have not deserved that

that punishment they undergo; if they did deserved it, then one person may deserve to be punished for anothers sins. If it be said, as it is by *Crellius*, *that his own sins make him capable of punishment, and God by occasion of others sins doth execute that punishment, which he might not have done for his own.* I answer, we are not enquiring into the bare capacity of punishing, but into the reason of it: was the reason of punishment his own or his fathers sins? If his own, then he was punished only for his own sins? if his fathers then the punishment may be just which is inflicted without consideration of proper *desert* of it; *for no man (say they) can deserve to be punished, but for his own sins.* But it's said, *that the sins of Fathers are only an impulsive cause for God to punish the Children according to the desert of their own sins which he might otherwise have forborn to punish.* Then, the sins of the Fathers are no *reason* why the Children should be punished; but their own sins are the *reason*, and their Fathers the *bare occasion* of being punished for them. But in *Scripture*, the *reason* of punishment is drawn from the *Fathers sins*, and not from the *Childrens*: For then the words would have

run thus, *if the Children sin, and deserve punishment by their own iniquities, then I will take occasion from their Fathers sins, to visit their own iniquities upon them*: Whereas the words refer to the *Fathers sins* as the reason of the *Childrens* punishment. So in the words of the Law, wherein the reason of punishment ought to be most expressly assigned, it is not, *I will certainly punish the Children, if they continue in the Idolatry of their Fathers*; but, *I will visit the sins of the Fathers upon the Children, unto the third and fourth Generation of them that hate me*. If it were only because of *imitation* of the Fathers sins by the Children, there could be no reason for the limitation to the third and fourth Generation; for then the reason of punishment would be as long as the *imitation* continued, whether to the fourth or tenth Generation:

And as *Alphonfus à Castro* observes, “ If the reason of punishment were the imitation of their Fathers sins, then the Children were not punished for their Fathers sins, but for their own; for that imitation was a sin of their own, and not of their Fathers. Besides, if the proper reason of punishment were the sins of the Children, and the Fathers sins

*Alph. à Castro de justâ  
harer. puni-  
tis. l. 2. c.  
10.*

sins only the occasion of it, then where it is mentioned that Children are punished for their Parents sins, the Childrens *sins* should have been particularly expressed, as the proper *cause* of the punishment: But no other reason is assigned in the Law, but the sins of the *Fathers*, no other cause mentioned of *Canaan's* punishment, but his Father's sin; nor of the punishment of the people in *David's* time, but his own sin; *Lo, I have sinned, and I have done wickedly, but these sheep, what have they done?* Which is no hyperbolical expression, but the assigning the proper *cause* of that judgment to have been his *own sin*, as the whole Chapter declares: Nor, of the hanging up of *Saul's sons by the Gibeonites*, but, *that Saul their Father had plotted their destruction*. And in an instance more remarkable than any of those which *Crellius* answers; viz. the punishment of the people of *Judah*, for the sins of *Manasses* in the time of *Josias*; when a through Reformation was designed among them, the Prince being very good, and all the places of Idolatry destroyed, such a Pass-over kept as had not been kept before in the time of any King in *Israel*, yet it then follows, *Notwithstanding the Lord*

Gen. 9. 25.

2 Sam. 24. 17.

2 Sam. 21. 5.

2 Kings 23.  
v. 4. to v. 21.

turned not from the fierceness of his great wrath, wherewith his anger was kindled against Judah, because of all the provocations wherewith Manasses had provoked him withal. Who can say here, that the sins

Verf. 22.

Verf. 26.

2 Chron.  
34. 33.

of Manasseh were only the occasion of God punishing the people in the time of Josias for their own sins, when their sins were much less in the time of Josias, than in any time mentioned before, after their lapse into Idolatry? Nay, it is expressly said, *That Josiah took away all the abominations out of all the countries that pertained to the Children of Israel, and made all that were present in Israel to serve, even to serve the Lord their God. And all his days they departed not from following the Lord God of their Fathers*: To say, that this was done in hypocrisie, and bare outward compliance, is to speak without book; and if the reason of so severe punishments had been their hypocrisie, that ought to have been mentioned; but not only here, but afterwards it is said, that the reason of God's destroying Judah, was for the sins of Manasseh; viz. his Idolatries and Murther, which it is said, *the Lord will not pardon*. And if he would not pardon, then he did punish for those sins, not barely

2 Sam. 24.  
3. 4.

barely as the *occasion*, but as the *meritorious cause* of that punishment. What shall we say then? Did the people in *Josiah's* time, deserve to be punished for the sins of *Manasseh*, Grandfather to *Josiah*? Or was God so highly provoked with those sins, that although he did not punish *Manasseh* himself upon his repentance, yet he would let the world see, how much he abhorred them, by punishing those sins upon the people afterwards; although according to the usual proportion of sins punishments, the sins of the people in that age did not exceed the sins of other ages, as much as the punishments they suffered, did exceed the punishments of other ages: which is necessary according to *Cresslius* his Doctrine; for if God never punisheth by occasion of their Fathers sins, the Children beyond the *desert* of their own sins; then it is necessary, that where judgments are remarkably greater, the sins must be so too; the contrary to which is plain in this instance. By which we see, that it is not contrary to the Justice of God in punishing, to make the punishment of some on the account of others sins, to exceed the *desert* of their own; measuring that *desert*, not in a way common

mon to all sin, but when the *desert*, of some sins is compared with the desert of others: For it is of this latter we speak of, and of the method which God useth in punishing sin here, for the demonstration of his hatred of it, according to which the greatest punishments must suppose the greatest sins, either of their own, or others which they suffer for.

Ezek. 18.  
20. explained.  
Ezek. 18.  
4. 20.

VII. But *bath not God declared, That he will never punish the Children for the Fathers sins? for the soul that sinneth it shall die; the son shall not bear the iniquity of the Father, &c.* To which I answer, These words are to be considered, as an answer to a complaint made by the *Jews*, soon after their going into Captivity, which they imputed to God's severity in punishing them for their Fathers sins. Now the complaint was either true or false; if it were true, then though this was looked upon as great severity in God, yet it was no injustice in him; for though God may act severely, he cannot act unjustly: If it was false, then the answer had been an absolute denial of it, as a thing repugnant to the Justice of God. Which we do not find here, but that  
God



God saith unto them, v. 3. *Ye shall not have occasion any more to use this Proverb in Israel: if the thing had been plainly unjust, which they complained of, he would have told them, they never had occasion to use it. But we find the Prophets telling them before hand, that they should suffer for their Father's sins, Jerem. 15. 3, 4. where he threatens them with destruction and banishment, because of the sins of Manasseh in Jerusalem; and in the beginning of the captivity they complain of this, Lam. 5. 7. Our Fathers have sinned, and are not, and we have born their iniquities. And Jerem. 31. 28. God saith by the Prophet, that he had watched over them to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy, and to afflict: but that he would watch over them to build, and to plant, and in those days they shall say no more, the Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, Jer. 31. 29, and the Childrens teeth are set on edge; but 30. every one shall die for his own iniquity. Which place is exactly parallel with this in Ezekiel, and gives us a clear account of it, which is, that now indeed God had dealt very severely with them, by making them suffer beyond what in the ordinary course of his providence their sins had deserved; but he punished them*  
not

not only for their own sins, but the sins of their *Fathers* : But lest they should think, they should be utterly consumed for their iniquities, and be no longer a people enjoying the Land which *God* had promised them, he tells them by the *Prophets*, though they had smarted so much, by reason of their *Fathers* sins, this severity should not always continue upon them ; but that *God* would visit them with his kindness again, and would plant them in their own Land, then they should see no reason to continue this Proverb among them, for they would then find, *Though their Fathers had eaten sowre grapes, their teeth should not be always set on edge with it.* And if we observe it, the occasion of the Proverb, was concerning the Land of *Israel*, על ארמת ישראל, *supra terra Israel*, as the *Chaldee Paraphrast* renders it more agreeable to the *Hebrew*, than the other Versions do. So that the Land of *Israel* was the occasion of the Proverb, by their being banished out of it for their *Fathers* sins. Now *God* tells them, they should have no more occasion to use this Proverb concerning the Land of *Israel* ; for they, notwithstanding their *Fathers* sins, should return into their own Land. And even during  
the

Ezek. 18.  
2.

the continuance of their captivity, they should not undergo such great severities for the future, but they should find their condition much more tolerable than they imagined ; only, if any were guilty of greater sins than others, they should themselves suffer for their own faults, but he would not punish the whole Nation for them, or their own posterity. This I take to be the genuine meaning of this place ; and I the rather embrace it, because I find such insuperable difficulties in other Interpretations that are given of it : For to say as our Adversaries do, *That what God saith, should not be for the future, was repugnant to his nature and justice ever to do*, is to charge God plainly with injustice in what he had done : For the *Prophets* told them they should suffer for the sins of their *Fathers* : Which sufferings were the ground of their complaint now, and the answer here given must relate to the occasion of the complaint ; for God saith, *They should not have occasion to use that Proverb* : Wherein is implied, they should not have the same reason to complain which they had then. I demand then, Do not these words imply, That God would not do for the future with them, what he had done before ;

fore; if not, the proper answer had been a plain denial, and not a promise for the future he would not; if they do, then either *God* properly punished them for the sins of their *Fathers*, and then God must be *unjust* in doing so, or it was just with *God* to do it, and so this place instead of overthrowing will prove, that some may be justly punished, beyond the desert of their own sins: or else, *God did only take occasion by their Fathers sins, to punish them according to the desert of their own iniquities*: But when they had no cause to complain, that they were punished for any more than their own iniquities; and withal, then God doth oblige himself by his promise here, never to punish men for the future *by the occasion of others sins*: which is not only contrary to their own Doctrine, but to what is plainly seen afterwards in the punishment of the *Jews* for their *Fathers sins*, mentioned by our *Saviour* after this: And if this be a certain rule of equity which God here saith, that he would never vary from, then the punishing of some on the occasion of others sins, would be as unjust, as our *Adversaries* suppose the punishing any beyond the desert of their own sins to be. *But is not implied,*

Matt. 23.  
35.

*implied, that Gods ways would be unequal, Ezek. 18. if he ever did otherwise than he there said* <sup>25.</sup>

*he would do ?* No, it is not, if by *equal* he meant *just*, for his ways never were, or can be so unequal ; but here if it be taken with a respect to the main dispute of the Chapter, no more is implied in them, but that they judged amiss concerning God's actions, and that they were *just*, when they thought them not to be so : or if at least, they thought his ways very severe, though *just*, God by remitting of this severity, would shew that he was not only *just*, but *kind* ; and so they would find his ways *equal*, that is, always agreeable to themselves, and ending in *kindness* to them, though they hitherto were so severe towards them in their banishment and captivity. Or if they be taken with a respect to the immediate occasion of them both, *Ezek. 18.*—33.

They do not relate to this dispute about *Childrens suffering for their Fathers sins* ; *Ezek. 33.* <sup>20.</sup> but to another, which was concerning a righteous mans sinning and dying in his sins, and a wicked mans repenting, and living in his righteousness ; which were directly contrary to the common opinion of the *Jews* to this day, which is, that God will judge men according  
to

to the greatest number of their actions good or bad: as appears by *Maimonides* and others. Now they thought it a very hard case, for a man who had been righteous the far greatest part of his time, if he did at last commit iniquity, that his former righteousness should signifie nothing, but he must die in his iniquity. To this therefore God answers, that it was only the inequality of their own ways, which made them think God's ways in doing so unequal. This then doth not make it unequal, for God either to punish men, upon the occasion, or by the desert of other mens sins, supposing such a conjunction between them, as there is in the same body of people, to those who went before them. And

*Crell. c. 4. sect. 15.* *Crellius* himself grants, " That *Socinus*

" never intended to prove, that one mans suffering for anothers sins was unjust in it self, from this place: no, not though we take it in the strictest sense, for one suffering in the stead of another.

VIII. Having thus far declared, how far it is agreeable to God's Justice, to punish any persons either by reason of his dominion, or the conjunction of persons, for the sins of others, and consequently whether any punishment may be undergone just-

The deliverance of the guilty by the sufferings of an innocent person by his own consent, makes not the punishment unjust.

justly beyond the proper desert of their own sins, I now return to *the consent of Mankind* in it, on supposition either of a near conjunction, or a valid consent which must make up the want of dominion in men without it. And the question still proceeds upon the supposition of those things, that there be a proper dominion in men over that which they part with for others sakes, and that they do it by their free consent; and then we justify it not to be repugnant to the principles of Reason and Justice, for any to suffer beyond the *desert* of their own actions. And *Crellius* his saying, that such a punishment is true punishment, but not just; is no answer at all to the consent of Nations that it is so. And therefore finding this answer insufficient; he relies upon another, *viz.* "That it *Crell. c. 4. sect. 30 32, 34. &c.*  
" was never received by the consent of  
" Nations, that one man should suffer in  
" the stead of another, so as the guilty  
" should be freed by the others suffering.  
" For, *he saith*, neither *Socinus* nor he  
" do deny that one man may be punish-  
" ed for anothers sins; but that which  
" they deny is, that ever the innocent  
" were punished so as the guilty were  
" freed by it; and so he answers, in the  
M " case

“ case of Hostages and Sureties, their punishment did never excuse the offenders themselves. And to this purpose *he saith*,  
 “ *Socinus* his argument doth hold good, that tho’ one mans money may become  
 “ anothers, yet one mans sufferings cannot become anothers: For, *saith he*, if it  
 “ could, then it would be all one who suffered, as it is who pays the money due :  
 “ And then the offender must be presently released; as the Debtor is upon payment of the debt. This is the substance of what is said by him upon this Argument. To which I reply ; 1. That this gives up the matter in dispute at present between us; for the present question is, Whether it be unjust for any one to suffer beyond the desert of his own actions ? *Tes*, *saith Crellius*, *it is, in case he suffers so, as that the guilty be freed by his sufferings*. But we are not enquiring, Whether it be just for another person to be freed for a mans suffering for him? but whether it be just for that man to suffer by his own consent, more than *his own* actions, without that consent, deserved ? The release of another person by vertue of his sufferings, is a matter of another consideration. Doth the freeing or not freeing of another by suffering, add any thing to the desert of suffering ?



suffering? He that being wholly innocent, and doth suffer on the account of anothers fault, doth he not suffer as *undeservedly*, though another be not freed, as if he were? As in the case of *Hostages* or *Sureties*, doth it make them at all the more guilty, because the persons they are concerned for, will be punished notwithstanding, if they come under the power of those who exacted the punishment upon them, who suffered for them? Nay, is not their *desert* of punishment so much the less, in as much as the guilty are still bound to answer for their own offences? If we could suppose the guilty to be freed by the others sufferings, it would be by supposing their guilt more fully translated upon those who suffer, and consequently, a greater obligation to punishment following that guilt. From whence it follows, that if it be just to punish, when the person is not delivered from whom the other suffers, it is more just when he is; for the translation of the penalty is much less in the former case, than in the latter; and what is just upon less grounds of punishment, must be more just upon greater. I look on this therefore but as a shift of *Crellius*, hoping thereby to avoid the consent

of mankind in one mans suffering for another, without attending to the main argument he was upon ; viz. The justice of one person suffering for another. 2. It is a very unreasonable thing, to make an action unjust for that, which of it self is acknowledged by our *Adversaries* to be very just ; viz. The pardoning the offenders themselves. If it were just to suffer, if the other were not pardoned, and it were just to pardon, whether the other were punished or no, how comes this suffering to be unjust, meerly by the others being pardoned by it : nay, is it not rather an Argument, that those sufferings are the most just, which do so fully answer all the ends of punishments ; that there is then no necessity that the offender should suffer ; but that the Supreme Governour having obtained the ends of Government, by the suffering of one for the rest, declares himself so well pleased with it, that he is willing to pardon the offenders themselves. 3. Many of those persons who have had their sins punished in others, have themselves escaped the punishment due to the desert of their sins : As is plain in the case of *Ahab*, whose punishment was not so great as his sins deserved, because the full punishment

punishment of them was reserved to his  
 posterity. If it be said, as it is by *Crel-  
 lius*, *That Ahab was not wholly freed, his* *Crell. c. 4.*  
*life being taken away, for his own sins:* *sect. 25.*  
 That gives no sufficient answer; for if *1 King. 21.*  
 some part of the punishment was defer-  
 red, that part he was delivered from;  
 and the same reason in this case will hold  
 for the whole as the part. As is plain  
 in the case of *Manasseh*, and several o-  
 thers, the guilt of whose sins were pu-  
 nished on their posterity, themselves e-  
 scaping it. 4. Our Adversaries confess, that  
 in some cases it is lawful and just for some  
 to suffer, with a design that others may  
 be freed by their suffering for them.  
 Thus they assert, *That one Christian, not  
 only may, but ought to lay down his life for  
 another, if there be any danger of his de-  
 nyng the truth, or he judges him far more  
 useful and considerable than himself: so  
 likewise a son for his Father, one Brother  
 for another, or a Friend, or any, whose  
 life he thinks more useful than his own.* *Crell cap. 6.*  
 Now I ask, whether a man can be bound *sect. 39.*  
 to a thing that is *in its own nature unjust?*  
 if not, as it is plain he cannot, then  
 such an obligation of one man to suffer  
 for the delivery of another cannot be  
 unjust, and consequently the suffering it

self cannot be so. But *Crellius* saith, *The injustice in this case lies wholly upon the Magistrate who admits it*: but I ask, wherefore is it unjust in the Magistrate to admit it? is it because the thing is in it self unjust? if so, there can be no obligation to do it; and it would be as great a sin to undergo it, as in the Magistrate to permit it; but if it be just in it self, we have obtained what we contend for; viz. that it may be just for a man to suffer beyond *the desert* of his own actions; for he that lays down his life for his Brethren, doth not deserve by his own actions that very punishment which he undergoes. And if the thing be in it self just, how comes it to be unjust in him that permits it? 5. The reason why among men the offenders themselves are punished, is because those were not the terms, upon which the persons suffered. For if they had suffered upon these terms that the other might be freed, and their suffering was admitted of by the Magistrate on that consideration, then in all reason and justice the offenders ought to be freed on the account of the others suffering for them. But among men the chief reason of the obligation to punishment of one man for another, is not, that the other might

might be freed, but that there may be security given to the publick, that the offenders shall be punished: and the reason of the Sureties suffering is not to deliver the offender; but to satisfy the Law, by declaring that all care is taken that the offender should be punished, when in case of escape, the Surety suffers for him. But it is quite another thing when the person suffers purposely that others might be freed by his suffering, for then in case the suffering be admitted, the release of the other is not only not unjust, but becomes due to him that suffered, on his own terms. Not as though it followed *ipso facto* as *Crellius* fancies, but the manner of release doth depend upon the terms which he who suffered for them, shall make in order to it. For upon this suffering of one for another upon such terms, the immediate consequent of the suffering is not the *actual discharge* but the *right* to it which he hath purchased; and which he may dispense upon what terms he shall judge most for his honour.

6. Although one persons sufferings cannot become anothers so as one mans *Money* may; yet one mans sufferings may be a sufficient consideration on which a benefit may accrue to another. For to

Crell. 16.  
Sect. 28.

that end a Donation, or such a transferring right from one to another as is in Money, is not necessary, but the acceptation which it hath from him who hath the power to pardon. If he declare that he is so well pleased with the sufferings of one for another, that in consideration of them, he will pardon those from whom he suffered; where lies the impossibility or unreasonableness of the thing? For *Crellius* grants, that rewards may be given to others than the persons who did the actions in consideration of those actions; and why may not the sufferings of one for others, being purposely undertaken for this end, be available for the pardon of those whom he suffered for? For a man can no more transfer the right of his good actions, than of his sufferings. From all which it follows, that one person may by his own consent, and being admitted thereto by him to whom the right of punishing belongs, suffer justly; though it be beyond the desert of his own actions; and the guilty may be pardoned on the account of his sufferings. Which was the first thing we designed to prove from *Crellius*, in order to the overthrowing his own hypothesis. For it being confessed by him that such sufferings have  
all

all that belongs to the nature of punishments, and since God hath justly punished some for the sins which they have not committed ; since all Nations have allowed it just for one man by his own consent to suffer for another ; since it cannot be unjust for the offender to be released by anothers sufferings, if he were admitted to suffer for that end, it evidently follows, contrary to *Crellius* his main Principle, that *a person may be justly punished beyond the desert of his own actions* : And so that first argument of *Crellius* cannot hold, that *one man cannot by his own consent suffer for another, because no man can deserve anothers punishment, and no punishment is just but what is deserved*. His second argument from the nature of *anger* and *revenge* hath been already answered in the first Discourse about the nature and ends of punishments, and his third argument, that *one mans punishment cannot become anothers*, immediately before. And so we have finished our first consideration of the *sufferings of Christ* in general, as *a punishment of our sins*, which we have shewed to be agreeable both to *Scripture* and *Reason*.

## C H A P. IV.

I. *The Death of Christ, considered as an Expiatory Sacrifice for sin.* II. *What the expiation of sin was by the Sacrifices under the Law; twofold, Civil and Ritual. The Promises made to the Jews under the Law of Moses, respected them as a People, and therefore must be temporal. The typical nature of Sacrifices asserted.* III. *A substitution in the Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, proved from Lev. 17. 11. and the Concession of Crellius about the signification of *avti* joyned with *luxis*. Lev. 10. 17. explained. The expiation of uncertain murder proves a substitution.* IV. *A substitution of Christ in our room proved from Christ being said to die for us; the importance of that phrase considered.* V. *In what sense a Surrogation of Christ in our room is asserted by us.* VI. *Our Redemption by Christ proves a substitution.* VII. *Of the true notion of Redemption: that explained, and proved against Socinus and Crellius. No necessity of paying the price to him that detains captive, where the captivity is not by force,*



force, but by sentence of Law. Christ's death a proper *ἀντὶ τοῦ*: and therefore the *ἀπολύτῳ* attributed to it, cannot be taken for meer deliverance.

**W**E come now to consider the death of Christ, as an *Expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of mankind*: Which is as much denied by our Adversaries, as that it was a punishment for our sins. For though they do not deny, That Christ as a Priest did offer up a Sacrifice of Expiation for the sins of men; yet they utterly deny, That this was performed on earth, or that the Expiation of sins did respect God, but only us; or, that the death of Christ, had any proper efficacy towards the expiation of sin, any further than as it comprehends in it all the consequences of his death, by a strange Catechresis. I shall now therefore prove, that all things which do belong to a proper Expiatory Sacrifice, do agree to the death of Christ. There are three things especially considerable in it: 1. A Substitution in the place of the Offenders. 2. An Oblation of it to God. 3. An Expiation of sin consequent upon it. Now these three, I shall make appear to agree fully to the death of Christ for us.

The death of Christ considered as an Expiatory Sacrifice for sin.

*1. A Substitution in the place of the Offenders.* That we are to prove, was designed in the *Expiatory Sacrifices* under the *Law*, and that *Christ* in his death for us, was *substituted* in our place.

*2. That in the Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, there was a Substitution of them in the place of the Offenders.* This our Adversaries are not willing to yield us, because of the correspondency which is so plain in the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, between those *Sacrifices*, and that which was offered up by *Christ*. We now speak only of those *Sacrifices*, which we are sure were appointed of old for the expiation of sin, by God himself. As to which the great rule assigned by the *Apostle* was, *That without shedding of blood there*

*Heb. 22. was no remission.* If we yield *Crellius*  
*Crell. c. 10.* what he so often urgeth; viz. *That these*  
*sect. 14.* words are to be understood, of what was done under the *Law*, They will not be the less serviceable to our purpose; for thereby it will appear, that the means of Expiation lay in the *shedding of blood*: Which shews, that the very *mactation* of the beast to be sacrificed, was designed in order to the Expiation of sin. To an inquisitive person, the reason of the slaying such multitudes of beasts in the

the Sacrifices appointed by God himself among the *Jews*, would have appeared far less evident than now it doth, since the *Author* of the *Epistle* to the *Hebrews* hath given us so full an account of them. For it had been very unreasonable to have thought, that they had been merely instituted out of compliance with the customs of other Nations, since the whole design of their Religion, was to separate them from them: and on such a supposition the great design of the *Epistle* to the *Hebrews* signifies very little; which doth far more explain to us the nature and tendency of all the Sacrifices in use among them, that had any respect to the expiation of sins, than all the customs of the *Egyptians*, or the Commentaries of the later *Jews*. But I intend not now to discourse at large, upon this subject of Sacrifices, either as to the nature and institution of them in general, or with a particular respect to the Sacrifice of Christ, since a learned person of our *Church*, hath already undertaken *Crellius* upon this Argument, and we hope ere long will oblige the world with the benefit of his pains. I shall therefore only insist on those things which are necessary for our purpose, in order to the clearing

clearing the Substitution of Christ in our stead, for the expiation of our sins by his death; and this we say was represented in the Expiatory Sacrifices, which were instituted among the Jews. If we  
 Crell. c. 10. yield *Crellius* what he after *Socinus* con-  
 sect. 13. tends for; viz. *That the Sacrifice of Christ was only represented in the publick and solemn Expiatory Sacrifices for the people, and especially those on the day of Atonement*, We may have enough from them to vindicate all that we assert, concerning the Expiatory Sacrifice of the blood of Christ.

What the  
 expiation  
 of sin was  
 by the Sa-  
 crifices  
 under the  
 Law.

II. For that those were designed by way of *Substitution* in the place of the offenders, will appear from the circumstances and reason of their Institution: But before we come to that, it will be necessary to shew what that *Expiation* was, which the Sacrifices under the Law were designed for; the not understanding of which, gives a greater force to our Adversaries Arguments, than otherwise they would have. For while men assert, that the expiation was wholly typical, and of the same nature with that expiation which is really obtained by the death of Christ, they easily prove, *That all the expiation then, was only declarative,*

tive, and did no more depend on the sacrifices offered, than on a condition required by God, the neglect of which would be an act of disobedience in them; and by this means it could represent, say they, no more than such an expiation to be by Christ; viz. God's declaring that sins are expiated by him, on the performance of such a condition required in order thereto, as laying down his life was. But we assert another kind of expiation of sin, by virtue of the Sacrifice being slain and offered; which was real, and depended upon the Sacrifice: And this was twofold a *Civil*, and a *Ritual* expiation, according to the double capacity in which the people of the *Jews* may be considered, either as members of a Society, subsisting by a body of *Laws*, which according to the strictest *Sanction* of it, makes death the penalty of disobedience, *Deut.* 27. 26. but by the will of the Legislator, did admit of a relaxation in many cases, allowed by himself; in which he declares, That the death of the beast designed for a *Sacrifice* should be accepted, instead of the death of the offender; and so the offence should be fully expiated, as to the execution of the penal Law upon him. And thus far, I freely admit what

Grotius

Grot. de Sa-  
tisf. c. 10.

Grotius asserts upon this subject, and do yield that no other offence could be expiated in this manner, but such which God himself did particularly declare should be so. And therefore no sin which was to be punished by cutting off, was to be expiated by Sacrifice; as wilful Idolatry, Murther, &c. Which it is impossible for those to give an account of, who make the expiation wholly *typical*; for why then should not the greatest sins much rather have had sacrifices of *expiation* appointed for them: because the Consciences of men would be more solicitous for the pardon of greater than lesser sins; and the blood of Christ represented by them, was designed for the expiation of all. From whence it is evident, that it was not a meer *typical* expiation; but it did relate to the civil constitution among them. But besides this, we are to consider the people with a respect to that mode of Divine Worship which was among them; by reason of which, the people were to be purified from the *legal* impurities which they contracted, which hindered them from joyning with others in the publick Worship of God, and many Sacrifices were appointed purposely for the expiating

expiating this *legal guilt*, as particularly, *the ashes of the red heifer*, Numb. 19. 9. which is there called a *purification for sin*. And the *Apostle* puts *the blood of Bulls* <sup>Heb. 9. 12,</sup> *and of Goats, and the ashes of a heifer* <sup>13.</sup> *sprinkling the unclean*, together; and the effect of both of them, he saith, was to *sanctifie to the purifying of the flesh*; which implies, that there was some proper and immediate effect of these sacrifices upon the people at that time, though infinitely short of the effect of the blood of Christ upon the *Consciences* of men. By which it is plain, the *Apostle* doth not speak of the same kind of *expiation* in those sacrifices, which was in the *Sacrifice of Christ*, and that the one was barely typical of the other; but of a different kind of *expiation*, as far as *purifying the flesh* is from *purging the Conscience*. But we do not deny, that the whole dispensation was *typical*, and that *the Law had a shadow of good things to* <sup>Heb 10. 1.</sup> *come, and not the very image of the things*, i. e. a dark and obscure representation, and not the perfect resemblance of them. There are two things which the *Apostle* asserts concerning the *Sacrifices of the Law*: First, that they had an effect upon the *Bodies of men*, which he calls

N purify-

Heb. 9. 9.  
10. 4.

*purifying the flesh*; the other is, that they had no power to expiate for the sins of the soul, considered with a respect to the punishment of another life, which he calls *purging the Conscience from dead works*; and therefore he saith, *that all the gifts and sacrifices under the Law, could not make him that did the service perfect, as pertaining to the Conscience, and that it was impossible that the blood of Bulls and Goats should take away sin.* So that the proper expiation which was made by them, was civil and ritual, relating either to corporal punishment, or to legal uncleanness, from whence the *Apostle* well proves the necessity of a higher Sacrifice to make expiation for sins, *as pertaining to the Conscience*: But that expiation among the *Jews* did relate to that *Polity* which was established among them, as they were a people under the Government of a body of Laws distinct from the rest of the world. And they being considered as such, it is vain to enquire, whether they had only *temporal* or *eternal* promises; for it was impossible they should have any other than temporal, unless we imagine, that *God* would own them for a distinct people in another World as he did in this. For what



what Promises relate to a People *as such*, must consider them as a People, and in that capacity they must be the blessings of a *Society*, viz. peace, plenty, number of People, length of days, &c. But we are far from denying that the general Principles of *Religion* did remain among them, viz. *that there is a God, and a rewarder of them that seek him*; and all the Promises God made to the *Patriarchs*, did continue in force *as to another Country*, and were continually improved by the *Prophetical* instructions among them. But we are now speaking of what did respect the people in general, by virtue of that Law which was given them by *Moses*, and in that respect the punishment of faults being either *death* or *exclusion* from the publick Worship, the expiation of them, was taking away the obligation to either of these, which was the guilt of them in that consideration.

*But doth not this take away the typical nature of these sacrifices?* No, but it much rather establisheth it. For as *Soci-* Socin. de  
servat. l. 2.  
c. 10. Pra-  
lect. Theo-  
log. cap. 22.  
*nus* argues, "If the expiation was only  
" typical, there must be something in  
" the type correspondent to that which  
" is typified by it. As the Brazen Ser-

N 2

" pent

" pent typified Christ, and the benefit  
 " which was to come by him, because  
 " as many as looked up to it were heal-  
 " ed. And *Noah's Ark* is said to be a  
 " type of Baptism, because as many as  
 " entred into that were saved from the  
 " deluge. So *Corinth. 10.* the Apostle  
 " saith, that those things happened to  
 " them in types, *v. 11.* because the e-  
 " vents which happened to them, did  
 " represent those which would fall upon  
 " disobedient Christians. So that to  
 make good the true notion of a *Type*,  
 we must assert an *expiation* that was  
*real* then, and agreeable to that dispen-  
 sation, which doth represent an expia-  
 tion of a far higher nature, which was  
 to be by the Sacrifice of the Blood of  
 Christ.

A substi-  
 tution  
 proved  
 from *Le-  
 vit. 17. 11,*  
 &c.

III. Which being premised. I come to  
 prove, that there was a *substitution* de-  
 signed of the Beast to be slain and sacri-  
 ficed in stead of the offenders themselves.  
 Which will appear from *Leviticus 17.*  
*11. For the life of the flesh is in the blood,*  
*and I have given it you upon the Altar, to*  
*make an Atonement for your Souls; for it*  
*is the blood that maketh an Atonement*  
*for the Soul.* The utmost that *Crellius*  
*sect. 9.* would have meant by this place is, *that*  
*there*

there is a double reason assigned of the prohibition of eating blood, viz. that the life was in the blood, and that the blood was designed for expiation; but he makes these wholly independent upon each other. But we say, that the proper reason assigned against the eating of the blood, is that which is elsewhere given, when this precept is mentioned, viz. that the blood was the life, as we may see Gen. 9. 4 Lev. 17. 14. but to confirm the reason given, that the blood was the life; he adds, that God had given them that upon the Altar for an Atonement for their Souls: So the Arabick Version renders it, and therefore have I given it you upon the Altar, viz. because the blood is the life. And hereby a sufficient reason is given, why God did make choice of the blood for atonement, for that is expressed in the latter clause, for it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the Soul; why should this be mentioned here, if no more were intended but to give barely another reason why they should not eat the blood? what force is there more in this clause to that end, than in the foregoing? for therein God had said, that he had given it them for an Atonement. If no more had been intended, but the bare prohibition of common

Exod. 30.  
32, 33.

37. 38.

use of the blood, on the account of its being consecrated to sacred use, it had been enough to have said, that the blood was holy unto the *Lord*, as it is in the other instances mentioned by *Crellius*, of the *holy Oyntment and Perfume*, for no other reason is there given, why it should not be profaned to common use, but *that it should be holy for the Lord*; if therefore the blood had been forbidden upon that account, there had been no necessity at all of adding, that *the blood was it that made atonement for the Soul*: which gives no peculiar reason why they should not eat the blood, beyond that of bare consecration of it to a sacred use; but if we consider it as respecting the first clause, viz. *For the life of the flesh is in the blood*, then there is a particular reason why the blood should be for atonement, viz. *because the life was in that*; and therefore when the blood was offered, the life of the Beast was supposed to be given instead of the life of the offender. According to that of *Ovid*,

*Ovid. Fast.*  
l. 6.

*Hanc animam vobis pro meliore damus.*

This will be yet made clearer by another instance produced by *Crellius* to explain this, which is *the forbidding the eating*

eating of fat, which, saith he, is joyned with this of blood, Levit. 3. 17. It shall be a perpetual Statute for your Generations, throughout all your dwellings, that ye eat neither fat nor blood. To the same purpose, Levit. 7. 23, 25, 26. Now no other reason is given of the prohibition of the fat, but this, *All the fat is the* Lev. 3. 16. *Lords.* Which was enough to keep them from eating it. But we see here in the case of *blood* somewhat further is assigned, viz. that it was *the life*; and therefore was most proper for *expiation*, the life of the beast being substituted in the place of the offenders. Which was therefore called *animalis hostia* among the *Romans*, as *Grotius* observes upon this place, and was distinguished from those whose entrails were observed; for in those Sacrifices as *Servius* saith, *soli Servius ad anima Deo sacratur*, the main of the Sa- *Ensid. 4.* crifice lay in shedding of the *blood*, which was called the *Soul*; and so it is *שׁוֹן* in this place. From whence it appears that such a sacrifice was properly *שׁוֹן אֵל וְשׁוֹן*, for the same word *שׁוֹן* is used, both relating to the *blood* and the *soul*, that is expiated by it: and the *LXX* do accordingly render it, *שׁוֹן πάλαι σαρξὶς ἀμα αὐτῆς ἔστι*, and in the last  
N 4 clause,

Euseb. de-  
monst. E-  
vang. l. 1.  
c. 10.

Crell. cap. 8.  
sect. 23. De-  
notat enim  
vix alicui  
sacrificii  
pro al-  
tero ani-  
mam ponat  
aut devo-  
beat, & sic  
id malum  
quod alteri  
subeundum  
erat ejus lo-  
co subire non  
debet.

Socin. de  
servat. l. 2.  
c. 11.

clause, τὸ ᾧ ἀνὰ αὐτῶν ἀντὶ θυχῆς ἐξ-  
λάσεται. From whence *Eusebius* calls  
these Sacrifices of living Creatures, ἀντὶ-  
θυχα ἢ αὐτῶν θυχῆς, and afterwards saith  
they were λύτρα ἢ ἐκτὸν ζῶντος καὶ ἀντὶ-  
θυχα ἢ ἀντὶ αὐτοῦ. And *Crellius* else-  
where grants, that where ἀντὶ is joyned  
with θυχῆ, it doth imply, that one doth  
undergo the punishment which another was  
to have undergone, which is all we mean  
by substitution, it being done in the place  
of another. From whence it follows  
that the Sacrifices under the Law being  
said to be ἀντὶ θυχῆς, doth necessarily in-  
fer a substitution of them in the place  
of the offenders. And from hence may  
be understood, what is meant be the  
Goat of the Sin offering, bearing the ini-  
quity of the Congregation, to make atone-  
ment for them before the Lord, Levit. 10.  
17. for *Crellius* his saying, That bearing  
is as much as taking away, or declaring  
that they are taken away, hath been al-  
ready disproved: And his other answer  
hath as little weight in it; viz. That it is  
not said, that the sacrifice did bear their  
iniquities, but the Priest: For, 1. The  
Chaldee Paraphrast, and the Syriack Ver-  
sion, understand it wholly of the sacri-  
fice. 2. *Socinus* himself grants, That if

it

*it were said, the Priest did expiate by the sacrifices, it were all one as if it were said, that the sacrifices themselves did expiate; because the expiation of the Priest was by the sacrifice. Thus it is plain in the case of uncertain murther, mentioned Deut. 21. from the first to the tenth; If a murther were committed in the Land, and the person not known who did it, a heifer was to have her head cut off by the Elders of the next City; and by this means they were to put away the guilt of the innocent blood from among them: The reason of which was, because God had said before, That blood defiled the Land, and* Numb. 35.  
*the Land cannot be cleansed of the blood* 33.  
*that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it. From whence it appears, that upon the shedding of blood, there was a guilt contracted upon the whole Land wherein it was shed, and in case the Murtherer was not found to expiate that guilt by his own blood, then it was to be done by the cutting off the head of a heifer instead of him: In which case, the death of the heifer was to do as much towards the expiating the Land, as the death of the Murtherer if he had been found: And we do not contend, that this was designed to expiate*  
*the*

Crell. c. 10.  
sect. 9.

Deut. 21.  
8.

*the Murtherers guilt* (which is the Objection of *Crellius* against this instance) but that a substitution here was appointed by God himself, for the expiation of the people: For what *Crellius* adds, *That the people did not deserve punishment, and therefore needed no expiation*; it is a flat contradiction to the Text: For the prayer appointed in that case is, *Be merciful, O Lord, unto thy people Israel, whom thou hast redeemed, and lay not innocent blood unto thy people Israels Charge, and the blood shall be expiated*: for the same word *כפר* is used here, which is in the other places where *Expiation* is spoken of. So that here must be some guilt supposed, where there was to be an *expiation*, and this *expiation* was performed by the *substitution* of a *sacrifice* in the place of the offender. Which may be enough at present to shew, that a substitution was admitted by the Law, of a sacrifice instead of the offender, in order to the expiation of guilt; but whether the offender himself was to be freed by that Sacrifice; depends upon the terms on which the sacrifice was offered; for we say still, that so much *guilt* was expiated, as the sacrifice was designed to expiate; if the sacrifice was designed to expiate the guilt of



of the offender, his sin was expiated by it; if not his, in case no sacrifice was allowed by the Law, as in that of murder, then the guilt which lay upon the Land was expiated, although the offender himself were never discovered.

IV. I now come to prove, that in correspondence to such a *substitution* of the sacrifices for sin under the Law, Christ was substituted in our room for the expiation of our guilt; and that from his being said *to die for us*, and his death being called a *price of Redemption* for us.

A substitution of Christ in our room proved by his dying for us.

1. *From Christ's being said to die for us.* By St. Peter, *For Christ hath also once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust*; by whom he is also said, *to suffer* ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, *for us, and for us in the flesh*:

1 Pet. 3. 18.

2. 21. 4. 1.

By St. Paul, he is said *to die* ὑπὲρ πάντων, *for all*, and ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν, *for the ungodly*, and *to give himself* ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων, *a ransom for all*, and, *to taste death* ὑπὲρ πάντων, *for every man*: By Caiaphas, speaking by inspiration, he is said *to die* ὑπὲρ τῶ λαοῦ, *for the people*. So Christ himself instituting his last Supper, said, *This is my body which was given, and my blood which was shed* ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, *for you*; and before he had said, *That the Son of man came to give his life* λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν,

2 Cor. 5.

14. Rom.

5. 6. 1 Tim.

2. 6. Heb.

2. 9.

Joh. 11. 50.

Luke 22.

19, 20.

Matt. 20.

28.

*a ransom for many.* We are now to consider, what arts our Adversaries have made use of to pervert the meaning of these places, so as not to imply a substitution of Christ in our room: 1. They say, *That all these phrases do imply no more, than a final cause; viz. That Christ died for the good of mankind; for the Apostle tell us, We are bound to lay down our lives for the Brethren, and St. Paul is said to suffer for the Church.* To which I answer; 1. This doth not at all destroy that which we now plead for; viz. *That these phrases do imply a substitution of Christ in our room: For when we are bid to lay down our lives for our brethren, a substitution is implied therein; and supposing that dying for another, doth signifie dying for some benefit to come to him, yet what doth this hinder substitution, unless it be proved, that one cannot obtain any benefit for another, by being substituted in his room.* Nay, it is observable, that although we produce so many places of *Scripture*, implying such a substitution, they do not offer to produce one that is inconsistent with Christ's suffering in our stead; all that they say is, *That ὑπὲρ doth not always signifie so, which we never said it did,*  
 who

1 Joh. 3. 16.

Coloss. 1.

24.

who say, that Christ suffered ἐπὶ ἡμῶν, not *instead* of our sins, but *by reason* of them ; but we assert, that when one person is said to die for others, as in the places mentioned, no other sense can be so proper and agreeable, as dying in the stead of the other. 2. *Socinus* himself grants, " That there is a peculiarity implied in those phrases, when attributed to Christ, above what they have when attributed to any other. And therefore *he saith*, It cannot be properly said, That one Brother dies for another, or that *Paul* suffered for the *Colossians*, or for the Church, as Christ may truly and properly be said to suffer and to die for us. And from hence, *saith he*, *St. Paul saith*, was *Paul* crucified for you ? implying thereby, that there never was, or could be any, who truly and properly could be said to die for Men but Christ alone. How unreasonable then is it, from the use of a *particle* as applied to others, to infer, that it ought to be so understood, when applied to Christ ? when a peculiarity is acknowledged in the death of Christ for us, more than ever was or could be in one mans dying for another. 3. It is not the bare force of the particle ἐπὶ that we insist

*Soc. de ser-  
vat. l. 2. c. 8.*

*1 Cor. 1.  
13.*

Socin. 1b.

insist upon; but that a *substitution* could not be more properly expressed, than it is in Scripture, by this and other particles, for not only  $\upsilon\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$  is used, but  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\iota$  too: which Socinus saith, *Although it may signifie something else besides in the stead of another, yet in such places, where it is spoken of a ransom or price, it signifies the payment of something which was owing before, as Matt. 17. 27.  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\iota$   $\epsilon\mu\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$   $\tau\eta\varsigma$   $\sigma\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ , and so he acknowledges, that where redemption is spoken of, there  $\alpha\upsilon\tau\iota$  doth imply a commutation, because the price is given, and the person received, which, he saith, holds in Christ only metaphorically: for the redemption according to him being only Metaphorical, the commutation must be supposed to be so too.*

In what sense a surrogation of Christ in our room is asserted by us.

Crell. c. 9.

sect. 3. 1b.

sect. 2.

V. And this now leads us to the larger Answer of *Crellius* upon this argument. Wherein we shall consider, what he yields, what he denies, and upon what reasons. 1. *He yields*, and so he saith *doth* Socinus, *very freely, a commutation*: but it is necessary that we should thoroughly understand what he means by it: to that end he tells us, *That they acknowledge a twofold commutation; one of the person suffering, the kind of suffering being changed, not actually but intentionally, because*

because we are not actually freed by Christ dying for us, but only Christ died for that end, that we might be freed. And this commutation, he saith, that Socinus doth not deny to be implied in the particle *ὡς*, in the places where Christ is said to die for us. Another commutation, which he acknowledges, is, that which is between a price, and the thing or person which is bought or redeemed by it; where the price is paid, and the thing or person is received upon it. And this kind of commutation, he saith, is to be understood in the places where *ἀντὶ* is mentioned; which price, he saith, by accident may be a person; and because the person is not presently delivered, he therefore saith, that the commutation is rather imperfect than metaphorical; and although, he saith, *ἀντὶ* doth not of it self imply a commutation, yet he grants, that the circumstances of the places do imply it. 2. He denies, that there is any proper surrogation in Christ's dying for us, which, he saith, is such a commutation of persons, that the substituted person is in all respects to be in the same place and state wherein the other was; and if it refers to sufferings, then it is when one suffers the very same which the other was to suffer, he being immediately delivered by

1b. sect. 6.

1b. sect. 7.

by the others sufferings. And against this kind of surrogation, *Crellius* needed not to have produced any reasons; for *Grotius* never asserted it; neither do we say, that Christ suffered eternal death for us, or that we were immediately freed by his sufferings. But that which *Grotius* asserts, that he meant by substitution was this, that *unless Christ had died for us, we must have died our selves, and because Christ hath died, we shall not die eternally.*

ib. sect. 3. But if this be all, saith *Crellius*, he meant by it, we grant the whole thing, and he complains of it as an injury for any to think otherwise of them. If so, they cannot deny but that there was a sufficient capacity in the death of Christ to be made an expiatory Sacrifice for the sins of the world. But notwithstanding all these fair words, *Crellius* means no more than *Socinus* did; and though he would allow the words which *Grotius* used, yet not in the sense he understood them in; for *Crellius* means no more by all this, but that the death of Christ was an antecedent condition to the expiation of sins in Heaven, *Grotius* understands by them, that Christ did expiate sins by becoming a Sacrifice for them in his death. However, from hence it appears, that our Adversaries can

can have no plea against the death of Christ's being an expiatory Sacrifice (from want of a substitution in our room) since they profess themselves so willing to own such a substitution. But if they say, that there could be no *proper substitution*, because *the death of Christ was a bare condition, and no punishment*, they then express their minds more freely; and if these places be allowed to prove a substitution, I hope the former discourse will prove that it was by way of punishment. Neither is it necessary, *that the very same kind of punishment be undergone in order to surrogation*, but that it be sufficient in order to the accomplishing the end for which it was designed. For this kind of *substitution* being in order to the delivery of another by it, whatever is sufficient for that end, doth make a *proper surrogation*. For no more is necessary to the delivery of another person than the satisfying the ends of the Law and Government, and if that may be done by an æquivalent suffering, though not the same in all respects, then it may be a proper surrogation. If *David* had obtained his wish, that he had died for his Son *Abſolom*, it had not been necessary in order to his Son's escape,  
O that

that he had *hanged by the hair of his head*, as his Son did ; but his death, though in other circumstances, had been sufficient. And therefore when the Lawyers say, *subrogatum, sapit naturam ejus in cujus* *locum subrogatur* : Covarruvias tells us, it is to be understood, *secundum primordialem naturam non secundum accidentalem*; from whence it appears, that all circumstances, are not necessary to be the same in *surrogation* ; but that the nature of the punishment remain the same. Thus *Christ dying for us*, to deliver us from death, and the curse of the Law, he underwent an *accursed death* for that end ; although not the very *same* which we were to have undergone, yet sufficient to shew, that he underwent the punishment of our iniquities in order to the delivering us from it. And if our Adversaries will yield us this, we shall not much contend with them about the name of a *proper surrogation*.

Our Redemption by Christ proves a substitution.

Crell. c. 9. sect. 2.

VI. But in the matter of *Redemption*, or where ἀντὶ is used, *Crellius* will by no means yield that there was a *commutation of persons between Christ and us*, but all the commutation he will allow here is only a *commutation between a thing, or a prince, and a person*. Which he therefore asserts,



asserts, that so there may be no necessity of Christ's undergoing the punishment of sin in order to *redemption*, because *the price that is to be paid, is not supposed to undergo the condition of the person delivered by it.* Which will evidently appear to have no force at all, in case we can prove, that a proper redemption may be obtained by the punishment of one in the room of another; for that punishment then comes to be the λύτρον or price of redemption; and he that pays this, must be supposed to undergo punishment for it. So that the commutation being between the punishment of one, and the other redeemed by it, here is a proper commutation of persons implied in the payment of the price. But hereby we may see that the great subtilty of our Adversaries is designed on purpose to avoid the force of the places of *Scripture*, which are so plain against them: For when these places where λύτρον and ἀντὶ are joyned together, are so clear for a substitution, that they cannot deny it; then they say, by it is meant only a commutation of a price for a person; but when the word λύτρον is urged to prove a redemption purchased by Christ, by the payment of a price

for it, then they deny that λύτρον doth signifie a proper price, but is only taken metaphorically ; and yet if it be so taken, then there can be no force in what *Crellius* saith , for a bare metaphorical price may be a real punishment : Two things I shall then prove against *Crellius*.  
 1. That the λύτρον as applied to Christ, is to be taken in a proper sense. 2. That although it be taken in a proper sense, yet it doth not imply a bare commutation of a price and a person, but a substitution of one person in the room of another.

Of the  
true noti-  
on of Re-  
demption.

VII. Both these will be cleared from the right stating the notion of redemption between our Adversaries and us. For they will not by any means have any other proper notion of redemption *but from captivity*, and that *by the payment of a price to him that did hold in captivity, and therefore because Christ did not pay the price to the Devil, there could be no proper sense either of the redemption, or the price which was paid for it.* This is the main strength of all the arguments used by *Socinus* and *Crellius*, to enervate the force of those places of Scripture which speak of our redemption by Christ, and of the price which he paid in order

*Socin. de  
servat. 1.2.*

*c. 1, 2.*

*Crell. c. 8.*

*f. 11.*

order to it. But how weak these exceptions are, will appear upon a true examination of the proper notion of Redemption, which in its primary importance signifies no more, than *the obtaining of one thing by another as a valuable consideration for it*. Thence *redimere* anciently among the *Latins* signified barely to purchase by a valuable price, for the thing which they had a right to by it; and sometimes to purchase that which a man hath sold before, thence the *patrum redimendi* in contracts: still in whatever sense it was used by the Lawyers or others, the main regard was, to the consideration upon which the thing was obtained, thence *redimere delatorem pecunia*, h. e. *eum à delatione deducere*; Ulpian l. 29. D. de jure fisci. so *redimere litem*; and *redemptor litis* was one that upon certain consideration took the whole charge of a suit upon himself: and those who undertook the farming of customs at certain rates, were called *redemptores vectigalium, qui redempturis auxissent vectigalia*, saith *Livy*. Budeus ad Pandect. p. 189. Liv. l. 23 Festus v. red. Ulpian. l. 39. D. de re vend. And all those who undertook any publick work at a certain price, *redemptores antiquitus dicebantur*, saith *Festus* and *Ulpian*. From hence it was applied to the delivery of any person from any in-

convenience that he lay under, by something which was supposed a valuable consideration for it. And that it doth not only relate to captivity, but to any other great calamity, the freedom from which is obtained by what another suffers; is apparent from these two remarkable expressions of *Cicero* to this purpose.

*Cicer. ep.  
famil. l. 2.  
ep. 16.*

*Orat. pro  
Syllâ.*

*Quam quidem ego* (saith he, speaking of the sharpness of the time) *à rep. meis privatis & domesticis incommodis libentissime redemisssem.* And more expressly elsewhere, *Ego vitam omnium civium, statum orbis terræ, urbem hanc denique, &c. quinque hominum amentium ac perditorum pæna redemi.* Where it is plain, that redemption is used for the delivery of some by the punishment of others; not from meer captivity, but from a great calamity which they might have fallen into, without such a punishment of those persons. So vain is that assertion of *Soci-nus*, *redimere, nihil aliud propriè significat, quam eum captivum è manibus illius, qui eum detinet, pretio illi dato liberare.*

*Soc. de servit. l. 2.  
c. 1.*

No necessity of paying the price to him that detains captive.

VIII. And yet supposing we should grant that *redemption* as used in sacred Authors doth properly relate to *captivity*, there is no necessity at all of that which

which our Adversaries contend so earnestly for, viz. *That the price must be paid to him that detains captive.* For we may very easily conceive a double sort of captivity, from whence a redemption may be obtained; the one by *force*, when a Captive is detained purposely for advantage to be made by his redemption: and the other in a *judicial manner*, when the Law condemns a person to captivity, and the thing designed by the Law is not a meer price, but satisfaction to be made to the Law, upon which a redemption may be obtained; now in the former case it is necessary, that the price be paid to the person who detains, because the reason of his detaining, was the expectation of the price to be paid; but in the latter, the detainer is meerly the instrument for execution of the Law, and the price of redemption is not to be paid to him; but to those who are most concerned in the honour of the Law. But *Crellius* Crell. c. 8. sect. 11. objects, *that the price can never be said to be paid to God, because our redemption is attributed to God as the author of it, and because we are said to be redeemed for his use and service, now, saith he, the price can never be paid to him for whose service the person is redeemed.* But all

this depends upon the former mistake, as though we spake all this while of such a redemption, as that is of a *Captive* by force ; in whom the detainer is no further concerned, than for the advantage to be made by him ; and in that case the price must be paid to him who detains, because it would otherwise be unsuccessful for his deliverance : but in case of captivity by Law, as the effect of disobedience, the Magistrate who is concerned in the life of the person, and his future obedience may himself take care that satisfaction may be given to the Law for his redemption, in order to his future serviceableness. From hence we see both that the *λύτρον* is *proper* in this case of our redemption, and that it is not a meer *commutation* of a *price* for a *person*, but a *commutation* of one *persons* suffering for *others*, which suffering being a punishment in order to satisfaction is a valuable consideration, and therefore a *price* for the redemption of others by it. Which *price* in this sense doth imply a proper substitution ; which was the thing to be proved. Which was the first thing to be made good concerning the death of Christ being a sacrifice for sin, *viz.* that there was a substitution of  
Christ

Christ in our stead as of the sacrifices of old under the Law<sup>d</sup>; and in this sense the death of Christ was a proper λύτρον or price of redemption for us. Nothing then can be more vain, than the way of our Adversaries, to take away the force of all this, because ἀπολύτρωσις is sometimes taken for a meer deliverance without any price, which we deny not; but the main force of our argument is from the importance of ἀπολύτρωσις, where the λύτρον is mentioned; and then we say that ἀπολύτρωσις when applied to sins, signifies expiation, (as Heb. 9. 15. εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῆς παραβάσεως,) but when applied to persons, it signifies the deliverance purchased by the λύτρον, which is not to be considered as a bare price, or thing given, but as a thing undergone in order to that deliverance: and is therefore not only called λύτρον, but ἀντίλυτρον too, which *Crellius* confesseth doth imply a *commutation*, and we have shewed, doth prove a *substitution* of Christ in our place.

## C H A P. V.

- I *The notion of a sacrifice belongs to the death of Christ, because of the Oblation made therein to God. Crellius his sense of Christ's Oblation proposed.* II. *Against him it is proved, that the Priestly office of Christ had a primary respect to God, and not to us. Expiatory Sacrifices did divert the wrath of God.* III. *Christ not a bare Metaphorical High-Priest.* IV. *Crellius destroys the Priesthood of Christ by confounding it with the exercise of his Regal Power.* V. *No proper expiation of sin belongs to Christ in Heaven, if Crellius his Doctrine be true.* VI. *Ephes. 5. 2. proves the death of Christ an Expiatory Sacrifice, and an Oblation to God. The Phrase of a sweet-smelling savour, belongs to expiatory Sacrifices; Crellius his gross notion of it.* VII. *His mistakes about the kinds of Sacrifices. Burnt-offerings were Expiatory Sacrifices both before and under the Law. A new distribution of sacrifices proposed.* VIII. *What influence the maturation of the Sacrifice had on Expiation. The*  
*High.*



*High Priest only to slay the Sin-offering on the day of Atonement; from whence it is proved, that Christ's Priesthood did not begin from his entrance into Heaven. The mactation in Expiatory Sacrifices no bare preparation to a Sacrifice, proved by the Jewish Laws, and the customs of other Nations.*

*IX. Whether Christ's, Oblation of himself once to God, were in Heaven, or on Earth? Of the proper notion of Oblations under the Levitical Law. Several things observed from thence to our purpose. X. All things necessary to a legal Oblation, concurr in the death of Christ. XI. His entrance into Heaven hath no correspondency with it; if the blood of Christ were no sacrifice for sin. In Sin-offerings for the People, the whole was consumed; no eating of the Sacrifices allowed the Priests, but in those for private Persons. XII. Christ's exercise of Power in Heaven, in no sense an Oblation to God. XIII. Crellius, his sense repugnant to the circumstances of the places in dispute. XIV. Objections answered.*

THE

Of the  
Oblation  
made by  
Christ un-  
to God.

I. **T**HE Second thing to prove the death of Christ a Sacrifice for sin, is the Oblation of it to God for that end. "*Grotius* towards the conclusion of his Book, makes a twofold oblation of Christ, parallel to that of the Sacrifices under the Law, the first of Mactation, the second of Representation ; whereof the first was done in the Temple, the second in the Holy of Holies ; so the first of Christ was on Earth, the second in Heaven ; the first is not a bare preparation to a Sacrifice, but a Sacrifice : the latter not so much a Sacrifice, as the commemoration of one already past. Wherefore, since appearing and interceding are not properly sacerdotal acts, any further than they depend on the efficacy of a sacrifice already offered, he that takes away that Sacrifice, doth not leave to Christ any proper Priesthood, against the plain authority of the Scripture, which assigns to Christ the office of a Priest distinct from that of a Prophet and a King. To which *Crellius* replies: *That the expiation of sin doth properly belong to what Christ doth in Heaven ; and may be applied*

*Crell. c. 10.  
sect. 45.*

plied to the death of Christ only, as the condition by which he was to enjoy that power in Heaven, whereby he doth expiate sins; but the Priest was never said to expiate sins when he killed the beast, but when the blood was sprinkled or carried into the Holy of Holies, to which the Oblation of Christ in Heaven does answer: but maclation, saith he, was not proper to the Priests, but did belong to the Levites also. And Christ was not truly a Priest, while he was on Earth, but onely prepared by his sufferings to be one in Heaven, where by the perpetual care he takes of his People, and exercising his Power for them, he is said to offer up himself, and intercede for them, and by that means he discharge the Office of a High-Priest for them. For his Priestly Office, he saith, is never in Scripture mentioned as distinct from his Kingly, but is comprehended under it; and the great difference between them is, that one is of a larger extension than the other is, the Kingly Office extending to punishing, and the Priestly only to expiation. This is the substance of what Crellius more at large discourseth upon this subject. Wherein he asserts these things. That the Priestly Office of Christ doth not in reference to the expiation of sins respect

respect *God* but us; his Intercession and Oblation wherein he makes the sacerdotal function of Christ to consist, being the exercise of his power for the good of his People. 2. That Christ did offer up no Sacrifice of expiation to God upon Earth, because the *maclation* had no reference to expiation, any other than as a preparation for it; and Christ not yet being constituted a *High-Priest* till after his Resurrection from the dead. Against these two assertions I shall direct my following discourse, by proving;  
 1. That the Priestly Office of Christ had a primary respect to God, and not to us.  
 2. That Christ did exercise this Priestly Office in the Oblation of himself to God upon the Cross.

That the  
 Priestly  
 Office of  
 Christ had  
 a primary  
 respect to  
 God, and  
 not us.  
*Crell. in*  
*Heb. 5. 1.*

II. 1. That the Priestly Office of Christ had a primary respect to *God*, and not to *us*; which appears from the first Institution of a *High-Priest*, mentioned by the *Apostle*, *Hebr. 5. 1.* *For every High-Priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins: Id est, saith Crellius elsewhere, ut procuret & peragat ea quæ ad colendum ac propitiandum numen pertinent; i.e.* That he may perform the things which appertain

tain to the *worshipping* and *propitiating* God: We desire no more, put that the *propitiating* God, may as immediately be said to respect him, as the *worshipping* of God doth; or let *Crellius* tell us, what sense the *propitiating* God will bear; if all that the *High-Priest* had to do, did immediately respect the people: nay, he saith not long after, That it was the "chief Office of a High-Priest, to plead  
 "the cause of sinners with God, and to  
 "take care, that they may find him kind  
 "and propitious, and not angry or displeased. In what sense God was said to be *moved* by the Expiatory Sacrifices, is not here our business to discuss; it is sufficient for our purpose, that they were instituted with a respect to God, so as to procure his favour, and divert his wrath. In which sense, the Priest is so often in the *Levitical Law* said, by the offering up of Sacrifices, to expiate the sins of the people. But *Crellius* saith,  
 "This ought not so to be understood,  
 "as though God by Expiatory Sacrifices, were diverted from his anger,  
 "and inclined to pardon; which is a plain contradiction, not only to the words of the law, but to the instances that are recorded therein; as when *Aa-*

*Crell. cap.*  
*10. sect. 3.*

ron was bid in the time of the *Plague* to  
 Numb. 16. *make an Atonement for the people, for*  
 46. *there is wrath gone out from the Lord: and*  
 Verf. 48. *he stood between the living and the dead,*  
*and the plague was stayed.* Was not God's  
 anger then diverted here, by the making  
 this Atonement? The like instance we  
 read in *David's* time, that *by the offering*  
*burnt-offerings, &c. the Lord was in-*  
 2 Sam. 24. *treated for the Land, and the plague was*  
 25. *stayed from Israel:* By which nothing can  
 be more plain, than that the primary  
 intention of such Sacrifices, and conse-  
 quently of the Office of the *Priest* who  
 offered them, did immediately respect  
 the *Atoning God*: But yet *Crellius* urgeth,  
 This cannot be said of all, or of the  
 " most proper Expiatory Sacrifices; but  
 we see it said of more than the meer Sa-  
 crifices for sin, as appointed by the Law;  
*viz. of burnt-offerings, and peace-offerings,*  
*and incense,* in the examples mentioned,  
 So that these Levitical Sacrifices did all  
 respect the atoning God; although in  
 some particular cases, different Sacrifices  
 were to be offered; for it is said, *the*  
 Lev. 1. 4. *burnt-offering was to make atonement for*  
 4. 20. *them, as well as the sin and trespass-offer-*  
 5. 7. *ings* ( excepting those sacrifices which  
 were instituted in acknowledgement of  
 God's

God's Sovereignty over them, and presence among them, as the daily Sacrifices, the meat and drink offerings, or such as were meerly occasional, &c.) Thus it is said, that *Aaron and his sons* 1 Chron. 6. 49. *were appointed to make an Atonement for* Grot in Heb. 5. 1. *Israel*: So that as *Grotius* observes out of "*Philo*, The High-Priest was a Mediator between God and man, by whom men might propitiate God, and God dispense his favours to men. But the means whereby he did procure favours to men, was by atoning God by the Sacrifices, which he was by his Office to offer to him. We are now to consider, how far this holds in reference to Christ, for whose sake the Apostle brings in these words; and surely would not have mentioned this as the primary Office of a High-Priest, in order to the proving Christ to be our *High-Priest*, after a more excellent manner than the *Aaronical* was, unless he had agreed with him in the nature of his Office, and exceeded him in the manner of performance.

III. For the *Apostle* both proves, that he was a true and proper, and not a bare *Metaphorical High-Priest*, and that in such a capacity, he very far exceeded

Christ no  
barely me-  
taphorical  
High-  
Priest.

the *Priests* after the order of *Aaron*. But how could that possibly be, if he failed in the primary Office of a *High-Priest*; viz. *In offering up gifts and sacrifices to God*? If his Office as *High-Priest* did primarily respect men, when the Office of the *Aaronical Priest* did respect God?

*Crell. cap.*  
*10. sect. 3.*

To avoid this, *Crellius* makes these words to be only an allusion to the Legal Priest-hood, and some kind of similitude between Christ and the *Aaronical Priests*; but it is such a kind of allusion, that the *Apostle* designs to prove, Christ to be an *High-Priest* by it; and which is of the greatest force, he proves the necessity of Christ's having somewhat to offer

*Heb. 8. 2.*

from hence: *For every High-Priest is ordained to offer gifts, and sacrifices; wherefore it is of necessity, that this man have somewhat also to offer.* This is that which he looks at as the peculiar and distinguishing character of a *High-Priest*; for interceding for others, and having compassion upon them, might be done by others besides the *High-Priest*; but this was that, without which he could not make good his name, what order soever he were of. If Christ then had no proper sacrifice to offer up to God, to what purpose doth the *Apostle* so industriously  
set



set himself to prove, that he is our *High-Priest*? when he must needs fail in the main thing, according to his own assertion? How easie had it been for the *Jews*, to have answered all the *Apostles* Arguments concerning the *Priesthood* of Christ, if he had been such a *Priest*, and made no other Oblation than *Crellius* allows him? When the *Apostle* proves against the *Jews*, that there was no necessity, that they should still retain the *Mosaical* Dispensation, because now they had a more excellent *High-Priest* than the *Aaronical* were; and makes use of that character of a *High-Priest*, that *he was one taken out from among men, in things pertaining to God to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins*: Well, say the *Jews*, we accept " of this character, but how do you  
 " prove concerning Christ, that he was  
 " such a one? Did he offer up a *Sacrifice*  
 " *for sin* to God upon earth, as our  
 " *High-Priests* do? No, saith *Crellius*,  
*his sufferings were only a preparation for*  
*his Priesthood in Heaven*: But did he  
 " then offer up such a *Sacrifice* to God in  
 " Heaven? Yes, saith *Crellius*, *He made*  
*an Oblation there*. But is that Oblation  
 " such a *Sacrifice* to God for sin, as  
 " our *High-Priests* offer? Yes, saith

*Crellius*, it may be called so *by way of allusion*. “Well then, say they, you grant  
 “ that your *Jesus* is only a *High-priest*  
 “ by way of *allusion*, which was against  
 “ your first design to prove; *viz.* That  
 “ he was a true *High-Priest*, and more  
 “ excellent than ours. But suppose it  
 “ be by way of allusion, doth he make  
 “ any Oblation to God in Heaven or not?  
*No*, saith *Crellius*, *really and truly* he doth  
 not: for all his Office doth respect us, but  
 the benefits we enjoy coming originally from  
 the kindness of God, you may call it an  
 Oblation to God if you please. But how is  
 “ it possible then, say the *Jews*, you can  
 “ ever convince us, that he is any  
 “ *High-Priest*, or *Priest* at all, much  
 “ less, that he should ever exceed the  
 “ *Aaronical High-Priests* in their Office?  
 “ for we are assured, that they do offer  
 “ *Sacrifices for sin*, and that *God* is at-  
 “ toned by them: but if your *High-*  
 “ *Priest* make no atonement for sin, he  
 “ falls far short of ours, and therefore  
 “ we will still hold to our *Levitical*  
 “ *Priesthood*, and not forsake that for  
 “ one barely Metaphorical, and having  
 “ nothing really answering the name of  
 “ a *High-Priest*. Thus the force of all  
 the *Apostles* Arguments is plainly taken  
 away,

away, by what *Crellius* and his Brethren assert concerning the Priesthood of Christ But *Crellius* thinks to make it good by saying, *That things that are improper and figurative, may be far more excellent than the things that are proper, to which they are opposed; so that Christ's Priesthood may be far more excellent than the Aaronical, although his be only figurative, and the other proper.* But the question is not, Whether Christ's *Priesthood* by any other adventitious considerations, as of greater Power and Authority than the *Aaronical Priests* had, may be said to be far more excellent than theirs was; but, Whether in the notion of *Priesthood*, it doth exceed theirs? Which it is impossible to make good, unless he had some proper Oblation to make unto God, which in it self did far exceed all the Sacrifices and Offerings under the Law.

IV. But what that oblation of Christ in Heaven was, which had any correspondence with the Sacrifices under the Law, our Adversaries can never assign; nay, when they go about it, they speak of it in such a manner, as makes it very evident they could heartily have wished the Epistle to the *Hebrews* had said as little of the *Priesthood* of *Christ*, as they

*Crell. cap.*  
*10 sect. 3.*  
*Id sect. 56.*  
*P. 547.*

*Crellius destroys the Priesthood of Christ.*

*Smalc. c.*  
*Smiglett.*  
*Crell cap.*  
 10. p. 544

say, any other part of the New Testament doth. Thence *Smalcus* and *Crellius* insist so much upon the *Priesthood* of *Christ*, being distinctly mentioned by none but the Author to the *Hebrews*; which, say they, had surely been done, if *Christ* had been a proper *Priest*, or that Office in him distinct from his *Kingly*. Which sufficiently discovers what they would be at; viz. That the Testimony of the Author to the *Hebrews*, is but a single Testimony in this matter; and in truth, they do (as far as is consistent with not doing it in express words) wholly take away the *Priesthood* of *Christ*: For what is there which they say his *Priesthood* implies, which he might not have had, supposing he had never been called a *Priest*? His *being in Heaven*, doth not imply that he is a *Priest*, unless it be impossible for any but *Priests* ever to come there: His *Power and Authority over the Church*, doth not imply it; for that power is by themselves confessed to be a *Regal* power: his *readiness to use that power*, cannot imply it, which is the thing *Smalcus* insists on; for his being a *King* of the Church, doth necessarily imply his readiness to make use of his power for the good of his Church.

*His*

*His receiving his power from God*, doth not imply that he was a Priest, although *Crellius* insist on that, unless all the Kings of the Earth are Priests by that means too, and Christ could not have had a subordinate power as King, as well as Priest. But *his death is more implied*, saith *Crellius*, *in the name of a Priest than of a King*; true, if his death be considered as a *Sacrifice*, but not otherwise: For what is there of a *Priest* in bare dying, do not others so too? But *this represents greater tenderness and care in Christ, than the meer title of a King*: What kind of *King* do they imagine *Christ* the mean while, if his being so, did not give the greatest encouragement to all his subjects? nay, it is plain, the name of a *King* must yield greater comfort to his people, because that implies his power to defend them, which the bare name of a *Priest* doth not. So that there could be no reason at all given, why the name of a *High-Priest* should be at all given to Christ, if no more were implied in it, than *the exercise of his power with respect to us*, without any proper oblation to God: For here is no proper Sacerdotal act at all attributed to him; so that upon their *hypothesis*,

the name of *High-Priest*, is a meer insignificant title used by the Author to the *Hebrews*, without any foundation at all for it. By no means, saith *Crellius*, for his *expiation of sin is implied by it, which is not implied in the name of King*: True, if the expiation of sin were done by him in the way of a *Priest* by an oblation to God, which they deny; but though they call it *Expiation*, they mean no more than *the exercise of his divine power* in the delivering his people. But what parallel was there to this in the *expiation of sins by the Levitical Priesthood*? that was certainly done by a Sacrifice offered to God by the *Priest*, who was thereby said to *expiate the sins of the people*: how comes it now to be taken quite in another sense, and yet still called by the same name?

Levit. 4.  
26. v. 34,  
35.

No proper expiation of sin belongs to Christ in Heaven, if *Crellius* his doctrine be true.

V. But this being the main thing insisted on by them, I shall prove from their own Principles, that no *expiation of sin in their own sense* can belong to Christ in Heaven, by virtue of his Oblation of himself there, and consequently that they must unavoidably overthrow the whole notion of the *Priesthood of Christ*. For this we are to consider, what their notion of the *expiati-*

on of sins is, which is set down briefly  
by *Crellius* in the beginning of his dis-  
course of *Sacrifices*, " There is a two- *Crell. cap.*  
" fold power, *saith he*, of the sacrifice *10. sect. 2.*  
" of Christ towards the expiation of sin,  
" one taking away the guilt and the pu-  
" nishment of sin, and that partly by  
" declaring, that God will do it, and giv-  
" ing us a right to it, partly by actual  
" deliverance from punishment; the o-  
" ther is by begetting Faith in us, and so  
" drawing us off from the practice of sin:  
Now the first and last *Crellius* and *Soci-*  
*nus* attribute to the death of Christ, as  
that was a confirmation of the Covenant  
God made for the remission of sin; and  
as it was an argument to perswade us to  
believe the truth of his Doctrine; and  
the other, viz. *the actual deliverance from*  
*punishment*, is by themselves attributed  
to *the second coming* of Christ; for then  
only, they say, the just shall be actu-  
ally delivered from the punishment of sin,  
viz. *eternal death*; and what expiation  
is there now left to the Oblation of  
Christ in Heaven? Doth Christ in  
Heaven declare the pardon of sin any  
other way than it was declared by him  
upon Earth? What efficacy hath his Ob-  
lation in Heaven upon perswading  
men

men to believe? or is his *second coming*, when he shall sit as Judge, the main part of his *Priesthood*; for then the expiation of sins in our Adversaries sense is most proper? And yet nothing can be more remote from the notion of Christ's *Priesthood*, than that is; so that expiation of sins according to them can have no respect at all to the Oblation of Christ in Heaven, or (which is all one in their sense) his continuance in Heaven to his second coming. *Tes*, saith *Crellius*, his continuance there, is a condition in order to the expiation by actual deliverance, and therefore it may be said, that God is as it were moved by it to expiate sins. The utmost then, that is attributed to Christ's being in Heaven, in order to the expiation of sins, is that he must continue there without doing any thing in order to it; for if he does, it must either respect God or us: but they deny (though contrary to the importance of the words, and the design of the places where they are used) that the terms of *Christ's interceding for us*, or *being an Advocate with the Father for us*, do note any respect to God, but only to us; if he does any thing with respect to us in expiation of sin, it must be either declaring, perswading,

*Crell. cap.*  
*10. sect. 3.*  
*p. 476.*

*Heb. 7. 25.*  
*Rom. 8. 3.*  
*1 Joh 2. 1.*



ding, or actual deliverance; but it is none of these by their own assertions; and therefore that which they call *Christ's Oblation*, or *his being in Heaven*, signifies nothing as to the *expiation* of sin: and it is unreasonable to suppose that a thing, which hath no influence at all upon it, should be looked on as a condition in order to it. From whence it appears, that while our Adversaries do make the exercise of *Christ's Priesthood* to respect *us* and not *God*, they destroy the very nature of it, and leave Christ only an empty name without any thing answering to it: But if Christ be truly a *High-Priest*, as the *Apostle* asserts that he is, from thence it follows that he must have a respect to *God* in *offering up gifts and sacrifices for sin*: which was the thing to be proved.

VI. 2. That Christ did exercise this *Priestly Office* in the Oblation of himself to *God* upon the Cross. Which I shall prove by two things. 1. Because the death of Christ is said in Scripture to be an Offering, and a Sacrifice to God. 2. Because Christ is said to offer up himself antecedently to his entrance into Heaven. 1. Because the death of Christ is said to be an offering and a sacrifice to God,

*Ep̄os. 5.2.*  
Proves the death of Christ an Expiatory Sacrifice and an oblation to God.

Eph. 5. 2. *God, which is plain from the words of St. Paul, as Christ also hath loved us, and given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savour.*

Our Adversaries do not deny that the death of Christ is here called an *Oblation*, but they deny, " That it is meant of an  
 " Expiatory Sacrifice, but of a Free-will  
 Crell. cap. 10 sect. 47. " offering ; and the reason Crellius gives  
 " is, because that phrase of a sweet-smell-  
 " ing savour is generally and almost al-  
 " ways used of sacrifices which are not Ex-  
 " piatory ; but if ever they be used of an  
 " Expiatory Sacrifice, they are not applied  
 " to that which was properly expiatory  
 " in it, viz. the offering up of the blood,  
 " for no smell, *saieth he*, went up from  
 " thence, but to the burning of the fat,  
 " and the Kidneys, which although re-  
 " quired to perfect the expiation, yet  
 " not being done till the High-Priest re-  
 " turned out of the Holy of Holies, hath  
 " nothing correspondent to the expiato-  
 " ry Sacrifice of Christ, where all things  
 " are perfected before Christ the High-  
 " Priest goes forth of his Sanctuary.  
 How inconsistent these last words are  
 with what they assert concerning the  
*expiation* of sin by actual deliverance at  
 the great day, the former discourse hath  
 already

already discovered. For what can be more absurd, than to say, *that all things which pertain to the expiation of sin are perfected before Christ goes forth from his Sanctuary*, and yet to make the most proper *expiation* of sin to lie in that act of Christ which is consequent to his going forth of the *Sanctuary*, viz. when he proceeds to judge the quick and the dead. But of that already. We now come to a punctual and direct answer, as to which two things must be enquired into.

1. What the importance of the phrase of a *sweet-smelling savour* is? 2. What the *Sacrifices* are to which that phrase is applied? 1. For the importance of the phrase. The first time we read it used in Scripture was upon the occasion of *Noah's Sacrifice* after the flood, of which it is said, *that he offered burnt-offerings on the Altar, and the Lord smelled a savour of rest, or a sweet savour.* Which we are not wont to imagine in a gross corporal manner, as *Crellius* seems to understand it, when he saith, *the blood could not make such a savour as the fat and the Kidneys*; for surely, none ever thought the smell of flesh burnt was a *sweet-smelling savour* of it self, and we must least of all imagine that of *God*, which *Porphyry*

Gen. 8.20,  
21.

phyry faith, was the property only of  
 the worst of *Dæmons* to be *pleased*, and  
 as it were, to grow fat, ταῖς ἐν τῶν αἱμά-  
 των ἢ σαρκὸν κνίσαις, with the smell and  
 Porphyr. de τῶν ἢ σαρκὸν κνίσαις, with the smell and  
 abstinent. vapours of blood, and flesh, (by which  
 L. 2. sect. 42. testimony, it withal appears, that the  
 same steams in Sacrifices were supposed  
 to arise from the blood as the flesh :) But  
 we are to understand that phrase in a  
 sense agreeable to the divine nature,  
 which we may easily do, if we take it  
 in the sense the Syriack Version takes it  
 in, when it calls it, *Odorem placabilita-*  
*tis*, or the savour of rest, as the word pro-  
 perly signifies ; for נָח is the word  
 formed from the Verb נָח which is used  
 for the resting of the Ark, v. 4. of the  
 same Chapter, and so it imports a rest  
 after some commotion, and in that sense  
 is very proper to *Atonement*, or that  
 whereby God makes his anger to rest ;  
 so *Aben Ezra* upon that place expounds  
 the Saviour of rest, to be such a one which  
 makes God cease from his anger : Thence  
 in Hiphil נָח signifies to appease, or to  
 make peace ; in which sense it is used  
 by R. Solom. upon Isa. 27. 5. *Munster*  
 tells us the sense is, *Deus nunc quievit ab*  
*ira & placatus fuit*, and to the same pur-  
 pose *Vatablus* : which sense is most a-  
 greeable

greeable to the design of the following words, in which God expresseth his great kindness, *and the Lord said in his heart, I will not again curse the ground any more for mans sake* ; which are words highly expressing, how much God was propitiated by the Sacrifice which *Noah* offered, and therefore *Josephus* doth well interpret this to be a proper *Expiatory Sacrifice* ; that *God* would now be atoned, and send no more such a deluge upon the world ; which he saith was the substance of *Noah's* prayer, when he offered this Burnt-offering, and that *God* would receive his Sacrifice *ὃς μὴδεμίαν ὀργὴν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν ἐμοίαν λάβειν*, That he would no more receive such displeasure against the earth : So that the first time ever this expression was used, it is taken in the proper sense of an *Expiatory Sacrifice*.

*Joseph. Antiq. Jud. l. 1. c. 4.*

VII. And by that the second enquiry may be easily resolved ; viz. What kind of *Sacrifices* it doth belong to, which we see in the first place is, to expiatory, which *Crellius* denies by a great mistake, of the sense of the phrase, and of the nature of the *Offerings*, concerning which this expression is most used ; viz. *Holocausts*, as though those were not Expiatory Sacrifices : But if we can make it appear,

*Crellius* his mistakes about the kinds of sacrifices.

appear, that the *Holocausts* were *Expiatory Sacrifices*, then it will follow, that this phrase doth most properly agree to a Sacrifice designed for Expiation. But *Crellius* here speaks very confusedly concerning Sacrifices, opposing *Holocausts* and *Freewill-offerings* to Expiatory Sacrifices; whereas the *Freewill-offerings* might be *Expiatory*, as well as *Eucharistical*; that denomination not respecting the end the Sacrifices were designed for, but that the precise time of offering them was not determined by the Law; as in the stated and solemn Sacrifices. For the general distribution of Sacrifices, seems proper into *Propitiatory* and *Eucharistical*; which distinction is thought by some to hold from the first time we read of Sacrifices in Scripture; because the Sacrifice of *Cain* was of the fruits of the ground, and of *Abel*, of the Firstlings of his flock. Although there seems to be nothing meant by this difference of Sacrifices, but the diversity of their employments, either of them Sacrificing according to them; and I cannot say what some do, that the reason of God's rejecting *Cain's Sacrifice*, was because it was not designed for expiation. But the practice of after ages, wherein we have a fuller account of the grounds of the several Sacrifices, makes

Gen. 4. 3, 4.

makes it appear, that the Expiatory Sacrifices before the Law, were all *Burnt-offerings*; and of all those who were not under the particular obligation of that Law: As is plain in the Expiatory Sacrifices of *Job* for his sons, and for his friends, which were *Burnt-offerings*; and among the *Jews*, all the Sacrifices that were offered up before the *Levitical Law*, were, as the *Jews* themselves tell us, only *Burnt-offerings*: And after the settling of their Worship among themselves, they did receive *Burnt-offerings* for expiation from strangers, as Mr. *Selden* at large proves from the *Jewish Writers*. It seems then very strange, that since *Burnt-offerings* before the Law were Expiatory, and under the Law they continued so for strangers, they should be of another nature for the *Jews* themselves. But what reason is there for it in the Text? not the least that I can find, but expressly the contrary. For in the beginning of *Leviticus*, where the Law for *Burnt-offerings* is delivered, the words are, *And he shall put his hand upon the head of the Burnt-offering, and it shall be accepted for him, to make atonement for him*; which is as much as is ever said of any Expiatory Sacrifices: And in the

Job 1. 5.

42. 8.

*Selden de  
jure nat. &  
gent. apud  
Ebræ. l. 3.  
c. 2. & c. 6.*

Levit. 1. 4.

Q

Verse

Verse before, where we render וּנְזַרְתָּ  
*of his own voluntary will*; it is by the vul-  
gar Latin rendred, *Ad placandum sibi Do-*  
*minum*; by the Syriack Version, *Ad pla-*  
*cationem sibi obtinendam à Domino*; and  
to the same purpose by the *Chaldee Pa-*  
*raphrast*; but no one Version considera-  
ble that so renders it, as to make *Burnt-*  
*offerings* to be Free-will offerings here,  
which are spoken of distinctly, and by  
themselves afterwards: And the *Chaldee*  
*Paraphrast*, *Jonathan* thus explains, *This*  
*is the Law of the Burnt-offering*; i.e.  
*Quod venit ad expiandum pro cogitationi-*  
*bus cordis*; but although the Jews be not  
fully agreed what the *Burnt-offerings* were  
designed to expiate, yet they consent  
that they were of an Expiatory nature.  
Which might make us the more won-  
der, that *Crellius* and others should ex-  
clude them from it, but the only reason  
given by him is, *because they are distin-*  
*guished from Sacrifices for sin*, as though  
no Sacrifices were of an Expiatory na-  
ture but they, and then the *Trespas-*  
*offerings* must be excluded too, for they  
are distinguished from *Sin-offerings* as well  
as the other. The ignorance of the Jews  
in the reason of their own customs, hath  
been an occasion of great mistakes a-  
mong

Lev. 7.16.

22.18 &c.

Levit. 6. 7.

Crell. c 10.

p. 530.



mong Christians, concerning the nature of them; when they judge of them according to the blind or uncertain conjectures which they make concerning them: So that the Text is oft-times far clearer than their Commentaries are. Setting aside then the intricate and unsatisfactory niceties of the *Jewish Writers*, about the several reasons of the *Burnt-offerings* and *Sin* and *Trespass-offerings*, and the differences they make between them, which are so various and incoherent, I shall propose this conjecture concerning the different reasons of them, *viz.* That some *Sacrifices* were assumed into the Jewish Religion, which had been long in use in the world before, and were common to them with the *Patriarchs*, and all those who in that age of the world did fear and serve God, and such were the *Burnt offerings* for expiation of sin, and the fruits of the earth by way of gratitude to God. Other *Sacrifices* were instituted among them, with a particular respect to themselves, as a people governed by the Laws of God: And these were of several sorts; 1. *Symbolical*, of God's presence among them, such was the *daily Sacrifice*, instituted as a testimony of God's presence, *Exod. 29.*

from v. 38. to the end. 2. *Occasional*, for some great mercies vouchsafed to them, as the *Passover* and the *Solemn Festivals*, &c. 3. *Expiatory*, for the sins committed against their *Law*: And these were of three sorts; 1. Such as were wholly consumed to the honour of God, which were the *Burnt-offerings*. 2. Such, of which some part was consumed upon the *Altar*, and some part fell to the share of the *Priests*; and these were either sins particularly enumerated by God himself, under the  $\square\omega\kappa$ , or else generally comprehended under the  $\square\omega\sigma$  as being allowed to be expiated, because committed through inadvertency. 3. Such, whereof a less part was consumed, as in the *Peace-offerings of the Congregation*, mentioned *Levit. 23. 19.* whereof the blood was sprinkled, only the inwards burnt, and the flesh not eaten by the persons that offered them, as it was in the *Peace-offerings* of particular persons (of which as being *private Sacrifices*; I have here no occasion to speak) but only by the *Priests in the Court*; and these had something of expiation in them. Forthence, saith *Vatablus*, the *Peace offering* was called by the Greeks  $\tau\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\nu$ , i.e. *Expiatorium*, and the *LXX.* commonly render it,  $\theta\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$   
*ωλνεῖς,*

*and* *several* of the *Jews* think the reason of the name was, *That it made peace between God and him that offered it*: But the great reason I insist on, is, Because all the things which were used in an Expiatory Sacrifice, were in this too; the slaying of the Beast, the sprinkling of the blood, and the consumption of some part of it upon the Altar, as an Oblation to God, which are the three ingredients of an *Expiatory Sacrifice*; for the *shedding of the blood*, noted the bearing the punishment of our iniquity; and, *the sprinkling of it on the Altar*, and *the consuming of the part of the Sacrifice, or the whole there*, that it was designed for the expiation of sin. From whence it follows, that the phrase of a *sweet-smelling savour*, being applied under the Law to *Expiatory Sacrifices*, is very properly used by *St. Paul*, concerning Christ's giving up himself for us: so that from this phrase, nothing can be inferred contrary to the Expiatory nature of the death of Christ, but rather it is fully agreeable to it.

VIII. But *Crellius* hath yet a farther Argument, to prove that Christ's death cannot be here meant as the Expiatory Sacrifice; viz. *That the notion of a sacrifice*

What influence the maceration of the sacrifice had on expiation.

Croll. cap.

10. p. 533.

*fice, doth consist in the oblation whereby the thing is consecrated to the honour and service of God; to which the maſtation is but a bare preparation; which he proves, Because the ſlaying the ſacrifice might belong to others beſides the Priests, Ezek. 44. 10, 11. but the oblation only to the Priests.*

To this I answer, 1. The *maſtation* may be conſidered two ways, either with a reſpect to the bare *instrument* of taking away the life, or to the design of the Offerer of that which was to be ſacrificed: As the *maſtation* hath a reſpect only to the instruments, ſo it is no otherways to be conſidered than as a *puniſhment*; but as it hath a reſpect to him that deſigns it for a Sacrifice, ſo the ſhedding of the blood, hath an immediate influence on the expiation of ſin. And that by this clear Argument, *The blood is ſaid to make an Atonement for the ſoul*; and the reaſon given is, *because the life of the fleſh is in the blood*: So that which was the life, is the great thing which makes the Atonement; and when the blood was ſhed, the life was then given; from whence it follows, that the great efficacy of the ſacrifice for Atonement lay in the *ſhedding of the blood* for that end. Thence the *Apoſtle* attributes remiſſion of ſins to the

Levit. 17.

11.

the ἀιματεχυσις, the *shedding of the blood*; and not to the bare *Oblation* of it on the Altar, or the carrying it into the Holy of Holies, both which seem to be nothing else but a more solemn representation of that *blood* before God, which was already shed for the expiation of sins, which was therefore necessary to be performed, that the concurrence of the *Priest* might be seen with the sacrifice in order to expiation. For if no more had been necessary but the bare slaying of the Beasts, which was the meanest part of the service, the people would never have thought the institution of the *Priesthood* necessary, and least of all that of the *High-Priest*, unless some solemn action of his had been performed, such as the entering into the Holy of Holies, on the day of expiation, and carrying it, and sprinkling the blood of the *sin-offering* in order to the expiation of the sins of the people. And it is observable, that although the *Levitical Law* be silent in the common Sacrifices, who were to kill them whether the *Priests* or the *Levites*; yet on that day whereon the *High-Priest* was to appear himself for the expiation of sin, it is expressly said, *that he should not only*

Heb. 9. 12.

Q. 4

kill

Levit. 16.  
11, 15.

*kill the bullock of the sin-offering, which is for himself, but the goat of the sin-offering, which is for the people. And although the Talmudists dispute from their Traditions on both sides, whether any one else might on the day of expiation, slay the sin-offerings besides the High-Priest; yet it is no news for them to dispute against the Text, and the Talmud it self is clear, that the High-Priest did it.* From whence it appears, there was something peculiar on that day as to the slaying of the *sin-offerings*; and if our Adversaries opinion hold good, *that the Sacrifices on the day of expiation did, if not atone, yet chiefly represent the Sacrifice of Christ*, no greater argument can be brought against themselves than this is, for the office of the *High-Priest* did not begin at his carrying the *blood* into the *Holy of Holies*, but the *slaying the sacrifice* did belong to him too: from whence it will unavoidably follow, that Christ did not enter upon his Office of *High-Priest*, when he entred into Heaven, but when the Sacrifice was to be slain which was designed for the expiation of sins. It is then to no purpose at all, if *Crellius* could prove that sometimes in ordinary Sacrifices, (which he will not say, the Sacrifice

Codex Joma  
cap. 4. sect.  
3. cap. 5.  
sect. 4.

Sacrifice of Christ was represented by) the *Levites* might kill the beasts for Sacrifice ; for it appears, that in these Sacrifices, wherein themselves contend that Christ's was represented, the office of the *High-Priest* did not begin with entring into the *Sanctuary*, but with the *mactation* of that Sacrifice whose blood was to be carried in thither. Therefore if we speak of the bare instruments of *mactation* in the death of Christ, those were the *Jews*, and we make not them *Priests* in it, for they aimed at no more than taking away his life (as the *Popæ* among the *Romans*, and those whose bare Office it was to kill the beasts for Sacrifice among the *Jews* did :) but if we consider it with a respect to him that offered up his life to God, then we say, that Christ was the *High-Priest* in doing it ; it being designed for the expiation of sin ; and by vertue of this *blood shed* for that end, he enters into Heaven as the *Holy of Holies*, there ever living to make *intercession* for us. But the vertue of the consequent acts, depends upon the efficacy of the *blood* shed for expiation ; otherwise the *High-Priest* might have entred with the same effect into the *Holy of Holies* with any other blood besides that which

Heb. 9. 13,  
14. 10. 4,  
10.

which was shed on purpose as a *sin-offering*, for expiation of the sins of the people; which it was unlawful for him to do. And from hence it is, that the *Apostle* to the *Hebrews* insists so much on the comparison between the *blood of Christ*, and the *blood of the legal sacrifices*, and the efficacy of the one far above the other, in its power of expiation; which he needed not to have done, if the shedding of his blood, had been only a preparation for his entrance on his *Priesthood* in Heaven. So that the proper notion of a *Sacrifice for sin*, as it notes the giving the life of one for the expiation of the sins of another, doth properly lie in the *mactation*, though other sacrificial acts may be consequent upon it. So it was in the *animales hostiæ* among the *Romans*, in which, saith *Macrobius*, *Sola anima Deo sacatur*: of which he tells us *Virgil* properly speaks in those words,

*Macrobius*. *Satur-  
n. l. 3.*  
c. 5.

*Hanc tibi Eryx meliorem animam pro  
morte Daretis.*

And that we may the better understand what he means by the *anima* here, he saith elsewhere (as *Macrobius* and *Servi-*



us observe out of his excellent Skill and accuracy in the Pontifical rites)

*Sanguine placastis ventos & virgine  
cæsa,*

*Cum primum Iliacas Danaï venistis ad  
oras :*

*Sanguine quærendi redivit, animaque  
litandum*

*Argolica.*

Which shews, that the expiation was supposed to lie in the blood which they called the *Soul*, as the Scripture doth. And the *Persians*, as *Strabo* tells us, looked upon the bare *maſtation* as the Sacrifice, for they did not *porricere* as the *Romans* called it, they laid none of the parts of the Sacrifice upon the Altar to be consumed there, τῆς γὰρ ψυχῆς παρὰ τῆς *Strabol. 15.*  
ἱερείς δαΐσαι τὸν Θεὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχὴν. For God regarded nothing but the Soul in the sacrifice: which words *Enſtathius* like- *Enſtath. in*  
wise useth upon *Homer*, of the Sacri- *Hom. Iliad.*  
fices of the *Magi*. And *Strabo* affirms *Strabo l. 3.*  
of the ancient *Lusitani*, that they cut off nothing of the Sacrifice, but consumed the entrails whole; but though such Sacrifices which were for divination were not thought expiatory, and there-  
fore

fore different from the *animales hostia*, yet among the *Persians*, every Sacrifice had a respect to expiation of the whole people. For *Herodotus* tells us, that every one that offers Sacrifice among them, *ὡς τοῖσι Πέρσαι κατέχευται εὖ γινέσθαι καὶ τῷ βασιλεῖ*, *prays for good to all Persians and the King*. But thus much may serve to prove against *Crellius*, that the *mactation* in an Expiatory Sacrifice, was not a meer preparation to a Sacrifice, but that it was a proper Sacrificial act, and consequently that Christ acted as High-Priest, when he gave himself for us, an offering and a Sacrifice to God for a *sweet-smelling savour*.

Whether  
Christ's  
Oblation  
of himself  
once to  
God, were  
in Heaven  
or on  
Earth.

IX. But this will further appear from those places wherein Christ is said *to offer up himself once to God*: the places to this purpose are, Heb. 7. 27. *Who needeth not daily as those High-Priests to offer up Sacrifice, first for his own sins, and then for the Peoples, for this he did once, when he offered up himself*. Heb. 9. 14. *How much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your Conscience from dead works, to serve the living God*. V. 25, 26, 27, 28. *Nor yet that he should offer himself often, as the High-Priest en-*  
*treth*

treth into the holy place every year with the blood of others; for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the World: but now once in the end of the World hath he appeared to put away sin by the Sacrifice of himself. And as it is appointed to men once to die, but after this the Judgement: so Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many, and unto them that look for him shall he appear the second time without sin unto salvation. Heb. 10.

10, 11, 12. By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the Body of Jesus Christ once for all. And every High-Priest, standeth daily ministring and offering oftentimes the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but this man after he had offered one sacrifice for sins for ever, sate down on the right hand of God.

To these places *Crellius* gives this answer, That the name of Oblation as ap- *Crell. cap. 10. sect. 54.*

plied to Christ, primarily signifies  
 “ Christ’s first entrance into Heaven, and  
 “ appearance before the face of God  
 “ there, but consequently the continu-  
 “ ance of that appearance; so that when  
 “ a thing is once actually exhibited and  
 “ presented, it is said to be once offered,  
 “ although being offered, it always re-  
 “ mains in the same place, and so may  
 “ be

“ be said to be a continual Oblation.  
 “ But this first appearance, *saieth he*, hath  
 “ a peculiar agreement with the legal  
 “ Oblation; and therefore the name of  
 “ Oblation doth most properly belong  
 “ to that, because Christ by this means  
 “ obtained that power on which the  
 “ perfect remission of our sins depends:  
 “ but although the continuance of that  
 “ appearance, seems only consequenti-  
 “ ally to have the name of Oblation  
 “ belonging to it, yet in its own nature,  
 “ it hath a nearer conjunction with the  
 “ effect of the Oblation, *viz.* the remission  
 “ of sins, or deliverance from punish-  
 “ ment, and doth of it self confer more  
 “ to it than the other doth. And there-  
 “ fore in regard of that, Christ is said  
 “ most perfectly to exercise his Priest-  
 “ hood, and to offer and intercede for  
 “ us, from the time he is said to sit down  
 “ at the right hand of God. Against  
 this answer, I shall prove these two  
 things, 1. That it is incoherent, and  
 repugnant to it self. 2. That it by no  
 means agrees to the places before menti-  
 oned. 1. That it is incoherent and re-  
 pugnant to it self in two things. 1. In  
 making that to be the proper *Oblation*  
 in correspondency to the Oblations of  
 the

the Law, which hath no immediate respect to the expiation of sins. 2. In making that to have the most immediate respect to the expiation of sins, which can in no tolerable sense be called an *Oblation*. For the first, since *Cressius* saith, that the proper notion of *Oblation* is to be taken from the *Oblations* in the *Levitical Law*, we must consider what it was there, and whether *Christ's* first entrance into Heaven can have any correspondency with it. An *Oblation* under the Law was in general, any thing which was immediately dedicated to God, but in a more limited sense it was proper to what was dedicated to him by way of *Sacrifice* according to the appointments of the *Levitical Law*. We are not now enquiring what was properly called an *Oblation* in other *Sacrifices*, but in those which then were for expiation of sin; And in the *Oblation* was, first of the persons for whom the *Sacrifice* was offered. So in the *Burnt-offering*, the person who brought it, was to offer it at the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation: i. e. as the *Jews* expound it, at the entrance of the Court of the *Priests*, and there he was to lay his hands upon the head of it, and it shall be accepted for him

Lev. 1. 3.

V. 4.

*to make atonement for him. This Offering was made before the Beast was slain; after the killing the beast, then the Priests were to make an Offering of the blood, by sprinkling it round about the Altar of Burnt-offerings; the rest of the blood, say the Jews, was poured out by the Priests, at the South-side of the Altar upon the foundation, where the two holes were for the passage into the Channel, which conveyed the blood into the valley of Kidron; thus the blood being offered, the parts of the beast, were by the Priests to be laid upon the Altar, and there they were all to be consumed by fire; and then it was called an Offering made by fire, of a sweet savour unto the Lord. The same rites were used in the Peace-offerings, and Trespass-offerings, as to the laying on of hands, and the sprinkling the blood, and consuming some part by fire: and in the sin-offerings, there was to be the same imposition of hands: but concerning the sprinkling of the blood, and the way of consuming the remainders of the Sacrifice, there was this considerable difference; that in the common sin-offerings for particular*

*persons, the blood was sprinkled upon the horns of the Altar of Burnt-offerings, but in the sin-offerings for the High-Priest and*  
*the*

Lev. 4. 25,

30.

the Congregation, or all the People, he was to carry the blood within the Sanctuary, and to sprinkle of it seven times before the Veil of the Sanctuary; and some of the blood was to be put upon the horns of the Altar of Incense; but the remainder of the blood, and the same things (which were offered by fire in Peace-offerings) were to be disposed of accordingly, on the Altar of Burnt-offerings. And withal, there was this great difference, that in other sin-offerings the Priests were to eat the remainder of the sacrifice in the Holy place; but in these there was nothing to be eaten by them; for the whole Bullock was to be carried forth without the Camp, and there he was to be burned till all were consumed. For it was an express Law, That no sin offerings, whereof any of the blood is brought into the Tabernacle of the Congregation, to reconcile withal in the Holy place, shall be eaten: it shall be burnt in the fire. All the difference that was on the great day of Atonement, was this, that the High-Priest himself was to slay the Sin-offerings, and then to carry the blood of them into the Holy of Holies, and there was to sprinkle the blood with his finger towards the Mercy-seat seven times: after which, and the sending away the scape-goat,

V. 6.

Lev. 6. 26.

Lev. 4. 11, 12.

Lev. 6. 30.

Lev. 16. 17, 15.

R

the

*the ceremonies were the same for the Atonement of the people, which were at other solemn sin-offerings, for the Priest or the people.*

X. From all which being thus laid together, we shall observe several things, which are very material to our purpose:

All things  
necessary  
to a legal  
oblation  
concur in  
the death  
of Christ.

I. That in the Oblations which were made for expiation of sins, the difference between the *mactation* and the *oblation*, did arise from the difference between the *Priest* and the *Sacrifice*. For the *Priest's* Office was to *atone*, but he was to *atone* by the *Sacrifice*; on which account, although the *Priest* were to offer the *Sacrifice* for himself, yet the *oblation* did not lie in the bare presenting himself before God, but in the presenting the *blood* of that *Sacrifice*, which was shed in order to expiation. If we could have supposed, that the *High-Priest* under the Law, instead of offering a Goat for a *Sin-offering* for the people, on the day of *Atonement*, should have made an *oblation* of himself to God, by dying for the expiation of their sins: In this case, his death being the *Sacrifice*, and himself the *Priest*, the *mactation*, as it relates to his own act, and his *oblation* had been one and the same thing. For his death had been nothing else, but the offering up himself to God,  
in



in order to the expiation of the sins of the people ; and there can be no reason, why the oblation must be of necessity something consequent to his death, since all things necessary to a perfect *oblation* do concur in it. For where there is something solemnly devoted to God, and in order to the expiation of sins, and by the hand of a *Priest*, there are all things concurring to a legal oblation ; but in this case, all these things do concur, and therefore there can be no imaginable necessity of making the oblation of Christ, only consequent to his Ascension, since in his death all things concur to a proper oblation. In the Law, we grant that the oblation made by the *Priest*, was consequent to the death of the beast for Sacrifice ; but the reason of that was, because the beast could not offer up it self to *God*, and *God* had made it necessary, that the *Priest* should expiate sins, not by himself, but by those Sacrifices, and therefore the oblation of the blood was after the Sacrifice was slain ; neither could this have been solved barely *by the Priest's slaying of the Sacrifices* ; for this being an act of violence towards the beasts that were thus killed, could not be a proper obla-

tion, which must suppose a consent antecedent to it. All which shewed the great imperfection of the *Levitical Law*, in which so many several things were to concur, to make up a *sacrifice for sin*; viz. The *first offering* made by the party concerned, of what was under his dominion; viz. The beast to be sacrificed at the door of the Tabernacle of the Congregation, but the beast not being able to offer up it self, it was necessary for the offering up its *blood*, that it must be slain by others; and for the better understanding, not only of the efficacy of the *blood*, but the concurrence of the Priest for *expiation*, he was to take the *blood*, and sprinkle some of it on the Altar, and pour out the rest at the foundation of it. But since we assert a far more noble and excellent Sacrifice, by the Son of God freely offering up himself, to be made a Sacrifice for the sins of the world, why may not this be as proper an *oblation* made unto God, as any was under the *Law*, and far more excellent, both in regard of the Priest and the Sacrifice: why should his oblation of himself then be made only consequent to his death and resurrection? Which latter, being by our Adversaries made not his own act,

act, but God's upon him, and his entrance into Heaven, being given him (as they assert) *as a reward of his sufferings*, in what tolerable sense can that be called an *oblation* of himself, which was conferred upon him as a reward of his former sufferings? From whence it follows, that upon our Adversaries own grounds, the death of Christ may far more properly be called the *oblation* of himself, than his *entrance into Heaven*; and that there is no necessity of making the oblation of Christ consequent to his death, there being so great a difference between the Sacrifice of Christ, and that of the Sacrifices for sin under the *Levitical Law*.

2. We observe, That the oblation as performed by the *Priest*, did not depend upon his presenting *himself* before God, but upon the presenting the *blood* of a *Sacrifice*, which had been already *slain* for the expiation of sins. If the *Priest* had gone into the *Holy of Holies*, and there only presented himself before the *Mercy-seat*, and that had been all required in order to the expiation of sins, there had been some pretence for our Adversaries making Christ's presenting himself in Heaven, to be the oblation of himself to God; but under the Law, the efficacy

of the *High-Priest's* entrance into the *Holy of Holies*, did depend upon the *blood* which he carried in thither, which was the *blood* of the *Sin-offering*, which was already slain for the expiation of sins: And in correspondency to this, Christ's efficacy in his *entrance into Heaven*, as it respects our *expiation*, must have a respect to that Sacrifice which was offered up to God antecedent to it. And I wonder our Adversaries do so much insist on the *High-Priest's* *entring into the most holy place once a year*, as though all the *expiation* had depended upon that; whereas all the promise of *expiation*, was not upon his bare entrance into it, but upon the *blood* which he carried along with him, and *sprinkled* there: In correspondency to which, our Saviour is not barely said, to

Heb. 9. 12. *enter into Heaven*, and present himself to God, but *that he did this by his own blood, having obtained Eternal Redemption for us.*

3. We observe, That there was something correspondent in the death of Christ, to somewhat consequent to the oblation under the Law, and therefore there can be no reason to suppose, that the oblation of Christ must be consequent to his death: for that destroys the correspondency between them. Now this  
appears

appears in this particular, in the solemn *Sacrifices for sin*, after the *sprinkling of the blood*, which was carried into the *Holy place to reconcile withall*, all the remainder of the Sacrifice was *to be burnt without the Camp*, and this held on the *day of Atonement*, as well as in other *Sin-offerings* for the Congregation. Now the Author to the *Hebrews* tells us, That in correspondency to this, *Jesus that he might sanctifie the people with his own blood, suffered without the gate*: What force is there in this, unless the blood of Christ did answer to the *Sin-offerings* for the people, and his oblation was supposed to be made before; and therefore that he might have all things agreeable to those *Sin-offerings*, the last part was to be compleated too; viz. *That he was to suffer without the gate*; which after the peoples settlement in *Jerusalem*, answered to the *being burnt without the Camp* in the Wilderness.

Heb. 13.  
12.

4. We observe, That the Oblation in Expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, by the Priest, had always relation to the *consumption* of what was offered: Thus the offering of the *blood*, in token of the destruction of the life of the beast, whose blood was offered; for no *blood* was to be offered of a *living creature*, nor of one

R 4

killed

killed upon any other account, but for that end to be a *sacrifice for sin*, and after the *sprinkling* and pouring out of the blood, the *inwards* of some, and all of the other, were to be consumed by fire. And it is observable, that the greater the *Sacrifice for sin* was, always the more was *consumed* of it ; as appears plainly by the forementioned difference of the *Sin-offerings* for *private persons*, and for the *people* ; of the former, the *Priests* were allowed to eat, but not at all of the latter. And so it was observed among the *Egyptians*, in the most solemn Sacrifices for expiation, nothing was allowed to be eaten of that part which was designed for that end. For *Herodotus* gives us an account why the *Egyptians* never eat

Καταρτίονται ὃ πάδε λέ-  
γοντες τῇσι κεφαλῇσι, ἅτε  
μέλλοι ἢ σφίσι τοῖσι θύου-  
σι, ἢ Αἰγύπτῳ τῇ συνα-  
πάσῃ κακὸν γινέσθαι, ἐς  
κεφαλὴν ταύτην τραπέ-  
σαι. Herodot. l. 2. c. 39.

Τῇ μὲν κεφαλῇ τῷ ἱε-  
ροῦ κατασφραγίσαντες, καὶ ἀ-  
ποκόψαντες οἷς τὸ πρῶτον  
ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ, οὕτως ὅτι οἱ  
ἱερεῖς ἀποδίδονται. Plu-  
tarch. de Iside.

the head of any living Crea-  
ture; which is, *That when*  
*they offer up a Sacrifice, they*  
*make a solemn execration upon*  
*it, that if any evil were to*  
*fall upon the persons who Sa-*  
*crificed, or upon all Egypt, it*  
*might be turned upon the head*  
*of that beast* : And *Plutarch*  
adds, that after this solemn  
execration, *They cut off the*  
*head, and of old, threw it in-*

to the River, but then gave it to strangers. From which custom we observe, that in a solemn Sacrifice for expiation, the guilt of the offenders, was by this rite of execration supposed to be transferred upon the head of the Sacrifice, as it was in the Sacrifices among the Jews, by the laying on of hands; and that nothing was to be eaten of what was supposed to have that guilt transferred upon it. From hence all Expiatory Sacrifices were at first whole Burnt-offerings, as appears by the Patriarchal Sacrifices, and the customs of other Nations, and among the Jews themselves, as we have already proved in all solemn offerings for the people. And although in the sacrifices of private persons, some parts were allowed to be eaten by the Priests; yet those which were designed for expiation were consumed. So that the greater the offering was to God, the more it implied the *Consumption* of the thing which was so offered: How strangely improbable then is it, That the Oblation of Christ should not ( as under the Law ) have respect to his death and sufferings; but to his *entrance into Heaven*, wherein nothing is supposed to be consumed, but all things given him with far greater power, as our Adversaries

*Xenoph. Cyropæd. l. 7.  
8. Strab. l. 4. Plutarch  
Symp. l. 6.  
probl. 8.*

faries suppose, than ever he had before. But we see the *Apostle* parallels Christ's suffering with the *burning of the Sacrifices*, and his *blood* with the *blood* of them, and consequently his offering up himself, must relate not to *his entrance into Heaven*, but to that *act* of his whereby he suffered for sins, and offered up *his blood* as a *Sacrifice* for the sins of the world.

Christ's  
entrance  
into Hea-  
ven could  
not be the  
Oblation  
of himself  
mention-  
ed.

XI. From all which it appears; how far more agreeably to the *Oblations* under the Law, Christ is said to offer up himself for the expiation of sins by his *death* and *Sufferings*, than by his *entrance into Heaven*; For it is apparent, that the *Oblations* in expiatory Sacrifices under the Law, were such upon which the expiation of sin did chiefly depend; but by our Adversaries own confession, Christ's oblation of himself by his entrance into Heaven, hath no immediate respect at all to the expiation of sin: only as the way whereby he was to enjoy that power by which he did expiate sins, as *Crellius* saith; now, let us consider, what more propriety there is in making this presenting of Christ in Heaven to have a correspondency with the legal Oblations, than the offering up himself upon the Cross. For, 1. on the very same reason that  
his



his entrance into Heaven is made an *Ob-  
lation*, his death is so too; viz. *Because  
it was the way whereby he obtained the  
power of expiation*; and far more pro-  
perly so than the other, since they make  
Christ's entrance and power the reward  
of his sufferings, but they never make  
his sitting at the right hand of God, the  
reward of his *entrance into Heaven*. 2 His  
offering up himself to God upon the  
Cross, was his own act, but his entrance  
into Heaven was *God's*, as themselves  
acknowledge, and therefore could not in  
any propriety of speech be called *Christ's  
offering up himself*. 3. If it were his own act,  
it could not have that respect to the *ex-  
piation* of sins, which his death had; for  
our Adversaries say, *that his death was  
by reason of our sins*, and that he suffer-  
ed to purge us from sin; but his *entrance  
into Heaven* was upon his own account,  
to enjoy that power and authority, which  
he was to have at the right hand of God.  
4. How could *Christ's entrance into  
Heaven*, be the way for his enjoying  
that power which was necessary for the  
expiation of sin, when Christ before his  
entrance into Heaven, saith, *that all po-* Matth. 28.  
*wer was given to him in Heaven and Earth:* 18.  
and the reason assigned in Scripture of Phil. 2. 8, 9.  
that power and authority which God  
gave

gave him is, *because he humbled himself, and became obedient to death, even the death of the Cross*: So that the entrance of Christ into Heaven, could not be the means of obtaining that power which was conferred before; but the death of Christ is mentioned on that account in *Scripture*. 5. If the death of Christ were no expiatory Sacrifice, the entrance of Christ into Heaven could be no *Oblation* proper to a *High-Priest*; for his entrance into the *Holy of Holies*, was on the account of the *blood* of the *sin-offering* which he carried in with him. If there were then no Expiatory Sacrifice before, that was slain for the sins of men; Christ could not be said to make any *Oblation in Heaven*, for the Oblation had respect to a Sacrifice already slain; so that if men deny that Christ's death was a proper Sacrifice for sin, he could make no Oblation at all in Heaven, and Christ could not be said to enter thither, as the *High-Priest* entred into the *Holy of Holies* with the blood of the Sacrifice; which is the thing which the *Author* to the *Hebrews* asserts concerning Christ.

Christ's  
exercise of  
power in  
Heaven in  
no sense  
an Oblati-  
on to God.

XII. 2. There is as great an inconsistency in making the exercise of Christ's power in Heaven, an *Oblation* in any sense, as in making Christ's entrance into Heaven,

ven, to be the Oblation which had correspondency with the *Oblations* of the Law. For what is there which hath the least resemblance with an *Oblation* in it? Hath it any respect *to God*, as all the legal Oblations had? no; *for his intercession and power, Crellius saith, respects us, and not God.* Was there any Sacrifice at all in it for *expiation*? how is it possible, that the meer exercise of power should be called a *Sacrifice*? What analogy is there at all between them? And how could he be then said *most perfectly to exercise his Priesthood*, when there was no consideration at all of any *Sacrifice* offered up to *God*? so that upon these suppositions the Author to the *Hebrews* must argue upon strange similitudes, and fancy resemblances to himself, which it was impossible for the *Jews* to understand him in, who were to judge of the nature of *Priesthood* and *Oblations* in a way agreeable to the Institutions among themselves. But was it possible for them to understand such *Oblations* and a *Priesthood* which had no respect at all to *God*, but wholly to the People; and such a *entrance into the Holy of Holies* without the *blood* of an *Expiatory Sacrifice* for the sins of the people? But such absurdities do men betray themselves into, when they are forced to strain express places  
of

of Scripture to serve an *hypothesis*, which they think themselves obliged to maintain.

XIII. We now come to shew that this interpretation of *Crellius* doth not agree with the circumstances of the places before mentioned, which will easily appear by these brief considerations. 1. That the *Apostle* always speaks of the offering of Christ *as a thing past and once done, so as not to be done again*; which had been very improper, if by the Oblation of Christ, he had meant the continual appearance of Christ in Heaven for us, which yet is, and will never cease to be till all his enemies be made his foot-stool. 2. That he still speaks in allusion to the Sacrifices which were in use among the *Jews*, and therefore the Oblation of Christ must be in such a way as was agreeable to what was used in the *Levitical Sacrifices*, which we have already at large proved he could not do in our Adversaries sense. 3. That the *Apostle* speaks of such a *Sacrifice for sins* to which the *sitting at the right hand of God* was consequent; so that the Oblation antecedent to it must be properly that Sacrifice for sins which he offered to God; and therefore the exercise of his power for expiation of sins, which they say is meant by *sitting*

*Crellius* his  
sense re-  
pugnant  
to the cir-  
cumstan-  
ces of the  
places.  
Heb. 7. 27.  
9. 26. 19.  
10.

Heb. 9. 12,  
13. 10. 4. 5.

ting at the right hand of God, cannot be that Sacrifice for sins : Neither can his entrance into Heaven be it, which in what sense it can be called a *Sacrifice for sins*, since themselves acknowledge it had no immediate relation to the *expiation* of them, I cannot understand. 4. The *Apostle* speaks of such an Offering of Christ once, which if it had been repeated, doth imply, that *Christ's sufferings* must have been repeated too. For then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the World : but the repeated exercise of *Christ's power* in Heaven doth imply no necessity at all of Christ's frequent suffering, nor his frequent entrance into Heaven ; which might have been done without suffering, therefore it must be meant of such an offering up himself as was implied in his death and sufferings. 5. He speaks of the offering up of that body which God gave him when he came into the World ; but our Adversaries deny, that he carried the same Body into Heaven, and therefore he must speak not of an offering of Christ in Heaven, but what was performed here on Earth. But here our Adversaries have shewn us a tryal of their skill, when they tell us with much confidence that the World  
into

Heb. 10.

12.

Heb. 9.26.

Heb. 10. 5,  
10.

*Crell. cap.*  
10. *sect.* 53.

*Heb.* 10. 7,  
9.

Objecti-  
ons an-  
swered.

*Heb.* 7. 26.  
8. 4. 7. 16.

into which Christ is here said *to come*, is not to be understood of *this World*, but of *that to come*, which is not only contrary to the general acceptation of the word when taken absolutely as it is here, but to the whole scope and design of the place. For he speaks of that *World*, wherein *Sacrifices and Burnt-offerings were used, and the Levitical Law* was observed, although not sufficient for perfect expiation, and so rejected for that end; and withal he speaks of that *World* wherein the chearful obedience of Christ to the will of his Father was seen, for he saith, *Lo I come to do thy will, O God*, which is repeated afterwards; but will they say, that this *World* was not the place into which Christ came to obey the *Will* of his Father? and how could it be so properly said of the future World, *Lo I come to do thy will*; when they make the design of his ascension to be the receiving the reward of his doing and suffering the will of God upon Earth?

XIV. But yet they attempt to prove from the same *Author* to the *Hebrews*, that Christ's entrance into Heaven, was necessary to his being a perfect *High-Priest*; for he was to be made *higher than the Heavens*; and if he were on earth, he

he should not be a Priest; but he was a Priest after the power of an endless life: Neither could he, say they, be a perfect High-Priest, till those words were spoken to him, *Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee*; which as appears by other places, was after the Resurrection: But all the sufferings he underwent in the world, were only to qualifie him for this Office in Heaven; therefore it is said, *That in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High-Priest, &c.* This is the substance of what is produced by Crellius and his Brethren, to prove that Christ did not become a perfect High-Priest, till he entred into Heaven: But it were worth the knowing, what they mean by a *perfect High-Priest*; Is it that Christ did then begin the Office of a High-Priest, and that he made no offering at all before? No, that they dare not assert at last, but that there was no perfect Sacrifice offered for sin, otherwise Socinus contends, *That Christ did offer upon earth, and that for himself too*: So that all kind of offering is not excluded by themselves, before Christ's entrance into Heaven: But if they mean by *perfect High-Priest* in Heaven, that his Office

5. 5.

2. 17.

Crell. cap.  
10. sect. 53.

Socin. præ-  
lect. c. ult.

fice of *High-Priest* was not consummated by what he did on earth, but that a very considerable part of the *Priesthood* of Christ was still remaining to be performed in Heaven ; it is no more than we do freely acknowledge, and this is all we say is meant by those places : For the *Apostles* design is to prove, the excellency of the *Priesthood* of Christ above the *Aaronical* ; which he doth, not only from the excellency of the Sacrifice which he offered, above *the blood of Bulls and Goats* ; but from the excellency of the *Priest*, who did excel the *Aaronical Priests* ; both in regard of *his calling from God*, which is all the *Apostle* designs, *Heb. 5. 5.* not at all intending to determine the time *when he was made*, but *by whom* he was made *High-Priest*, even by him that had said, *Thou art my Son, &c.* and in regard of the excellency of the *Sanctuary* which he entred into , which was not an *earthly*, but a *heavenly Sanctuary* ; and in regard of the perpetuity of his function there, *Not going in once a year, as the High-Priests under the Law did*, but *there ever living to make intercession for us* : Now this being the *Apostles* design, we may easily understand why he saith, *That he was to be a heavenly High-Priest,*  
and



and if he had been on earth, he could not have been a Priest: The meaning of which is only this, that if Christ's Office had ended in what he did on earth, he would not have had such an excellency as he was speaking of; for then he had ceased to be at all such a *High-Priest*, having no *Holy of Holies* to go into, which should as much transcend the earthly Sanctuary, as his Sacrifice did the blood of Bulls and Goats: Therefore in correspondency to that *Priesthood*, which he did so far excel in all the parts of it, he was not to end his *Priesthood* merely with the blood which was shed for a Sacrifice, but he was to carry it into Heaven, and present it before God, and to be a perpetual Intercessor in the behalf of his people: And so was in regard of the perpetuity of his Office, a Priest after the Law of an endless life: But lest the people should imagine, that so great and excellent a *High-Priest*, being so far exalted above them, should have no sense or compassion upon the infirmities of his people, therefore to encourage them to adhere to him, he tells them, *That he was made like to his Brethren*; and therefore they need not doubt, but by the sense which he had of the infirmi-

ties of humane nature, he will have *pi-ty* on the weaknesses of his people; which is all the *Apostle* means by those expressions. So that none of these places do destroy the *Priesthood of Christ on earth*, but only assert the *excellency*, and the *continuance* of it *in heaven*: Which latter, we are as far from denying, as our Adversaries are from granting the former. And thus much may suffice for the second thing, to prove the death of Christ a proper sacrifice for sin; viz. *The Oblation which Christ made of himself to God by it.*

---

# C H A P. VI.

- I. *That the effects of proper Expiatory Sacrifices belong to the death of Christ, which either respect the sin or the person. Of the true notion of expiation of sin, as attributed to Sacrifices. Of the importance of כפר, as applied to them. Socinus his proper sense of it examined.*
- II. *Crellius his Objections answered.*
- III. *The Jews notion of כפר. The Sacrifices not bare conditions of pardon, nor expiated meerly as a slight part of obedience.*
- IV. *God's expiating sin, destroys not expiation by Sacrifice.*
- V. *The importance of καθάρσις and ἀνάγκη, relating to Sacrifices.*
- VI. *Expiation attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ, in the same sense that it was to other Sacrifices.*
- VII. *And from thence, and the places of Scripture which mention it, proved not to be meerly declarative. If it had been so, it had more properly belonged to his Resurrection than his death.*
- VIII. *The Death of Christ not taken Metonymically for all the Consequents of it; because of the peculiar effects of the death of Christ in Scripture.*
- IX. *And*

because Expiation is attributed to him antecedently to his entrance into Heaven. X. No distinction in Scripture of the effects of Christ's entrance into Heaven from his sitting at the right hand of God. XI. The effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice, respecting the person, belong to the death of Christ, which are Atonement and Reconciliation. Of the signification of *ἱλασμός* and *ἱλαρόμεθα*. XII. The Reconciliation by Christ's death, doth not meerly respect us, but God; why the latter less used in the New Testament. A twofold Reconciliation with God mentioned in Scripture. Crellius his evasion answered. XIII. The Objections from God's being reconciled in the sending his Son. XIV. And the inconsistency of the Freeness of Grace with the Doctrine of Satisfaction answered, and the whole concluded.

Of the true notion of Expiation, as attributed to Sacrifices.

I. **T**HE last thing to prove the death of Christ a proper Expiatory Sacrifice, is, That the effects of a proper Sacrifice for sin are attributed to it. Which do either respect the *sins* committed, and are then called *Expiation* and *Remission*, or the persons who were guilty of them, as they stand

stand obnoxious to the displeasure of God, and so the effect of them is *Atonement* and *Reconciliation*. Now these we shall prove do most properly and immediately refer to the death of Christ; and are attributed to it, as the procuring cause of them; and not as a bare condition of Christ's entrance into Heaven, or as comprehending in it the consequents of it. I begin with the *Expiation* and *Remission* of sins; as to which *Socinus* doth acknowledge, *That the great correspondency doth lie between Christ's and the Legal Sacrifices*. We are therefore to enquire: 1. What respect the Expiation of sins had to the Sacrifices under the Law. 2. In what sense the Expiation of sins is attributed to the Sacrifice of Christ: For the due explication of the respect which Expiation of sins had to the Legal Sacrifices, we are to consider in what sense *Expiation* is understood, and in what respect it is attributed to them. For this we are to enquire into the importance of the several phrases it is set forth by, which are כפר and חטא in the Old Testament, καθαριζω, ἀγαθίζω, ἱλασθεσθαι in the New; all which are acknowledged by our Adversaries to have a peculiar respect to the

*Socin. de  
Christo ser-  
uat. p. 2.  
l. 13.  
Crell. cap.  
10 sect. 26.*

Crell. cap.  
10. sect. 38.

Expiation made by a *Sacrifice*. We shall begin with the former, because *Crellius* objects this against *Grotius*, That he employed his greatest diligence in the explication of the Greek and Latin words for Expiation of sin, and was contented only to say, that the Hebrew words would bear the same signification: Whereas, saith he, he ought to have proved, that the Hebrew words do require that sense which he takes them in. But by *Crellius* his leave, *Grotius* took the best course was to be taken in words, whose signification is so obscure as those are in the Hebrew Language. For כפר being so very rarely used in Scripture in that which *Socinus* and *Crellius* contend to be the proper and natural signification of it; viz. *To hide or cover*, and so frequently in the sense of *Expiation*, what better way could be taken for determining the sense of it, as applied to *Sacrifices*, than by insisting upon those words which are used in the *New Testament*, to the very same purpose that כפר is used in the old? For they cannot pretend that which they say is the most proper sense, can be applied to this subject, viz. *To cover* with pitch, or a bituminous matter, which is called קטר Gen. 6. 14. therefore it must of necessity

cessity be taken in another sense here. But *Socinus* contends, *That it ought to be taken in a sense most agreeable to that, which is, saith he, that the Expiation of sin be nothing else, but the covering of it, by God's grace and benignity. Thence, saith he, David saith, Blessed is the man whose iniquity is covered.* But how can this prove, that the proper signification of כפר as applied to sin, is covered by God's Grace, when neither the word כפר is here used, nor is there any respect at all mentioned of an *Expiation* by Sacrifice, which is the thing we are discoursing of? And is the *covering of sin* such an easie and intelligible phrase, that this should be made choice of to explain the difficulty of כפר by? What is it that they would have us understand by *the covering sin*? surely not to make it stronger and more lasting, as the Ark was covered, with that bituminous matter for that end, and yet this would come the nearest to the proper sense of כפר. So that from their own interpretation it appears, that כפר as applied to the expiation of sin by Sacrifices, cannot be taken so much as in allusion to that other sense; for their sense of Expiation, is either by the destruction of sin, or deliverance of the sinner

*Socin. de  
Serruat. p.  
2. c. 11.*

*Psal. 32. 1.*

sinner from the punishment of it, but what resemblance is there between the covering of a thing, in order to its preservation, and the making it not to be, or at least destroying all the power of it? But supposing we should grant that it hath some allusion to the sense of covering, why must it necessarily be supposed to be done by the *meer Grace of God*, as excluding all antecedent causes which should move to it? would not the propriety of the sense remain as well, supposing a *moving cause*, as excluding it? What should hinder, but that God may be said as well to *cover sin* upon a Sacrifice as to *forgive it*, and this is very frequently used upon a Sacrifice, *That the sin shall be forgiven*? But yet themselves acknowledge, that the Sacrifices were conditions required in order to expiation; if then כִּפּוּר hath an immediate respect to God's immediate favour and benignity, how comes it to be used where a condition is necessarily supposed in order to it? Had it not been more agreeable to this benignity of God to have pardon'd sin without requiring any sacrifice for it, than so strictly insisting upon the offering up Sacrifice in order to it, and then declaring that the *sin is expiated*,

Lib. 4. 26.  
Ver. 31,  
35.



red, and it should be forgiven? from hence we see that there is no necessity why כפר should be used as applied to sacrifices in a sense most agreeable to that of *covering* with pitch, nor that it is not possible it should have such a sense when applied to *sin*; and withal that it is very consistent with an antecedent condition to it, and therefore can by no means destroy satisfaction.

H. Yes, saith *Crellius*, it doth, for expiation is explained in the Law by non imputation, Deut. 21. 8. Be merciful, O Lord, unto thy people Israel whom thou hast redeemed; and lay not innocent blood unto thy people of Israel's charge; and the blood shall be forgiven them. But not to impute, saith he, and to receive true and full satisfaction overthrow each other: and so expiation being the same with that, will overthrow it too. To this I answer, 1. I grant that כפר is here used both as applied to God; and to the sin, and that the sense of it is used as to the people, when the prayer is that God would not lay it to their charge, which is the same with expiating of it. 2. We are to consider, what the foundation of this Prayer was, viz. the slaying of the Heifer for expiation of the uncertain murder; and when the  
Elders

*Crellius* his  
Objections an-  
swered.

*Crell. c. 10.  
sect. 9.*

*Elders* had washed their hands over the head of the Heifer, then they were to protest their own innocency, and to use this prayer. כפר למען ושראל *Expiate thy people Israel*, &c. i. e. accept of this Sacrifice as an expiation for them, and so charge not on them the innocent blood, &c. and upon doing of this it is said, ונכפר להם הדם, *and the blood shall be expiated*, i. e. as the *Vulgar Latin* explains it, *the guilt of the blood shall be taken from them*. But how then should the expiating sin upon a Sacrifice slain in order thereto, destroy that satisfaction which we assert by the blood of Christ being shed in order to the expiation of our sins? Nay, it much rather sheweth the consistency and agreeableness of these one with another. For we have before proved, that the Sacrifice here did expiate the sin by a substitution, and bearing the guilt which could not have been expiated without it. But *Crellius* further urgeth, *that God himself is here said to expiate, and therefore to expiate cannot signify to atone or satisfy; in which sense Christ may be said to expiate too, not by atoning or satisfying, but by not imputing sins, or taking away the punishment of them by his power*. To which we need no other

other answer than what *Crellius* himself  
 elsewhere gives, viz. that *Socinus* never  
 denies but that *כפר* doth signifie to appease  
 or atone; which is most evidently proved  
 from the place mention'd by *Grotius*, Gen.  
 32. 20. *אֶכְפֹּר פָּנָיו בְּמִנְחָה* *Expiabo fa-*  
*ciem ejus in munere*, saith the interlineary  
 Version, *placabo illum muneribus*, the Vulg.  
 Lat. *ἐξιλάσομαι τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ*, the  
 LXX. and all the circumstances of the  
 place make it appear to be meant in the  
 proper sense of *appeasing* the anger of a  
 person by something which may move  
 him to shew favour. And if *Crellius*  
 will yield this to be the sense of *expiati-*  
*on* as applyed to the Sacrifice of Christ,  
 he need not quarrel with the word *satis-*  
*faction*. But why should he rather at-  
 tribute that sense of expiation to Christ,  
 which is alone given to God, wherein  
 the *expiation* is attributed to him that  
 receives the Sacrifice: rather than to  
 him that offers the sacrifice in order to  
 the atonement of another? since it is ac-  
 knowledged that Christ did offer a *sa-*  
*crifice*; and therefore there can be no  
 reason why that sense of expiation should  
 not belong to him, which was most pe-  
 culiar to that; which we shall now  
 shew to be of the same kind with what  
 is

*Cum non  
 neget, So-  
 cinus hoc  
 verbum  
 placandi  
 significati-  
 onem ha-  
 bere. Crell.  
 c. 20. sect.  
 38.*

is here mentioned, viz. an *appeasing* by a gift offered up to God. So we find the word used to the same sense, 2 Sam. 21. 3. וְכַפֵּר אֶתְּכֶם וְכַפֵּר אֶתְּיָדָיו וְכַפֵּר אֶתְּיָדָיו וְכַפֵּר אֶתְּיָדָיו, and *wherewith shall I make the Atonement*, i. e. *wherewith shall I satisfy you for all the wrong which Saul hath done unto you?* and we see afterwards it was *by the death of Saul's sons*. In which place it cannot be denied but that כַּפֵּר not only signifies to *appease*, but such a kind of satisfaction as is by the death of some for the faults of others; and so comes home, not only to the importance of the *expiation* belonging to a Sacrifice in general; but to such a kind of expiation as is by the suffering of some in the place of others. Which though it be more clear and distinct, where one man suffers for others, yet this was sufficiently represented in the sacrifices under the Law, in which we have already proved that there was a substitution of them in the place of the offenders.

The Jews  
notion of  
כַּפֵּר

Buxtorf.  
Lexic. Tal.  
mud. v.  
כַּפֵּר

III. And in this sense the Jews themselves do understand כַּפֵּר viz. such an *expiation* as is made by the substitution of one in the place of another. Of which many instances are collected by Buxtorf, wherein כַּפֵּר is taken by the *Rabbinical*

Writers

Writers for such an *expiation*, whereby one was to undergo a punishment in the place of another. So when in the title *Sanhedrin* the people say to the High-Priest *אנו כפרתך לו* *simus nos expiatio tua*, let us be for an expiation for you, the *Gloss* explains it thus, *hoc est, in nobis fiat expiatio tua, nosq; subeamus tuo loco quicquid tibi evenire debet.* And when they tell us how Children ought to honour their Parents after their death, they say when they recite any memorable speech of their Fathers, they are not barely to say, *My Father said so*: but *my Lord and Father said so, would I had been the expiation of his death*: i. e. as they explain it themselves, *would I undergone what he did*, and they give this general rule, *where ever it is said, behold I am for expiation, it is to be understood, behold I am in the place of another to bear his iniquities.* So that this signifies the same with *λύτρον* or a price of redemption for others. Hence *כֶּפֶר* is taken for a *price of redemption of the life of another*, and rendred by *λύτρον*, *Exod. 21. 30. --- 30. 12. Numb. 35. 31, 32.* where we render it *satisfaction*, and by *ἐξίλασμα*, *Psal. 48. 7.* and thereby we fully understand, what our Saviour meant when he said, that he  
gave

Marth. 20. gave his Soul, *λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν*, a ran-  
 28. some for many, and to this day the Jews  
 call the Cock which they kill for Expi-  
 ation on the day of Atonement, by the  
 name of *Cappara*; and when they beat  
 the Cock against their heads thrice, they  
 every time use words to this purpose, *Let  
 this Cock be an exchange for me, let him  
 be in my room, and be made an Expiation  
 for me; let death come to him, but to me  
 and all Israel life and happiness.* I insist  
 on these things, only to let us under-  
 stand, that the Jews never understood

\* Socin. l. 2.  
 c. 11. Docet  
 Socinus vi-  
 timarum  
 oblationem  
 obedienti-  
 am quan-  
 dam Deo  
 præstan-  
 dam, quan-  
 quam le-  
 vem con-  
 tinuisse,  
 quam ex  
 promisso  
 Dei levium  
 quorundam  
 erratorum  
 ac pecca-  
 torum ve-  
 nia conse-  
 queretur.  
 Crell. c.  
 10. sect.  
 10-

כפר in the sense our Adversaries contend  
 for, when applied to an Expiatory Sa-  
 crifice, but as implying a *Commutation*,  
 and a *Substitution* of one in the place of  
 another, so as by the punishment of that,  
 the other in whose room he suffers, may  
 obtain deliverance. Which is the sense  
 we plead for. But the utmost which \* So-  
 cinus and Crellius will allow to the Sacri-  
 fices in order to Expiation, is barely this,  
*That the offering of them is to be consider-  
 ed as a meer condition* (that hath no o-  
 ther respect to the expiation of sins, than  
 the paring a mans nails would have had,  
 if God had required it) *upon which slight  
 obedience, the pardon of some light sins  
 might be obtained.* But can any one  
 imagine,

imagine, that this was all that was designed by the Sacrifices of old, who considers the antiquity and universality of them in the world in those elder times before the Law, the great severity by which they were required under the Law, the punctual prescriptions that were made in all circumstances for them, the vast and almost inestimable expence the people were at about them, but above all, the reason that God himself assigns in the Law, *That the blood was given for expiation, because it was the life*, and the correspondency so clearly expressed in the New Testament, between the Sacrifice of Christ, and those Levitical Sacrifices? Can any one, I say, imagine upon these considerations, that the Sacrifices had no other respect to the expiation of sin, than as they were a slight testimony of their obedience to God? Why were not an inward sorrow for sin, and tears and prayers rather made the only conditions of Expiation, than such a burthensome and chargeable service imposed upon them, which at last signified nothing, but that a command being supposed, they would have sinned if they had broken it? But upon our supposition, a reasonable account is given of all the

T                      expiatory

expiatory Sacrifices; *viz.* That God would have them see, how highly he esteemed his Laws, because an expiation was not to be made for the breach of them, but by the sacrificing of the life of some Creature which he should appoint in stead of the death of the Offender; and if the breach of those Laws which he had given them must require such an expiation, what might they then think would the sins of the whole world do, which must be expiated by a Sacrifice infinitely greater than all those put together were; *viz.* The death and sufferings of the Son of God for the sins of men? But if the offering Sacrifice had been *a bare condition required of the person who committed the fault, in order to expiation;* Why is it never said, That the person who offered it, did expiate his own fault thereby? For that had been the most proper sense; for if the expiation did depend on the offering the Sacrifice, as on the condition of it, then the performing the condition, gave him an immediate right to the benefit of the promise. If it be said, *That his own act was not only necessary in bringing the Sacrifice, but the Priests also in offering up the blood:* This will not make it at all the more reasonable;



ble; because the pardon of sin should not only depend upon a man's own act, but upon the act of another, which he could not in reason be accountable for, if he miscarried in it. If the Priest should refuse to do his part, or be unfit to do it, or break some Law in the doing of it, how hard would it seem that a mans sins could not be expiated, when he had done all that lay in his own power in order to the expiation of them, but that another person, whose actions he had no command over, neglected the doing his duty? So that if the Sacrifice had no other influence on expiation, but as a part of obedience, in all reason the expiation should have depended on no other conditions but such as were under the power of him, whose sins were to be expiated by it.

IV. But *Crellius* urgeth against our sense of Expiation, *That if it were by Substitution, then the Expiation would be most properly attributed to the Sacrifices themselves; whereas it is only said, that by the Sacrifices the Expiation is obtained; but that God or the Priest do expiate, and to God it belongs properly, because he takes away the guilt and punishment of sin; which is, saith he, all meant by expiation;*

God expiating sin,  
destroys  
not expiation by sacrifices.  
*Crell. ib. sect. 39.*

to the Priest only consequently, as doing what God requires in order to it ; and to the Sacrifices only as the conditions by which it was obtained. But if the Expiation doth properly belong to God, and implies no more than bare pardon, it is hard to conceive that it should have any necessary relation to the blood of the Sacrifice : but the Apostle to the *Hebrews* tells us, that Remission had a necessary respect to the *shedding of blood*, so that *without*

Heb. 9. 22. *that there was no remission.* How improperly doth the *Apostle* discourse throughout that *Chapter*, wherein he speaks so much concerning the *blood* of the *Sacrifices purifying*, and in correspondency to

Verse 13, that, *the blood of Christ purging our Con-*  
 14. *sciences ; and that all things under the*

Verse 18, *Law, were purified with blood ;* Had all  
 19, 20, 21, this no other signification, but that this

23. was a bare condition that had no other importance, but as a meer act of obedience when God had required it? why doth not the *Apostle* rather say, *without God's favour* there is no remission, than *without the shedding of blood* ; if all the expiation did properly belong to that, and only very remotely to the *blood* of the Sacrifice? What imaginable necessity was there, that Christ must shed his

*blood*

*blood* in order to the *expiation* of our sins, if all that *blood* of the Legal Sacrifices did signifie no more than a bare condition of pardon, though a slight part of obedience in it self? Why must Christ lay down his life in correspondency to these *Levitical Sacrifices*? for that was surely no *slight part* of his obedience. Why might not this condition have been dispensed with in him, since our *Adversaries* say, that in it self it hath no proper efficacy on the expiation of sin? And doth not this speak the greatest repugnancy to the kindness and *Grace of God* in the *Gospel*, that he would not dispense with the ignominious death of his Son, although he knew it could have no influence of it self on the expiation of the sins of the world? But upon this supposition, that the *blood* of Sacrifices under the *Law* had no proper influence upon Expiation, the *Apostles* discourse proceeds upon weak and insufficient grounds. For what necessity in the thing was there, because the blood of the Sacrifices was made a condition of pardon under the *Law*, therefore the *blood* of *Christ* must be so now; although in it self it hath no proper efficacy for that end? But the *Apo-*

Lev. 17.  
11.

*uses* words and way of Argumentation doth imply, that there was a peculiar efficacy both in the one and the other, in order to Expiation; although a far greater in the *blood* of Christ, than could be in the other; as the thing typified, ought to exceed that which was the representation of it. From hence we see, that the *Apostle* attributes what Expiation there was under the Law, not immediately to God, as belonging properly to him, but *to the blood of Bulls and Goats, and the ashes of an Heifer, sprinkling the unclean.* Which he had very great reason to do, since God expressly saith to the *Jews*, that the blood was given them לַכֹּהֵן *ad expiandum*, to expiate for their souls, for the blood כֹּהֵן כֹּהֵן shall expiate the soul. Than which words, nothing could have been more plainly said to overthrow *Crellius* his assertion, that Expiation is not properly or chiefly attributed to the Sacrifices, but primarily to God, and consequentially to the Priest: who is never said to *expiate*, but by the Sacrifice which he offered, so that his Office was barely Ministerial in it. But from this we may easily understand, in what sense God is said to *expiate* sins, where it hath respect to a Sacrifice (which

(which is that we are now discoursing of, and not in any larger or more improper use of the word) for since *God* himself hath declared, that the *blood* was given for Expiation, the Expiation which belongs to *God*, must imply his acceptance of it for that end, for which it was offered. For the execution or discharge of the punishment belonging to him, he may be said in that sense to expiate, because it is only in his power to discharge the sinner from that obligation to punishment he lies under by his sins. And we do not say, that where expiating is attributed to him that accepts the *Atonement*, that it doth imply his undergoing any punishment which is impossible to suppose; but that where it is attributed to a *Sacrifice*, as the means of *Atonement*, there we say it doth not imply a bare condition, but such a Substitution of one in the place of another, that on the account of that, the fault of the offender himself is expiated thereby.

V. And to this sense the other word *שׁוּב* doth very well agree; for *Socinus* and *Crellius* cannot deny, *But that Gen. 22. 39. it properly signifies Luere, or to bear punishment; although they say, it no where else signifies so, and the reason is,*

The importance of *קַרְבָּן*, *קָרַב*, and *קָרַבָּן*, relating to sacrifices.

because it is applied to the Altar, and such other things, which are not capable of it ; but doth it hence follow, that it should not retain that signification where the matter will bear it, as in the case of Sacrifices. And although it be frequently rendred by ἀγιάζειν, καθαρίζειν, ἐξιλάσκεσθαι, yet that will be no prejudice to the sense we plead for in respect of Sacrifices, because those words when used concerning them, do signifie Expiation too. “ *Grotius* proves, that they do from their own nature and constant use in “ *Greek Authors* , not only signifie an “ antecedency of order, but a peculiar “ efficacy in order to Expiation. Thence “ expiatory Sacrifices among the *Greeks* “ were called ἱλαστικὰ, ἀγνιστικὰ, καθαρευτικὰ “ and ἱλᾶσκειν, frequently in *Homer*, “ applied to Sacrifices, ἀγνίζειν τὴν πόλιν “ καθαρευτικῶς in *Plutarch*, and ἀγιάζειν used “ in the same sense ; an Expiatory Sacrifice in *Herodotus* is call’d καθαῖρον, and “ to the same purpose it is used in *Her- “ mogenes, Plato and Plutarch* : as among “ the *Latins*, placare, purgare, purificare, “ conciliare, lustrare in the same sense, “ and piare when used in Sacrifices, he “ proves to signifie *Luere per successionem “ rei alterius in locum pænæ debitæ.* “ Thence

“ Thence *piaculum* used for an Expiatory  
 “ Sacrifice, and *expiare* is to appease by  
 “ such a Sacrifice, so *Cereris numen expi-*  
 “ *are* is used in *Cicero*; *filium expiare* in  
 “ *Livy*. So that all these Sacrifices a-  
 “ mong them were supposed still to per-  
 “ tain to the atoning the Deity, and ob-  
 “ taining a remission of sins committed  
 “ by them. And from hence (because  
 “ where there was a greater equality and  
 “ nearness, there might be the greater  
 “ efficacy of the Sacrifice for expiation)  
 “ came the custom of sacrificing men,  
 “ which *Grotius* at large shews to have  
 “ almost universally obtained before the  
 “ coming of Christ. We are now to con-  
 “ sider what *Crellius* answers to this; the  
 “ substance of which lies in these two  
 “ things. 1. He denies not *but that* *καθα-* *Crell. c. 10.*  
*ριστεω* and *ἀγαγεω* *sect. 23, &* *do in their proper use*  
 “ *in the Greek Tongue signifie the purging of* <sup>24.</sup>  
 “ *guilt, and the averſion of the wrath of God*  
 “ *and puniſhment, but that thoſe and ſuch*  
 “ *other words are attributed to Sacrifices,*  
 “ *becauſe thoſe were ſuppoſed to be the effects*  
 “ *of them among the Heathen; but the*  
 “ *attributing ſuch effects to them, did ariſe*  
 “ *from their ſuperſtition, whereby greater*  
 “ *things were attributed to Sacrifices, than*  
 “ *God would have given to them, either be-*  
 “ *fore*

Itaq; quoad voces Graecas  $\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\iota\zeta\epsilon\upsilon$  &  $\alpha\gamma\iota\alpha\zeta\epsilon\upsilon$  attinet, quibus in hoc argumento non semel utitur D. scriptor ad Heb. ea ad Christi Sacrificium & Sacerdotii functionem relata eo etiam sensu usurpantur quem Graeca lingua recuperat, h. e. de expurgatione reatus & aversione irae numinis aut paene. Crell. c. 10. p. 499.

fore or under the Law. 2. He denies not, but that those words,  $\kappa\alpha\theta\alpha\rho\iota\zeta\epsilon\upsilon$  and  $\alpha\gamma\iota\alpha\zeta\epsilon\upsilon$ , being used by the Author to the Hebrews more than once with respect to the Sacrifices and Priesthood of Christ, were taken in the same sense in which they are used in the Greek Tongue, viz. For the purging of guilt, and the aversion of the wrath of God, and the punishment consequent upon it: But all that he contends for is, That there is a difference in the manner of effecting it, which he acknowledges the words themselves do not imply; and the reasons he gives for it are, That the other were proper, but Christ's an improper Sacrifice; and that the other Sacrifices were offered by men to God, but the Sacrifice of Christ was given by God to men, and therefore he must be supposed to be reconciled before. From whence he would at least have other senses of these words joyned together with the former; viz. Either for purging away the filth of sin, or for a declaration of a deliverance from guilt and punishment, in imitation of the Idiom of the Hebrew, in which many words are used in the New Testament. From hence it follows, that Crellius doth yield the main cause, if



if it appear, that Christ did offer up an *Expiatory Sacrifice* to God in his death, for then he grants that *καθαρσις* and *ἀπαλ-  
ξις* being applied to the Sacrifice of Christ, are to be taken for the purging away of guilt, and the averſion of the wrath of God, and the punishment of ſin. And it is to no purpoſe to ſay, that it is not a proper Sacrifice, for if the effects of a proper Sacrifice do belong to it, that proves that it is ſo ; for theſe words being acknowledged to be applied to the Sacrifice of Chriſt by the Author to the *Hebrews*, what could more evince that Chriſt's was a proper *Sacrifice*, than that thoſe things are attributed to it, which by the conſent of all Nations, are ſaid to belong to proper *Sacrifices*, and that in the very ſame ſenſe in which they are uſed by thoſe who underſtood them in the moſt proper ſenſe. And what reaſon could *Creſſius* have to ſay, that it was only the ſuperſtition of the *Heathens*, which made them attribute ſuch effects to ſacrifices ; when himſelf acknowledges that the very ſame ſenſe doth belong to the Sacrifice of Chriſt under that notion ? and as to the *Jews* we have already proved that the ſenſe of expiation among them was by vertue of the Law to be taken in

in as proper a sense as among the *Heathens*, for the purging of guilt, and the averſion of the wrath of God. And why ſhould *Crellius* deny that effect of the Sacrifice of Chriſt as to the atonement of God, *because God's love was ſeen in giving him who was to offer the Sacrifice?* ſince that effect is attributed to thoſe *Sacrifices* under the Law which God himſelf appointed to be offered, and ſhewed his great kindneſs to the people in the Inſtitution of ſuch a way, whereby their ſins might be expiated, and they delivered from the puniſhment of them. But of the conſiſtency of theſe two, I ſhall ſpeak more afterwards, in the effect of the Sacrifices as relating to Perſons.

Expiation  
attributed  
to the Sa-  
crifice of  
Chriſt in  
the ſame  
ſenſe that  
it was to  
other Sa-  
crifices.

VI. We now come to conſider in what ſenſe the *expiation* of ſins is in *Scripture* attributed to the Sacrifice of Chriſt, and therein I ſhall prove theſe two things.

1. That the *expiation* is attributed to the Sacrifice of Chriſt in the ſame ſenſe that is attributed to other Sacrifices, and as the words in themſelves do ſignifie.
  2. That what is ſo attributed doth belong to the Sacrifice of Chriſt in his death, antecedent to his entrance into Heaven.
1. That the *expiation* is to be taken in a proper ſenſe, when it is attributed to the Sacrifice

Sacrifice of Christ. *Crellius* tells us, *The controversie is not about the thing, viz. Crell. c. 10. whether expiation in the sense we take it in* <sup>sect. 24.</sup> *for purging away guilt, and averſion of the wrath of God, doth belong to the Sacrifice of Christ, for he acknowledges it doth, but all the question is about the manner of it :* which in the next Section he thus explains: *There are three senses in which Christ may be said to expiate sins ; either by begetting Faith in us, whereby we are drawn off from the practice of sin, in which sense, he saith, it is a remoter antecedent to it ; or as it relates to the expiation by actual deliverance from punishment, so he saith, it is an immediate antecedent to it : or as he declares that they are expiated, but this, he saith, doth not so properly relate to Christ as a Sacrifice, but as a Priest.* But never a one of these senses comes near to that which *Crellius* grants to be the proper importance of *καθαρσις* and *ἀπαλλαγis*, as applied to a Sacrifice, viz. *the purging away guilt, and the averſion of the wrath of God, and punishment, not any way, but by the means of the Sacrifice offered.* For in the *Legal Sacrifices* nothing can be more plain than that the expiation was to be by the Sacrifice offered for *Atonement* : supposing then that

that in some other way (which could be by no means proper to those Sacrifices) Christ may be said to expiate sins, what doth this prove that there was an expiation belonging to his Sacrifice agreeable to the Sacrifices of old? But as I urged before in the case of *Christ's* being *High-Priest*, that by their assertions the *Jews* might utterly deny the force of any argument used by the *Author* to the *Hebrews* to prove it: so I say as to the expiation by Christ's Sacrifice, that it hath no analogy or correspondency at all with any Sacrifice that was ever offered for the expiation of sins. For by that they always understood something which was immediately offered to *God* for that end, upon which they obtained remission of sins; but here is nothing answerable to it in their sense of Christ's Sacrifice; for here is no Oblation at all made *unto God* for this end; all the efficacy of the Sacrifice of Christ, in order to expiation doth wholly and immediately respect us; so that if it be a proper Sacrifice to any, it must be a Sacrifice to us, and not to God: for a Sacrifice is always said to be made to him whom it doth immediately respect; but Christ in the planting Faith, in actual delive-

deliverance, in declaring to us this deliverance, doth wholly respect us, and therefore his Sacrifice must be made to men, and not to God. Which is in it self a gross absurdity, and repugnant to the nature and design of Sacrifices from the first institution of them; which were always esteemed such immediate parts of divine Worship, that they ought to respect none else but God, as the object to which they were directed, though for the benefit and advantage of Mankind. As well then might Christ be said to *pray for us*, and by that no more be meant but that *he doth teach us to understand our duty*; as he made an expiatory Sacrifice for us, and all the effect of it only respect us and not God. And this is so far from adding to the perfection of Christ's Sacrifice above the Legal (which is the thing pleaded by *Crellius*) Crell. c. 10. sect. 26. that it destroys the very nature of a Sacrifice, if such a way of expiation be attributed to it (which though conceived to be more excellent in it self) yet is wholly incongruous to the end and design of a Sacrifice for Expiation. And the excellency of the manner of expiation ought to be in the same kind, and not quite of another nature; for, will any one say, that

that a *General* of an *Army* hath a more *excellent conduct* than all that went before him, because he can make *finer speeches*; or that the *Affomanæan* Family discharged the Office of *Priesthood* best, because they had a *greater power* over the people; or that *Nero* was the most *excellent Emperour* of *Rome* because he excelled the rest in *Musick* and *Poetry*: by which we see that to assert an excellency of one above another, we must not go to another kind, but shew its excellency in *that* wherein the comparison lies: So that this doth not prove the excellency of the *Sacrifice* of *Christ*, because he hath a greater power to persuade, deliver and govern, than any *Sacrifice* under the Law; for these are things quite of another nature from the consideration of a *Sacrifice*: But therein the excellency of a *Sacrifice* is to be demonstrated, that it excells all other in the proper end and design of a *Sacrifice*, *i.e.* if it be more effectual towards *God* for obtaining the expiation of sin; which was always thought to be the proper end of all *Sacrifices* for expiation. Although then *Christ* may be allowed to excell all other *Sacrifices* in all imaginable respects but that which is the proper intention of a  
Sacrifici-

*Sacrifice*; it may prove far greater excellency in Christ, but it doth withall prove a greater imperfection in his Sacrifice, if it fail in that which is the proper end of it.\* So that if we should grant that the expiation attributed to Christ's Sacrifice signified no more than reclaiming men from their sins, or their deliverance by his power, or a declaration of God's decree to pardon, this may prove that there are better arguments to believe the remission of our sins now under the Gospel; but they do not in the least prove that *Christ* is to be considered as a *Sacrifice*; much less that he doth far excell in the notion of an Expiatory Sacrifice all those which were offered up to God for that end under the Law.

VII. But we must now further consider, whether this be all attributed to Christ in order to expiation in *Scripture*; *i.e.* Whether those words which of themselves do imply *the aversion of the wrath of God*, when used concerning other Sacrifices, when applied to the Sacrifice of Christ, do only imply the begetting faith in us, or a declaration of pardon. The words which are used to this purpose, are *καταξιζεν*, *ἀγαθίζειν*, *παλιζεν*, *ἀγειν*, which are all applied to the blood

Ex piation  
by Christ  
not merely  
declarative.

of Christ, and the dispute is, whether they signifie no more but a declaration of pardon, or a means to beget faith in us.

*Crell. cap.*

*10. sect.*

*28. p. 506.*

*The first words קָדַשׁ לַיהוָה and אֲרִיאֵי־עַו* Crellius acknowledgeth do frequently signifie deliverance from guilt and punishment; but, he saith, they may likewise signifie a declaration of that deliverance, as decreed by God, or a purging from the sins themselves, or from the custom of sinning. So that by *Crellius* his own confession, the sense we contend for is most proper and usual, the other are more remote, and only possible; why then should we forsake the former sense, which doth most perfectly agree to the nature of a *Sacrifice*, which the other senses have no such relation to, as that hath? For these being the words made use of in the *New Testament*, to imply the force and efficacy of a *Sacrifice*, why should they not be understood in the same sense which the *Hebrew* words were taken in, when they are applied to the *Sacrifices* under the Law? We are not enquiring into all possible senses of words, but into the most natural and agreeable to the scope of them that use them: and that we shall make it appear to be the same, we plead for in the places in dispute between us;

as,



as, 1 John 1. 7. *The blood of Jesus Christ his Son, καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάντων ἁμαρτιῶν, purgeth us from all sin, Heb. 9. 13, 14. If the blood of bulls, and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the unclean, ἀγιάζει πρὸς τὸ ῥαγεῖν καὶ καθαροποιεῖν, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh, How much more shall the blood of Christ purge your consciences from dead works, καθαρίζει τὸ συνείδητον? Heb. 1. 3. δι' αὐτοῦ καθαρισμὸν ποινοῦμεθα ῥῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, when he had by himself purged our sins. So ῥαγεῖν and ἄγειν are used with a respect to the blood of Christ, Heb. 10. 22. Apocalyp. 1. 5. And because remission of sin was looked on as the consequent of expiation by Sacrifice under the Law; therefore that is likewise attributed to the blood of Christ, Matth. 26. 28. *This is the blood of the New Testament which was shed for many, εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, for the remission of sins, Eph. 1. 7. In whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins, and to the same purpose, Coloss. 1. 14. And from hence we are said to be justified by his blood, Rom. 5. 9. and Christ is said to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, Rom. 3. 25. The substance of all that Cressius replies to these places is, That* *Cress. cap. 10 sect. 28.**

those words which do properly signifie the thing it self, may very conveniently be taken only for the declaration of it, when the performance of the thing doth follow by vertue of that declaration: which then happens, when the declaration is made of the thing decreed by another, and that in the name and by the command of him who did decree it. And in this sense, Christ by his blood may be said to deliver us from the punishment of our sins, by declaring or testifying to us the will and decree of God for that purpose. But this answer is by no means sufficient, upon these considerations; 1. Because it doth not reach the proper and natural sense of the words, as *Crellius* himself confesseth; and yet he assigns no reason at all, why we ought to depart from it, unless the bare possibility of another meaning be sufficient. But how had it been possible for the efficacy of the blood of Christ for purging away the guilt of our sins, to have been expressed in clearer and plainer terms than these, which are acknowledged of themselves to signifie as much as we assert? If the most proper expressions for this purpose, are not of force enough to persuade our Adversaries, none else could ever do it: so that it had been impossible for

for our Doctrine to have been delivered in such terms, but they would have found out ways to evade the meaning of them. It seems very strange, that so great an efficacy should not only once or twice, but so frequently be attributed to the blood of Christ for expiation of sin, if nothing else were meant by it, but that Christ by his death did only declare that God was willing to pardon sin? If there were danger in understanding the words in their proper sense, why are they so frequently used to this purpose? why are there no other places of Scripture that might help to undeceive us, and tell us plainly, that Christ dyed only to declare his Fathers will? but what ever other words might signifie, this was the only true meaning of them. But what miserable shifts are these, when men are forced to put off such Texts which are confessed to express our Doctrine, only by saying that they may be otherwise understood? which destroys all kind of certainty in words; which by reason of the various use of them, may be interpreted to so many several senses, that if this liberty be allowed, upon no other pretence, but that *another meaning is possible*, men will never agree about

the intention of any person in speaking. For upon the same reason, if it had been said, *That Christ declared by his death Gods readiness to pardon*, it might have been interpreted, *That the blood of Christ was therefore the declaration of Gods readiness to pardon, because it was the consideration upon which God would do it*: So that if the words had been as exprefs for them, as they are now against them, according to their way of answering places, they would have been reconcileable to our opinion. 2. The Scripture in these expressions, doth attribute something *peculiar* to the *blood of Christ*; but if all that were meant by it were no more, than the *declaring Gods will to pardon*, this could in no sense be said to be peculiar to it. For this was the design of the Doctrine of Christ, and all his miracles were wrought to confirm the truth of that part of his Doctrine, which concerned remission of sins as well as any other: but how absurd would it have been to say, that the *miracles of Christ purge us from all sin*, that through *Christ healing the sick, raising the dead, &c.* we have *redemption, even the forgiveness of sins*, which are attributed to the *blood of Christ*?

*Christ*? but if no other respect, than as a testimony to the truth of the Doctrine of Remission of sins, they were equally applicable to one as to the other. Besides, if this had been all intended in these expressions, they were the most incongruously applied to the *blood* of Christ; nothing seeming more repugnant to the Doctrine of the Remission of sins, which was declared by it, than that very thing by which it was declared, if no more were intended by it: For how unsuitable a way was it to declare the pardon of the guilty persons, by such severities used towards the most Innocent! Who could believe, That God should declare his willingness to pardon others, by the death of his own Son; unless that death of his be considered as the *Meritorious cause* for procuring it? And in that sense we acknowledge, That the death of Christ was a *declaration* of God's will and decree to pardon, but not merely as it gave *testimony* to the truth of his Doctrine (for in that sense the *blood* of the *Apostles* and *Martyrs* might be said to *purge us from sin*, as well as the *blood of Christ*) but because it was the *consideration* upon which God had decreed to pardon. And so as the accep-

tance of the condition required, or the price paid, may be said to declare or manifest, the intention of a person to release or deliver a Captive : So God's acceptance of what Christ did suffer for our sakes, may be said to *declare* his readiness to pardon us upon his account. But then this *declaration* doth not belong properly to the act of Christ in suffering ; but to the act of God in accepting : and it can be no other ways known, than *God's* acceptance is known ; which was not by the *Sufferings*, but by the *Resurrection* of *Christ*. And therefore the declaring God's will and decree to pardon, doth properly belong to that : and if that had been all which the *Scripture* had meant, by *purging of sin by the blood of Christ*, it had been very incongruously applied to that, but most properly to his *Resurrection*. But these phrases being never attributed to that which most properly might be said to *declare* the will of God ; and being peculiarly attributed to the *death* of Christ, which cannot be said properly to do it ; nothing can be more plain, than that these expressions ought to be taken in that which is confessed to be their proper sense ; viz. That *Expiation* of sin, which doth belong to  
the

the death of Christ, as a *Sacrifice* for the sins of the world.

VIII. But yet *Socinus* and *Crellius* have another subterfuge, (for therein lies their great art, in seeking rather by any means to escape their enemies, than to overcome them.) For being sensible, that the main scope and design of the *Scripture* is against them, they seldom, and but very weakly assault: but shew all their subtlety in avoiding by all imaginable arts, the force of what is brought against them. And the *Scripture* being so plain in attributing such great effects to the death of Christ, when no other answer will serve turn, then they tell us, *That the death of Christ is taken Metonymically for all the consequents of his death*; viz. *His Resurrection, Exaltation, and the Power and Authority which he hath at the right hand of his Father*. But how is it possible to convince those, who by death, can understand life; by sufferings, can mean glory, and by the shedding of blood, sitting at the right hand of God? And that the *Scripture* is very far from giving any countenance to these bold Interpretations, will appear by these considerations; 1. Because the effect of *Expiation of our sins*, is attributed to the death

The death of Christ not taken Metonymically for all the consequents of it.

*Crell. cap. 1. sect. 103. Sect. 119. c. 10. Sect. 45. p. 527.*

*Crell cap. 1.  
sect. 112.*

Rom. 5. 6.

7.  
8.  
9.  
10.

death of Christ, as distinct from his Resurrection; viz. Our reconciliation with God, Rom. 5. 10. For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son; much more being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. To which Crellius answers, That the Apostle doth not speak of the death of Christ alone, or as it is considered distinct from the consequences of it; but only that our Reconciliation was effected by the death of Christ intervening. But nothing can be more evident to any one, who considers the design of the Apostles discourse, than that he speaks of what was peculiar to the death of Christ: for therefore it is said, that Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a righteous man will one die: but God commendeth his love towards us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved through him; upon which those words follow, For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, &c. The Reconciliation here mentioned, is attributed to the death of Christ in the same sense, that it is mentioned before; but there it is not mentioned as a bare condition intervening in order



der to something farther ; but as the great instance of the love both of *God and Christ* ; of God, in sending his Son ; of Christ, in laying down his life for sinners, in order to their being justified by his blood. But where is it that *St. Paul* saith, that the death of Christ had no other influence on the expiation of our sins, but as a bare condition intervening in order to that power and authority whereby he should expiate sins ? what makes him attribute so much to the death of Christ, if all the benefits we enjoy depend upon the consequences of it ; and no otherwise upon that, than merely as a preparation for it ? what peculiar *emphasis* were there in Christ's *dying for sinners, and for the ungodly* ; unless his death had a particular relation to the expiation of their sins ? Why are men said *to be justified by his blood*, and not much rather by his *glorious Resurrection*, if the blood of Christ be only considered as antecedent to the other ? And that would have been the great demonstration of the love of God which had the most immediate influence upon our advantage : which could not have been the death in this sense, but the life and glory of Christ. But nothing can be more absurd

fur'd than what *Crellius* would have to be the meaning of this place, viz. *that the Apostle doth not speak of the proper force of the death of Christ distinct from his life; but that two things are opposed to each other for the effecting of one of which the death of Christ did intervene, but it should not intervene for the other; viz. it did intervene for our reconciliation, but it should not for our life.* For did not the death of Christ equally intervene for our *life* as for our *reconciliation*? was not our eternal deliverance the great thing designed by Christ, and our reconciliation in order to that end? what opposition then can be imagined, that it should be necessary for the death of Christ to intervene in order to the one than in order to the other? But he means, *that the death of Christ should not intervene any more*; what need that, when it is acknowledged by themselves, that Christ died only for this end before, that he might have power to bestow eternal life on them that obey him? But the main force of the Apostles argument lies in the comparison between *the death of Christ* having respect to us as *enemies* in order to *reconciliation*, and the *life of Christ* to us considered as *reconciled*; so that if  
he

he had so much kindness for enemies, to die for their reconciliation, we may much more presume that he now living in Heaven will accomplish the end of that reconciliation, in the eternal salvation of them that obey him. By which it is apparent that he speaks of the death of Christ, in a notion proper to it self, having influence upon our reconciliation; and doth not consider it *Metonymically* as comprehending in it, the consequents of it.

IX. 2. Because the expiation of sins is attributed to Christ antecedently to the great consequents of his death, viz. *his sitting at the right hand of God*, Heb. 1.3. *When he had by himself purged our sins, sate down on the right hand of his Majesty on high*, Heb. 9. 12. But by his own blood he entred in once into the Holy Place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. To these places *Crellius* gives a double answer. 1. *That indefinite particles* (*ἐν ᾧ* *μεν* and *πρὸς τῷ* *μεν*) *being joyned* Expiation attributed to Christ antecedently to his entrance into heaven. Crell cap. 10. sect. 59. *with Verbs of the preterperfect tense do not always require that the action expressed by them, should precede that which is designed in the Verbs to which they are joyned; but they have sometimes the force of particles of the present or imperfect tense;*

tense; which sometimes happens in particles of the preterperfect tense, as Matth. 10. 5. ἀπέστειλαν παρ' αὐτοῦ, so ἀποκρίθεις ἔπεν; and several other instances produced by him: according to which manner of interpretation the sense he puts upon those words, *Heb. 9. 12.* is, *Christ by the shedding of his blood entred into the Holy of Holies, and in so doing he found eternal redemption, or the expiation of sins.* But not to dispute with *Crellius* concerning the importance of the *Aorist* being joyned with a *Verb* of the preterperfect tense, which in all reason and common acceptation doth imply the action past by him who writes the words antecedent to his writing of it, as is plain in the instances produced by *Crellius*; but according to his sense of Christ's expiation of sin, it was yet to come after Christ's entrance into Heaven, and so it should have been more properly ἐψησόμεν than ἐψάμεν; not I say to insist upon that, the *Apostle* manifesteth, that he had a respect to the death of Christ in the obtaining this eternal redemption, by his following discourse: for v. 14. he compares the blood of Christ in point of efficacy for expiation of sin, with the blood of the Legal Sacrifices: whereas

whereas if the expiation meant by him had been found by *Christ's Oblation* of himself in Heaven, he would have compared *Christ's entrance into Heaven* in order to it, with the *entrance of the High-Priest into the Holy of Holies*, and his argument had run thus. For if the *High-Priest* under the Law did expiate sins by entering into the Holy of Holies ; How much more shall the Son of God entering into Heaven expiate the sins of Mankind ? but we see the *Apostle* had no sooner mention'd the *redemption* obtained for us ; but he presently speaks of the efficacy of the *blood* of Christ in order to it, and as plainly asserts the same, v. 15. *And for this cause he is the Mediator of the New Testament, that by means of death, for the redemption of the transgressions which were under the first Testament, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance.* Why doth the *Apostle* here speak of the ἀπολύτρωσις τῶν παραβάσεων, the expiation of sins by the means of death ; if he had so lately asserted before that the redemption or expiation was found not by his death, but by his entrance into Heaven ? and withal the *Apostle* here doth not speak of such a kind of expiation as wholly respects the  
future,

future, but of *sins that were under the first Testament*, not barely such as could not be expiated by vertue of it, but such as were committed during the time of it, although the Levitical Law allowed no expiation for them. And to confirm this sense, the *Apostle* doth not go on to prove the necessity of *Christ's entrance into Heaven*; but of *his dying*, v. 16, 17, 18. But granting that he doth allude to the *High-Priest's* entering into the *Holy of Holies*, yet that was but the representation of a Sacrifice already offer'd, and he could not be said to find expiation by his entrance; but that was already found by the *blood* of the Sacrifice, and his entrance was only to accomplish the end for which the blood was offer'd up in sacrifice. And the benefit which came to men is attributed to the *Sacrifice*, and not to the *sprinkling of blood* before the *Mercy-seat*: and whatever effect was consequent upon his entrance into the Sanctuary, was by vertue of the blood which he carried in with him, and was before shed at the Altar. Neither can it with any reason be said, that if the redemption were obtained by the blood of Christ, *there could be no need of his entrance into Heaven*;

ven; since we do not make the Priesthood of Christ to expire at his death; but that he is in Heaven a merciful High-Priest in negotiating the affairs of his People with God, and *there ever lives to make intercession for them.*

X. Crellius answers, *That granting the Aorist being put before the Verb, should imply such an action which was antecedent to Christ's sitting at the right hand of God, yet it is not there said, that the expiation of sins was made before Christ's entrance into Heaven; for those, saith he, are to be considered as two different things; for a Prince first enters into his Palace, before he sits upon his throne. And therefore, saith he, Christ may be said to have made expiation of sins, before he sat down at the right hand of his Father, not that it was done by his death, but by his entrance into Heaven, and offering himself to God there, by which means he obtained his sitting on the right hand of the Majesty on high, and thereby the full Power of remission of sins, and giving eternal life. To which I answer. 1. That the Scripture never makes such a distinction between Christ's entrance into Heaven, and sitting at the right hand of God; which latter implying no more but the glori-*

No distinction in Scripture of the effects of Christ's entrance into Heaven from his sitting at the right hand of God.

Crell. c. 10. sect. 50. p. 537.

Matt. 28.  
18.

Phil. 2.8,9.

ous state of Christ in Heaven, his entrance into Heaven doth imply it : For therefore *God exalted him to be a Prince and a Saviour* ; and the reason of the power and authority given him in Heaven is no where attributed to his *entrance* into it as the means of it ; but our Saviour before that tells us *that all power and authority was committed to him* ; and his very entrance into Heaven was a part of his glory ; and given him in consideration of his sufferings ; as the *Apostle* plainly asserts ; *and he became obedient to death, even the death of the Cross, wherefore God hath highly exalted him, &c.* There can be then no imaginable reason to make the entrance of Christ into Heaven, and presenting himself to God there, a condition or means of obtaining that power and authority which is implied in his *sitting at the right hand of God*. 2. Supposing, we should look on these as distinct, there is as little reason to attribute the expiation of sin to his *entrance*, considered as distinct from the other : For the expiation of sins in Heaven being by *Crellius* himself confessed to be by the exercise of Christ's power, and this being only the means to that power, how could Christ expiate

—sins.



sins by that power which he had not ? But of this I have spoken before, and shewed that in no sense allowed by themselves the expiation of sins can be attributed to the entrance of Christ into Heaven as distinct from his sitting at the right hand of God. Thus much may suffice to prove, that those effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice, which do respect the sins committed, do properly agree to the death of Christ.

XI. I now come to that which respects the person, considered as obnoxious to the wrath of God by reason of his sins ; and so the effect of an Expiatory Sacrifice is *Atonement* and *Reconciliation*.

Of the Atonement made by Christ's death.

By the *wrath of God*, I mean, the reason which God hath from the holiness and justice of his nature, to punish sin in those who commit it : by the means of *Atonement* and *Reconciliation*, I mean, that in consideration of which, God is willing to release the sinner from the obligation to punishment he lies under by the Law of God, and to receive him into favour, upon the terms which are declared by the Doctrine of Christ. And that the death of Christ was such a means of *Atonement* and *Reconciliation* for us, I shall prove by those places of

*Crell. c. 7.  
sect. 3.*

Scripture which speak of it. But *Crellius* would seem to acknowledge, *That if Grotius seem to contend for no more, than that Christ did avert that wrath of God which men had deserved by their sins, they would willingly yield him all that he pleads for :* but then he adds, *That this deliverance from the wrath to come, is not by the death, but by the power of Christ.* So that the question is, Whether the death of Christ were the means of Atonement and Reconciliation between God and us? and yet *Crellius* would seem willing to yield too, *that the death of Christ may be said to avert the wrath of God from us, as it was a condition in order to it ;* for in that sense it had no more influence upon it than his birth had : but we have already seen, that the Scripture attributes much more to the death and blood of Christ, in order to the expiation of sin. We do not deny, that the death of Christ may be called a condition, as the performance of any thing in order to an end, may be called the condition upon which that thing is to be obtained ; but we say, that it is not a bare condition, but such a one as implies a consideration, upon which the thing is obtained, being such as answers the end of him that grants it :

it: by which means it doth propitiate or atone him, who had before just reason to punish, but is now willing to forgive and be reconciled to them, who have so highly offended him. And in this sense we assert, that Christ is said to be ἱλασμός, *a propitiation for our sins*, 1 John 2. 2.---4. 10. which we take in the same sense that ἱλασμός, is taken for the *Sin offering for Atonement*, Ezek. 44. 27. προσποιήσῃ ἱλασμόν, *they shall offer a sin-offering*; for so ἡγοῖται there signifies and in the same sense ἐξ-ἱλασμός is taken, Ezek. 45. 19. and the *Ram for Atonement* is call'd κριὸς τῆς ἱλασμοῦ, Numb. 5. 8. And thence the *High-Priest* when he made an *Atonement*, is said ποιεῖν τὴν ἱλασμόν, 2 Maccab. 3. 33. which is of the greater consequence to us, because Crellius would not have the sense either of ἱλασμός or ἱλάσκεσθαι, to be taken from the common use of the word in the Greek Tongue; but from that which some call the *Hellenistical use of it*; viz. That which is used in the Greek of the new Testament, out of the LXX. and the Apocryphal Greek; in both which we have found the word ἱλασμός in a sense fully correspondent to what we plead for. But he yet urges, and takes a great deal of pains to prove, that ἱλάσκεσθαι and ἐξιλά-

Crell. 7.  
scilicet. 10.

σκέδαι do not always signifie to be appeased by another ; but sometimes signifies to be propitious and merciful in pardoning ; and sometimes to expiate, and then signifies the same with καθαρίζω and ἀγάζω : which if it be granted, proves nothing against us, having already proved, that those words do signifie the *aversion of the wrath of God by a Sacrifice*, and that there is no reason to recede from that signification, when they are applied to the *blood of Christ*. And we do not contend, that when the word ἰλασμός or ἰλδοσκεσθαι is applied to him that doth forgive, it doth imply *appeasing* ; but the effect of it, which is *pardoning* ; but that which we assert, is, that when it is applied to a third person, or a thing made use of in order to forgiveness, then we say it signifies the propitiating him that was justly displeased : so as by what was done or suffered for that end, he is willing to pardon what he had just reason to punish. So Moses is said, to *make Atonement for the people by his prayers*, καὶ ἰλάσθη κύριος περὶ τὸ κακόν, *Exod. 34. 14.* and we may see *Verse 11.* how much God was displeased before. And Moses besought the Lord his God, and said, *Why doth thy wrath wax hot against thy people ?* and  
 Verse

Verſe 12. *Turn from thy fierce wrath, and repent of this evil againſt thy people, and then it is ſaid, Verſe 14. The Lord was atoned for the evil which he thought to do unto his people.* I would therefore willingly know, why *Mofes* might not here properly be ſaid, ἱλάσκειν. Δεὸν περὶ τῆς κακίας, as it is ſaid ἱλάσθη κύριον περὶ τῆς κακίας, and therefore ſince it is ſo very often ſaid in the Levitical Law, ἱλάσκει and ἐξιλάσκεισθαι περὶ τινός, as περὶ αὐτῶν, περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, περὶ ψυχῶν, and the accuſative caſe ſcarce ever put but in two caſes; (*viz.* When theſe words are applied to inanimate things, as the Altar, &c, or when to God himſelf, implying forgiveness) what reaſon can we aſſign more probable for this different conſtruction, than that when περὶ is uſed, the verb hath a reſpect to the offended party as the accuſative underſtood? as *Chriſt* is ſaid in the places mentioned to be ἱλασμενός περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, which ought in reaſon to be underſtood as thoſe words after *Mofes* his interceſſion, ἢ ἱλάσθη κύριον περὶ τῆς κακίας. But *Crellius* asks, *Why then do we never read once concerning the Prieſt, that he did ἱλάσκειν ἢ Δεὸν περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν or περὶ τινός, but we read that he did ἐξιλάσκειν*

τὸ ἄγιον τὸ θυσιάζειον, and God is said, ἐξιλάσκειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας. To this I answer; 1. That the reason why the person propitiated, is not expressed, is, because it was so much taken for granted, that the whole Institution of Sacrifices did immediately respect God, and therefore there was no danger of mistaking, concerning the person who was to be atoned. 2. I wonder *Crellius* can himself produce no instance where ἐξιλάσκειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας is used with respect to the Sacrifices, and the persons whose offences are remitted by the Atonement; but where ἱλάσκειν hath a relation to that, it is still joyned with a Preposition relating either to the person or to the offences; if no more were understood when it is so used, than when God himself is said to do it, why is not the phrase ἐξιλάσκειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας, as well said of the Priest, as it is of God? From whence *Grotius* his sense of *Hebr. 2. 17.* εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας for ἱλάσκειν θεὸν ὡς τὸ ἁμαρτιῶν, is far more agreeable to the use of the phrase in the Old Testament, than that which *Crellius* would put upon it. Therefore since the ἱλασμός ὡς τὸ ἁμαρτιῶν is attributed to Christ, we ought to take it in the sense proper to a Propitiatory Sacri-

Sacrifice: so it is said by *Moses*, where God is left out, but is necessarily understood, after the people had provoked God by their Idolatry ; *Ye have sinned a great sin: And now I will go up unto the Lord, ἵνα ἐξιλάσομαι ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἁμαρτία ὑμῶν, That I may make an Atonement for your sin* : What way could *Moses* be said to make this *Atonement*, but by propitiating God ; yet his name is not there expressed, but necessarily understood. So ἐξιλάσκεαι τὸ ὀργισμένον is used in the most proper sense for appeasing the anger of a person, *Gen.* 32.20. and ἐν τινι ἐξιλάσσομαι, *2 Sam.* 21.3. which places have been already insisted on, in the signification of the word כִּפֵּר: And that those places wherein Christ is said to be a propitiation for our sins, are capable of no other sense, will appear from the consideration of Christ, as a middle person between God and us ; and therefore his being ἱλασμος περὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, cannot be parallel with that phrase, where God himself is said, ἐξιλάσκεαι πᾶς ἁμαρτίας, for Christ is here considered as interposing between God and us, as *Moses* and the *Priests* under the Law did between God and the people, in order to the averting his wrath from them. And when one doth thus interpose in order

order to the Atonement of the offended party, something is always supposed to be done or suffered by him, as the means of that Atonement. As *Jacob* supposed the present he made to his Brother would propitiate him; and *David* appeased the *Gibeonites* by the death of *Saul's Sons*, both which are said ἐξιλάσκει-  
*Day*. So the *shedding of the blood of Sacrifices* before and under the Law, was the means of *atoning God* for the sins they committed. What reason can there be then why so received a sense of *Atonement*, both among the *Jews*, and all other Nations at that time ~~when~~ these words were written, must be forsaken; and any other sense be embraced, which neither agrees with the propriety of the expression, nor with so many other places of Scripture, which make the blood of Christ to be a Sacrifice for the Expiation of sin?

Of Recon-  
 ciliation  
 by Christ's  
 death.

Rom. 5. 10.

2 Cor. 18.  
 19, 21.

XII. Neither is it only our Atonement, but our Reconciliation is attributed to Christ too, with a respect to his Death and Sufferings. As in the place before insisted on. *For if when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son*; and more largely in the second Epistle to the *Corinthians*. *And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us*



us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation: To wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed to us the word of reconciliation. For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. And to the Ephesians, And that he might reconcile both Eph. 2. 16. unto God in one body by his Cross, having slain the enmity thereby. To the same purpose to the Colossians, And having made Col. 1. 20, peace through the blood of his Cross, by 21, 22. him to reconcile all things to himself, by him I say whether they be things in Heaven or in Earth; and you that were sometimes alienated and enemies in your mind by wicked works, yet now hath he reconciled, in the body of his flesh through death. Two things the substance of Crellius his answer Crell. c. 7. may be reduced to concerning these sect. 15, 16, places. 1. That it is no where said that God 17, 18, &c. was reconciled to us, but that we are reconciled to God, and therefore this reconciliation doth not imply any averting of the anger of God. 2. That none of these places do assert any reconciliation with God antecedent to our conversion, and so that the Reconciliation mention'd implies only the  
laying

*laying aside our enmity to God by our sins*

I begin with the first of these, concerning which we are to consider not barely the phrases used in Scripture, but what the nature of the thing implies; as to which a difference being supposed between God and man on the account of sin, no reconciliation can be imagined but what is mutual. For did man only fall out with God, and had not God just reason to be displeased with men for their Apostasie from him? If not, what made him so severely punish the first sin that ever was committed by man? what made him punish the old World for their impieties by a deluge? what made him leave such Monuments of his anger against the sins of the World in succeeding Ages? what made him add such severe sanctions to the Laws he made to the people of the *Jews*? what made the most upright among them so vehemently to deprecate his wrath and displeasure upon the sense of their sins? what makes him declare not only his hatred of the sins of men, but of the persons of those who commit them; so far as to express the greatest abhorrency of them? Nay, what makes our Adversaries themselves to say, *that impiety is in its own nature hateful to God,*

*Psal. 6. 1.*

*38. 1. Psal.*

*5. 5. 7. 11.*

*11. 5.*

*Levit. 26.*

*30.*

*Croll. de Deo*

*& Attrib.*

*l. 1. c. 30.*

God, and stirs him up to anger against all who commit it? what means, I say, all this, if God be not angry with men on the account of sin? Well then; supposing God to be averse from men by reason of their sins, shall this displeasure always continue or not? if it always continues, men must certainly suffer the desert of their sins; if it doth not always continue, then God may be said to be *reconciled* in the same sense that an offended party is capable of being reconciled to him who hath provoked him. Now there are two ways whereby a party justly offended may be said to be *reconciled* to him that hath offended him. First, when he is not only willing to admit of terms of agreement, but doth declare his acceptance of the mediation of a third person, and that he is so well satisfied with what he hath done in order to it, that he appoints this to be published to the World to assure the offender, that if the breach continues, the fault wholly lies upon himself. The second is, when the offender doth accept of the terms of agreement offered, and submits himself to him whom he hath provoked, and is upon that received into favour. And these two we assert must

must necessarily be distinguished in the reconciliation between God and us. For upon the death and sufferings of Christ, God declares to the World he is so well satisfied with what Christ hath done and suffered in order to the reconciliation between himself and us, that he now publishes remission of sins to the World upon those terms which the Mediator hath declared by his own doctrine, and the *Apostles* he sent to preach it: But because remission of sins doth not immediately follow upon the death of Christ, without supposition of any act on our part, therefore the state of favour doth commence from the performance of the conditions which are required from us. So that upon the death of Christ *God* declaring his acceptance of Christ's mediation, and that the obstacle did not lie upon his part; therefore those Messengers who were sent abroad into the world to persuade men to accept of these terms of agreement, do insist most upon that which was the remaining obstacle, *viz.* the sins of Mankind, that men by laying aside them, would be now reconciled to God, since there was nothing to hinder this reconciliation, their obstinacy in sin excepted. Which may be a very  
reasona-

reasonable account why we read more frequently in the Writings of the *Apostles*, of mens duty in being reconciled to God; the other being supposed by them as the foundation of their preaching to the world, and is insisted on by them upon that account, as is clear in that place to the *Corinthians*, <sup>2 Cor. 5. 19,</sup> *That God was in Christ reconciling the* <sup>20.</sup> *World to himself, not imputing unto men their trespasses, and hath committed to us the word of Reconciliation; and therefore adds, Now then we are Ambassadors for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us, we pray you in Christ's stead be ye reconciled to God: And least these words should seem dubious, he declares that the reconciliation in Christ was distinct from that reconciliation he perswades them to; for the reconciliation in Christ he supposeth past, v. 18. All things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and v. 21. he shews us how this Reconciliation was wrought: For he hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. Crellius here finds it necessary to acknowledge a twofold Reconciliation, but hopes to escape the force of this place by a rare distinction of the Reconciliation as preached by Christ, and by*  
*his*

*Crell. cap. 1. sect. 118. cap. 7. sect. 24.*

*his Apostles ; and so God's having reconciled the world to himself by Jesus Christ is nothing else but Christ's preaching the Gospel himself, who afterwards committed that Office to his Apostles. But if such shifts as these will serve to baffle mens understandings, both they were made, and the Scripture were written to very little purpose ; for if this had been all the Apostle had meant, that Christ preached the same Doctrine of Reconciliation before them, what mighty matter had this been to have solemnly told the World, that Christ's Apostles preached no other Doctrine, but what their Master had preached before ? especially if no more were meant by it, but that men should leave their sins, and be reconciled to God. But besides, why is the Ministry of Reconciliation, then attributed only to the Apostles, and not to Christ, which ought in the first place to have been given to him, since the Apostles did only receive it from him ? Why is that Ministry of Reconciliation said to be, viz. that God was in Christ reconciling the World to himself ? was this all the subject of the Apostles preaching, to tell the World, that Christ perswaded men to leave off their sins ? how comes God to reconcile the World to himself by the preaching*

preaching of *Christ*, since *Christ* himself faith, he was not sent to preach to the world; but to *the lost sheep of the house of Israel*? Was the World reconciled to God by the preaching of *Christ*, before they had ever heard of him? Why is God said not to *impute to men their trespasses* by the preaching of *Christ*, rather than his *Apostles*; if the not imputing were no more than declaring God's readiness to pardon; which was equally done by the *Apostles* as by *Christ* himself? Lastly, what force or dependance is there in the last words, *For he made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin*, &c. if all he had been speaking of before had only related to *Christ's* preaching? How was he *made sin* more than the *Apostles*, if he were only *treated as a sinner* upon the account of the same Doctrine which they preached equally with him? and might not men be said to be made *the righteousness of God in the Apostles*, as well as *in Christ*, if no more be meant, but being persuaded to be *righteous*, by the Doctrine delivered to them?

In the two latter places, *Eph. 2. 16. Coloss. 1. 20, &c.* it is plain, that a *two-fold reconciliation* is likewise mentioned,

Y

the

Crell. cap. 7.  
sect. 30.

the one of the *Jews* and *Gentiles* to one another, the other of both of them to *God*. For nothing can be more ridiculous than the Exposition of *Socinus*, who would have  $\tau\omega\ \Theta\epsilon\omega$  not to be joyned with the Verb,  $\delta\iota\omicron\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}\xi\eta$ , but to stand by it self, and to signifie that this reconciliation of the *Jews* and *Gentiles* did tend to the glory of *God*. And *Crellius*, who stands out at nothing, hopes to bring off *Socinus* here too; by saying, that it is very common, for the end to which a thing was appointed to be expressed by a Dative case following the Verb; but he might have spared his pains in proving a thing no one questions; the shorter answer had been to have produced one place where  $\delta\iota\omicron\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\lambda\acute{\alpha}\omega\sigma\epsilon\iota\ \Theta\epsilon\omega$  ever signifies any thing but to be reconciled to *God* as the offended party; or wherever the Dative of the person following the Verb importing reconciliation, did signifie any thing else but the party with whom the reconciliation was to be made. As for that objection concerning *things in Heaven being reconciled*; that phrase doth not import such a Reconciliation of the *Angels* as of *Men*, but that *Men* and *Angels* upon the reconciliation of men to *God*, become one



one body under Christ, and are gathered together in him, as the *Apostle* expresseth it, *Eph. 1. 10.*

XIII 1. Having thus far proved, that the effects of an Expiatory Sacrifice do belong to the death of Christ, nothing now remains but an answer to be made to two Objections, which are commonly insisted on by our Adversaries. The first is, *That God was reconciled before he sent his Son, and therefore Christ could not die to reconcile God to us.* The second is, *That the Doctrine of Satisfaction asserted by us, is inconsistent with the freeness of Gods grace in the remission of sins:* Both which will admit of an easie Solution upon the principles of the foregoing discourse: To the first I answer, That we assert nothing inconsistent with that love of God, which was discovered in sending his Son into the world; we do not say, That God hated mankind so much on the account of sin, that it was impossible he should ever admit of any terms of Reconciliation with them, which is the only thing inconsistent with the greatness of God's love, in sending Christ into the world; but we adore and magnifie the infiniteness and unexpressible greatness of his love, that notwithstanding

Objections answered.

ing all the contempt of the former kindness and mercies of Heaven, he should be pleased to send his own Son to die for sinners, that they might be reconciled to him. And herein was the great love of God manifested, that *while we were enemies and sinners, Christ died for us*, and that for this end, that we might be reconciled to God by his death. And therefore surely, not in the state of favour or Reconciliation with God then. But it were worth the while, to understand what it is our Adversaries mean, when they say, *God was reconciled when he sent his Son, and therefore he could not die to reconcile God to us*. Either they mean, that God had decreed to be reconciled upon the sending his Son, or that he was actually reconciled when he sent him: if he only decreed to be reconciled, that was not at all inconsistent with Christ's dying to reconcile God and us in pursuance of that decree: if they mean, he was actually reconciled, then there was no need for Christ to die to reconcile God and us; but withal, actual Reconciliation implies pardon of sin; and if sin were actually pardoned before Christ came, there could be no need of his coming at all, and sins would have been

been pardoned before committed; if they were not pardoned, notwithstanding that love of God, then it can imply no more, but that God was willing to be reconciled. If therefore the not-remission of sins were consistent with that love of God, by which he sent Christ into the world, then notwithstanding that he was yet capable of being reconciled by his death. So that our Adversaries are bound to reconcile that love of God, with not presently pardoning the sins of the world, as we are to reconcile it with the ends of the death of Christ, which are asserted by us.

XIV. To the other Objection, *Concerning the inconsistency of the Freeness of God's Grace, with the Doctrine of Satisfaction.* I answer, Either God's Grace is so free as to exclude all conditions, or not: If it be so free, as to exclude all conditions, then the highest *Antinomianism* is the truest Doctrine; for that is the highest degree of the Freeness of Grace, which admits of no conditions at all. If our Adversaries say, *That the Freeness of Grace is consistent with conditions required on our part,* Why shall it not admit of conditions on God's part? especially, when the condition required, tends so

The freeness of Grace asserted in Scripture, destroys not satisfaction.

highly to the end of God's governing the world, in the manifestation of his hatred against sin, and the vindication of the honour of his Laws by the Sufferings of the Son of God in our stead, as an Expiatory Sacrifice for our sins. There are two things to be considered in sin, the dishonour done to God, by the breach of his Laws, and the injury men do to themselves by it ; now remission of sins, that respects the injury which men bring upon themselves by it ; and that is *Free*, when the penalty is wholly forgiven, as we assert it is by the Gospel to all penitent sinners : but shall not God be free to vindicate his own Honour, and to declare his righteousness to the world, while he is the Justifier of them that believe ? Shall men in case of Defamation, be bound to vindicate themselves, though they freely forgive the Authors of the slander, by our *Adversaries own Doctrine* ? and must it be repugnant to God's Grace, to admit of a *Propitiatory Sacrifice*, that the world may understand, that it is no such easie thing to obtain pardon of sin committed against God ; but that as often as they consider the bitter Sufferings of Christ, in order to the obtaining the forgiveness of our sins, that should be the

the greatest Argument to dissuade them from the practice of them? But why should it be more inconsistent with the Sacrifice of Christ, for God freely to pardon sin, than it was ever presumed to be in all the Sacrifices of either *Jews* or *Gentiles*? who all supposed Sacrifices necessary in order to *Atonement*; and yet thought themselves obliged to the goodness of God in the Remission of their sins? Nay, we find that God himself, in Gen. 20. 7. the case of *Abimelech*, appointed *Abraham* to pray for him, in order to his pardon; And will any one say, this was a derogation to the Grace of God in his pardon? Or to the pardon of *Job's* Job 42. 7. Friends, because *Job* was appointed to Sacrifice for them? Or to the pardon of the *Israelites*, because *God* out of kindness to them, directed them by the *Prophets*, and appointed the means in order to it? But although *God* appointed our *High-Priest* for us, and out of his great love sent him into the world, yet his Sacrifice was not what was given him, but what he freely underwent himself; he gave us Christ, but Christ offered up himself a full, perfect and sufficient Sacrifice, Oblation and Satisfaction for the sins of the world.

Y 4

Thus,

Thus, Sir, I have now given you a larger account of what I then more briefly discoursed of, concerning *the true Reason of the Sufferings of Christ*; and heartily wishing you a *right understanding in all things*, and requesting from you an *impartial consideration* of what I have written,

I am,

S I R,

Your, &c.

Jan. 6. 1668.

E. S.

---

THE  
MYSTERIES  
OF  
The Christian Faith  
*ASSERTED and VINDICATED:*  
IN A  
SERMON

Preached at  
S. Laurence-Jewry in London,  
*APRIL* the 7th. 1691.


---

By the Right Reverend Father in GOD,  
*EDWARD* Lord Bishop of *Worcester*.

---

L O N D O N,  
Printed by J. H. for Henry Mortlock at the  
*Phoenix* in S. Paul's Church-Yard, 1696.

---





---

A  
S E R M O N

Preached at

S. Laurence-Jewry,

APRIL the 7th. 1691.

---

1 TIM. I. 15.

*This is a faithful saying and worthy of all  
acceptation, That Christ Jesus came in-  
to the World to save Sinners, of  
whom I am chief.*

**I**F these Words were to be under-  
stood without any Restriction or  
Limitation *that Christ Jesus came  
into the World to save sinners*, they  
would overthrow the great Design of  
the Gospel, and make its Excellent Pre-  
cepts Useless and Ineffectual. For, to  
what purpose should men be put upon  
the severe Practice of Repentance, Mor-  
tification

tification and a continued Course of a Holy Life, if the meer being *Sinners* did sufficiently qualifie them for Salvation? This indeed would be thought a Doctrine worthy of all Acceptation by the greatest *Sinners*; but it could not be a faithful saying, being not agreeable either to the Nature of God, or Revelation of his Will by *Christ Jesus*. But *S. Paul* speaks of such *Sinners* as himself had been; *i. e.* such as had been great *Sinners*, but had truly and sincerely repented. *Of whom I am chief.* What then? Must we look on him as the Standard and Measure of such *Sinners* whom *Christ Jesus* came to save? What will then become of all those who have been *Sinners* of a higher Rank than ever he was? It's true in the Verses before the Text, he sets out his Sins, as a humble Penitent is wont to do, with the worst Colours and deepest Aggravations, *Who was before a blasphemers and a persecutor, and injurious*; but yet he adds, *that he obtained Mercy because he did it ignorantly, in unbelief.* How then is *S. Paul* the Chief of *Sinners*? Are Sins of Ignorance and Mistake the greatest of Sins, for which *Christ* died? Is there no *Expiation* for any other by *Jesus Christ*? What will be-

Ver. 13.

become then of all such who sin against Knowledge and Conscience, and not *in Ignorance and Unbelief*? Can none of these hope for Mercy by *Christ Jesus*, although they do truly Repent? But *the Blood of Christ* is said elsewhere *to cleanse us from all Sin*; not, while we continue in them, but if we repent and forsake them. And *Jesus Christ* is said *to be a Propitiation for our Sins*; and not for ours only, but for the Sins of the whole World. And therefore this Expression of *S Paul* notes his great Humility and deep Sense of his own Sins; but doth not exclude others from the hopes of Pardon whose Sins have other Aggravations than his had. For, if we leave out the last words as peculiar to his Case, yet the other contain in them a true Proposition and of the greatest Importance to Mankind; *This is a faithful saying and worthy of all acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the World to save sinners.*

This, you may say, is a matter out of all doubt among all such who hope for Salvation by *Christ Jesus*; for all are agreed, that one way or other we are to be *saved by him*. But there is great Difficulty as to the Way of *saving sinners by Christ Jesus*; whether by the *Doctrine*

*Doctrine and Example of the Man Christ Jesus, by the Power he attained through his Sufferings; Or, by the Eternal Son of God's assuming our Nature, and suffering in our stead in order to the Reconciling God to us and making a Propitiation for our Sins.* These are two very different *Hypotheses* or *Notions* of *Christ's coming to save Sinners*; and the former seems more Easie to be understood and believed; and the other seems to have Insuperable Difficulties in point of Reason; and to run our Religion into *Mysteries*, which expose our Faith and make Christianity appear Contemptible to Men of Sense and Understanding. Is it not therefore much better to embrace such a Scheme of it, as will have the least Objection against it, that so Men of Reason may not be tempted to Infidelity, and Men of Superstition may not under the Colour of *Mysteries* bring in the most Absurd and Unreasonable Doctrines?

These are plausible Insinuations, and would be apt to prevail on considering Mens minds, if they were to form and make a Religion that might be most accommodated to the *Genius* and *Humour* of the Age they live in. And truly no Men (by their own Authority) can pretend

pretend to a Right to impose on others any *Mysteries of Faith*, or any such things which are above their Capacity to understand. But that is not our Case; for we all profess to believe and receive *Christianity* as a *Divine Revelation*; and God ( we say ) may require from us the belief of what we may not be able to comprehend, especially if it relates to Himself, or such things which are Consequent upon the Union of the Divine and Human Nature. Therefore our business is to consider, whether any such things be contained in that *Revelation* which we all own; and if they be, we are bound to believe them, although we are not able to comprehend them.

Now here are two Remarkable *Characters* in these Words, by which we may examin these different *Hypotheses* concerning the way of *Salvation by Jesus Christ*.

I. *It is a faithfull saying*, and therefore must be contained in that Revelation which God hath made concerning our Salvation by Christ.

II. *It is worthy of all Acceptation; i. e.* most usefull and beneficial to Mankind.

Now

Now by these two I shall proceed in the Examination of them.

- I. Which is most agreeable to the Revealed Will of God.
- II. Which doth offer fairest for the Benefit and Advantage of Mankind.

I. Which is most agreeable to the revealed Will of God. For that we are sure is the most *faithfull saying*; since Men of Wit and Reason may deceive us, but God cannot. When the Apostles first preached this Doctrine to the World, they were not bound to believe what they affirmed to be a *faithfull saying* till they gave sufficient Evidence of their Authority from God, by the wonderful Assistance of the Holy Ghost. But now this *faithfull saying* is contained in the Books of the *New Testament*, by which we are to judge of the Truth of all *Christian* Doctrines. And when two different Senses of Places of Scripture are offer'd, we are to consider, which is most Reasonable to be preferr'd. And herein we are allow'd to Exercise our Reason as much as we please; and the more  
we

we do so, the sooner we shall come to Satisfaction in this matter.

Now according to Reason we may judge that Sense to be preferr'd,

(1.) Which is most plain and easie and agreeable to the most received Sense of Words; not that which is forced and intricate, or which puts improper and *metaphorical* Senses upon Words which are commonly taken in other Senses; especially when it is no Sacramental thing, which in its own Nature is Figurative.

(2.) That which suits most with the Scope and Design not only of the particular Places, but of the whole *New Testament*; which is, to magnifie God and to depress Man? to set forth, the Infinite Love and Condescension of God *in giving his Son to be a Propitiation for our Sins*; to set up the Worship of one *true God* in Opposition to *Creatures*; to Represent and Declare the mighty Advantages Mankind receive by the *Sufferings* of *Christ Jesus*.

(3.) That which hath been generally received in the *Christian Church* to be the Sense of those place. For, we are certain, this was always look'd on as a matter of great Concernment to all Christians;

Z

and

and they had as great Capacity of understanding the Sense of the Apostles : and the Primitive Church had greater Helps for knowing it than others at so much greater Distance. And therefore the Sense is not to be taken from modern *Inventions*, or *Criticisms*, or pretences to *Revelation*; but that which was at first deliver'd to the *Christian Church* and hath been since received and embraced by it in the several Ages; and hath been most strenuously asserted, when it hath met with Opposition, as founded on *Scripture* and the *general Consent* of the *Christian Church*.

(4.) That which best agrees with the *Characters* of those Persons from whom we receive the Christian Faith; and those are *Christ Jesus* and his *holy Apostles*. For, if their *Authority* be lost, our Religion is gone; and their Authority depends upon their *Sincerity* and *Faithfulness*, and Care to inform the World aright in matters of so great Importance.

(1.) I begin with the Character which the Apostles give of *Christ Jesus* himself; which is, that he was a Person of the greatest Humility and Condescension, that he did not assume to himself that  
which



which he might justly have done. For let the Words of *S. Paul* be understood either as to the *Nature*, or *Dignity* of Christ, it is certain that they must imply thus much, that when *Christ Jesus* was here on Earth, he was not of a vain assuming humour, that he did not boast of himself, nor magnifie his own Greatness, but was contented to be look'd on as other Men; although he had at that time far greater and Diviner Excellency in him than the World would believe. Less than this, cannot be made of those Words of the Apostle, *Who being in the* Phil. 2.6,7. *form of God, he thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but made himself of no Reputation and took upon him the form of a Servant.*

Now this being the *Character* given of him, let us consider what he doth affirm concerning himself. For although he was far from drawing the People after him, by setting forth his own Perfections; yet upon just Occasions, when the *Jews* contested with him, he did Assert such things, which must favour of Vanity and Ostentation, or else must imply that he was the *Eternal Son of God*. For, all Mankind are agreed that the highest degree of Ambition lies in Affe-

- Atting Divine Honour, or for a meer Man to be thought a *God*. How severely did God punish *Herod* for being pleased with the Peoples folly in crying out, *the Voice of God and not of Man*? And therefore he could never have born with such positive Assertions and such repeated Defences of his being *the Son of God* in such a manner as implied his being so from Eternity. This in his Disputes with the *Jews* he Affirms several times, *that*  
 Act. 12. 22. *he came down from Heaven*, not in a *Metaphorical* but in a proper Sense, as appears by those words, *What and if ye shall*  
 Joh. 6. 32. 33. *see the Son of Man ascend up where he was before*? In another Conference he asserted, *that he was before Abraham*. Which the *Jews* so literally understood, that  
 Joh. 8. 58. without a *Metaphor* they went about to stone him; little imagining that by *Abraham* the calling of the *Gentiles* was to be understood. But above all, is that Expression which he used to the *Jews* at another Conference, *I and my Father are one*; which they understood in such a manner that immediately *they took up stones to have stoned him*. What means all this Rage of the *Jews* against him? What? for saying *that he had Unity of Consent with his Father*? No certainly.  
 But

*But the Jews misunderstood him.* Let us suppose it; would not our *Saviour* have immediately explained himself to prevent so dangerous a Misconstruction? But he asked them, what it was they stoned him for? They answer him directly and plainly, *because that thou be- v. 32, 33.*  
*ing a man makest thy self God.* This was home to the purpose. And here was the time for him to have denied it, if it had not been so. But doth he deny it? Doth he say, it would be *Blasphemy* in him to own it? No; but he goes about to defend it; and proves it to be no *Blasphemy* *for him to say that he was the Son of God; v. 36.*  
*i.e. so as to be God,* as the *Jews* understood it. Can we imagin that a *meer Man* knowing himself to be such, should Assume this to himself; and yet *God* to bear witness to him not only by *Miracles* but by a *Voice from Heaven*, wherein he was called his *beloved Son in whom he was* *Matt. 3.17.*  
*well pleased?* Could *God* be pleased with a mortal, finite, despicable Creature, as the *Jews* thought him, that Assumed to himself to be *God*, and maintained and defended it among his own People, in a solemn Conference at a very Publick Place in one of the *Portico's* of the Temple? And this he persisted in to the last. For,

when *the High Priest adjured him by the*  
 Matt. 26. *living God to tell, whether he were the*  
 63. *Christ the Son of God, (for he, no doubt,*  
 v. 64. *had heard of the Result of this Conference*  
 Mark 14. *in Solomon's Porch) Jesus said unto him,*  
 62. *Thou hast said. S. Mark, more expresly,*  
 v. 64. *Jesus said I am. And this was the Blas-*  
 phemy, for which they put him to death;  
 as appears by the *Evangelists*. So that  
 this ought to be a Dispute only between  
 Matt. 26. *Jews and Christians*; since it was the very  
 66. point, for which they condemned him to  
 death. And in his last most divine Prayer  
 just before his suffering, he owns the  
 Glory which he had *with the Father* before  
 Luk. 22. the World had a being. *And now, O Fa-*  
 71. *ther, glorifie thou me with the glory which*  
 Joh. 17. 5. *I had with thee, before the World was.*  
 Was this nothing but the *Glory* which  
 God had designed to give him? This is  
 so far from being peculiar to Christ, that  
 it is common to all whom God designs  
 to glorifie; and takes away the distin-  
 ction between the *Decree* and the *Exe-*  
*cution* of it.

(2.) As to the *Apostles*, the Reason  
 we believe their Testimony is, that they  
 were Men of great Sincerity and Plain-  
 ness, and of great Zeal for the Honour  
 and Glory of God. And according to  
 this

this *Character*, let us examin what they say concerning *Christ Jesus*.

He that was most conversant with him, and beloved by him, and lived to see his *Divinity* contested by some, and denied by others, is most ample in setting it forth in his Admirable, Sublime, *Joh. 1. 1, 2, &c.* and Divine Introduction to his Gospel. Which all the Wit of Mankind can never make tolerable Sense of, if they deny *Christ's* being the *Eternal Son of God*; and it is he, that hath preserved those *Conferences* with the *Jews*, wherein he asserts his own *Divinity*.

*S. Paul* was a Stranger to him while he lived; but at the same time when he was so zealous to perswade the *Gentiles* to the *Worship* of *God* and not of *Creatures*, he calls him *God*, over all blessed *Rom. 9. 5.* for evermore. And when he saith, that the *Eternal Power and Godhead are known* *Rom. 1. 20* by the *Creation of the World*, he attributes *Col. 1. 16.* the *Creation of all things* to *Christ*, applying to him those words of the *Psalmist*, *Heb. 1. 2,* *Thou Lord in the beginning hast laid the* *10.* *Foundation of the Earth and the Heaven, the Work of thy hands.* Which cannot be understood of any *Metaphorical Creation*.

And after the strictest Examination

of Copies, those will be found the best, which have that Reading on which our Translation is grounded. And without  
 1 Tim. 3: *Controversie great is the Mystery of God-*  
 16. *liness, God was manifest in the Flesh.* So that *God's being manifest in the Flesh* is made a great Part of the *Mystery of Christianity*.

But here arises a Difficulty, which deserves to be consider'd; *i. e.* If there  
 “ were nothing in the Christian Doct-  
 “ rine, but the Way of *Saving sinners*  
 “ by the Doctrine and Example of  
 “ Christ, there would be little Objecti-  
 “ on to be made to it; since the obtain-  
 “ ing Eternal Life is certainly the best  
 “ thing can be propos'd to Mankind, and  
 “ the Precepts of Christ are Divine and  
 “ Spiritual, Plain and Easie to be Under-  
 “ stood, and Agreeable to the Reason of  
 “ Mankind; but many other things are  
 “ impos'd on Men as necessary to be be-  
 “ lieved concerning *Christ Jesus*, as to his  
 “ *Divinity, Incarnation*, and the *Hypo-*  
 “ *statical Union* of both Natures, which  
 “ perplex and confound our Understand-  
 “ ings; and yet these things are not only  
 “ deliver'd as *Mysteries of the Christian*  
 “ *Faith*; but the Belief of them is re-  
 “ quired as necessary to the Salvation  
 “ of

“ of Sinners ; whereas, if they are Re-  
 “ vealed they are no longer *Mysteries*; and  
 “ if they are not Revealed, how come  
 “ they to be made Articles of Faith ?  
 “ The Scripture knows of no other *My-*  
 “ *series of Faith* but such as were hid-  
 “ den before the Revelation of them,  
 “ but since they are Revealed they are  
 “ plain and open to all mens Capacities ;  
 “ and therefore it is a great Injury to the  
 “ Plainness and Simplicity of the Gospel  
 “ to impose such incomprehensible *My-*  
 “ *series*, as Necessary Articles of Faith ;  
 “ and it is Abusing the Credulity of Man-  
 “ kind, to make such things necessary  
 “ to be believed, which are impossible  
 “ to be understood. But those who have  
 “ ever loved to Deceive and Abuse the  
 “ rest of the World, have been always  
 “ fond of the Name of *Mysteries* ; and  
 “ therefore all such things are to be sus-  
 “ pected, which come under that Name.  
 “ For, all such Points which will not  
 “ bear Examination, must be wrapt up  
 “ and Reverenced under the Name of  
 “ *Mysteries*, that is, of things to be swal-  
 “ low’d without being understood. *But* Discourse  
of the  
Word My-  
stery, &c.  
 “ *the Scripture never calls that a My-*  
 “ *stery which is Incomprehensible in it* p. 5.  
 “ *self, though never so much revealed.*

This

This is the main force of the Objection, which I shall endeavour to remove by shewing,

- (1.) That God may justly require from us in general, the Belief of what we cannot comprehend.
- (2.) That which way soever the Way of Salvation by *Christ* be explained, there will be something of that Nature found in it; and that those who reject the Mysteries of Faith run into greater Difficulties than those who assert them.
- (3.) That no more is required as a Necessary Article of Faith than what is plainly and clearly Revealed.

(1.) That God may justly require from us in general, the Belief of what we cannot comprehend. It is to very little purpose to enquire whether the Word *Mystery* in *Scripture* be applied to such particular Doctrines, whose Substance is Revealed, but the manner of them is incomprehensible by us; for why may not we make use of such a Word whereby to express things truly revealed, but above our Comprehension?



on? We are certain the Word *Mystery* is used for things far less difficult and abstruse; and why may it not then be fitly applied to such matters, which are founded on Divine Revelation, but yet are too deep for us to go to the bottom of them? Are there not *Mysteries* in Arts, *Mysteries* in Nature, *Mysteries* in Providence? And what Absurdity is there to call those *Mysteries*, which in some Measure are known, but in much greater unknown to us? Although therefore in the Language of Scripture it be granted, that the word *Mystery* is most frequently applied, *to things before hidden, but now revealed*, yet there is no Incongruity in calling that a *Mystery*, which being revealed, hath yet something in it which our understandings cannot reach to. But it is meer Cavilling to insist on a Word, if the Thing it self be granted. The chief thing therefore to be done is, to shew that God may require from us the belief of such things which are incomprehensible by us. For, *God* may require any thing from us, which it is reasonable for us to do; if it be then reasonable for us to give Assent where the manner of what *God* hath revealed is not comprehended, then *God* may certainly  
require

require it from us. Hath not God revealed to us that *in six days he made Heaven and Earth and all that is therein*? But is it not reasonable for us to believe this, unless we are able to comprehend the manner of *God's* production of things? Here we have something revealed and that plainly enough, *viz. that God created all things*, and yet, here is a *Mystery* remaining as to the manner of doing it. Hath not God plainly revealed that there shall be a *Resurrection* of the dead? and must we think it unreasonable to believe it, till we are able to comprehend all the changes of the Particles of Matter from the *Creation* to the *General Resurrection*? But it is said *that there is no Contradiction in this, but there is in the Mystery of the Trinity and Incarnation*. It is strange Boldness in Men to talk thus of *Monstrous Contradictions* in things above their Reach. The *Atheists* may as well say, *Infinite Power* is a *Monstrous Contradiction*; and *God's Immensity* and his other unsearchable Perfections are *Monstrous Paradoxes and Contradictions*. Will Men never learn to distinguish between *Numbers* and the Nature of *Things*? For *three* to be *one* is a *Contradiction in Numbers*; but whether an

Observations on Dr. Wallis his four Letters, p. 4.

an Infinite Nature can communicate it self to three *different Subsistences* without such a *Division* as is among Created Beings, must not be determin'd by bare *Numbers*, but by the Absolute *Perfections* of the Divine Nature ; which must be owned to be above our Comprehension.

For let us examine some of those *Perfections* which are most clearly revealed and we shall find this true. The *Scripture* plainly reveals, that God is from *everlasting to everlasting* ; that he was and is and is to come ; but shall we not believe the Truth of this till we are able to fathom the *Abyss* of God's *Eternity* ? I am apt to think (and I have some thoughtful Men concurring with me) that there is no greater Difficulty in the Conception of the *Trinity* and *Incarnation*, than there is of *Eternity*. Not, but that there is great Reason to believe it ; but from hence it appears that our Reason may oblige us to believe some things which it is not possible for us to comprehend. We know that either God must have been for ever, or it is impossible he ever should be ; for if he should come into Being when he was not, he must have some Cause of his Being ; and that which

Psal. 90. 2.  
Revel. 1. 4.  
c. 11. v. 17.

Bisterfield  
c. Croll. p.  
50.

Petav. de  
Trinit. l. 3.  
c. 9. sect.  
15.

which was the first Cause would be God. But, if he was for ever he must be from himself; and what Notion or Conception can we have in our Minds concerning it? And yet, *Atheistical* men can take no Advantage from hence; because their own most absurd *Hypothesis* hath the very same Difficulty in it. For something must have been for ever. And it is far more Reasonable to suppose it of an Infinite and Eternal Mind, which hath Wisdom and Power and Goodness to give Being to other things, than of dull, stupid and senseless Matter, which could never move it self, nor give Being to any thing besides. Here we have therefore a thing which must be owned by all; and yet such a thing which can be conceived by none. Which shews the narrowness and shortness of our Understandings, and how unfit they are to be the Measures of the Possibilities of things. *Vain men would be wise*; they would fain go to the very bottom of things, when alas! they scarce understand the very Surface of them. They will allow no *Mysteries* in Religion; and yet every thing is a *Mystery* to them. They cry out of *Cheats* and *Impostures* under the Notion of *Mysteries*; and yet there is  
not

not a Spire of Grass but is a *Mystery* to them; they will bear with nothing in *Religion* which they cannot comprehend, and yet there is scarce any thing in the World which they can comprehend. But above other things the *Divine Perfections*, even those which are most Absolute and Necessary are above their Reach. For let such Men try their Imaginations about God's *Eternity*, not meerly how he should be from himself, but how God should coexist with all the Differences of Times, and yet there be no Succession in his own Being. I do not say there is such Difficulty to conceive a Rock standing still when the Waves run by it; or the *Gnomon* of a Dial when the Shadow passes from one Figure to another; because these are gross unactive things; but the Difficulty is far greater where the Being is Perfect and always Active. For, where there is Succession there is a passing out of not being in such a duration into being in it; which is not consistent with the Absolute Perfection of the Divine Nature. And therefore God must be all at once what he is, without any Respect to the Difference of Time past, present or to come. From whence *Eternity* was defined by *Boethius* to be a  
*perfect*

De Con-  
sol. 1. 3.

*perfect and complete Possession all at once of everlasting Life.* But how can we form any Conception in our Minds of that being all at once, which hath such different Acts as must be measur'd by a long Succession of Time? As, the Creating and Dissolving the Frame of the World; the Promising and sending the *Messias*; the Declaring and Executing a general Judgment; how can these things be consistent with a Permanent Instant, or a Continuance of being without Succession? For, it is impossible for us in this Case, as to God's Eternity, to form a clear and distinct *Idea* in our Mind, of that which both *Reason* and *Revelation* convince us must be. The most we can make of our Conception of it is, that God hath neither Beginning of Being, nor End of Days; but that he always was and always must be. And this is rather a necessary Conclusion from Reason and Scripture, than any distinct Notion or Conception of Eternity in our Minds. From whence it evidently follows, that God may reveal something to us, which we are bound to believe, and yet after that Revelation the Manner of it may be incomprehensible by us, and consequently a *Mystery* to us.

Hath

Hath not God Revealed to us in Scri-  
 pture the *Spirituality* of his own Nature? s. Joh. 4.  
 That he is a *Spirit* and therefore will be  
 worshipped in Spirit and in Truth; For  
 that is a true Reason why Spiritual Wor-  
 ship should be most agreeable to him.  
 Now, if we could have a clear, distinct  
 positive Notion in our minds of God's  
 Spiritual Nature, we might then pre-  
 tend that there is nothing *mysterious* in  
 this, since it is revealed.

But let such then Examine their own  
 thoughts about this matter; and try,  
 whether the utmost they can attain to,  
 be not something *Negative*, viz. because  
 great Absurdities would follow if we at-  
 tributed any thing *Compound* to God;  
 for, then he must be compounded of  
 Parts, and so he may be dissolved; then  
 he must be confined to a certain place,  
 and not every where present; he can-  
 not have the Power of Acting and Self-  
 determining which a meer Body hath  
 not. For the clearest Notion we can  
 have of *Body*, is, that it is made up of  
 some things as parts of it, which may  
 be separated from each other; and is  
 confined to a certain place, and hath no  
 Power to Move or Act from it self. But

A a

some

some of these men who cry down *Mysteries* and magnifie Reason, to shew how slender their pretences to Reason are, have asserted a *Corporeal God*, with *Shape* and *Figure*. It was indeed, well thought of by those who would make a *Man* to be *God*, to bring *God* down as near to *Man* as might be. But how to Reconcile the Notion of a *Body* with Infinite Perfections, is a *Mystery* to me, and far above my *Comprehension*. But if it be no *Mystery* to such Men, they must either deny *God's* Infinite Perfections or shew how a *bodily Shape* can be capable of them. But some men can confound *Finite* and *Infinite*, *Body* and *Spirit*, *God* and *Man*, and yet are for no *Mysteries*; whereas these things are farther from our *Reach* and *Comprehension*, than any of those *Doctrines* which they find fault with. But to proceed.

If we believe *Prophecy*, we must believe *God's* fore-knowledge of future Events: For, how could they be fore-told if he did not fore-know them? And if he did fore-know those which he did fore-tell, then it was either because those only were revealed to him which is inconsistent with the *Divine Perfections*; or that



that he doth fore-know all other Events and only thought fitting to Reveal these: But how can they Solve the Difficulties about *Divine Prescience*? Is there no *Mystery* in this? Nothing above their Comprehension? What then made their great Master deny it, as a thing above his Comprehension? Because nothing can be fore-known but what hath a certain Cause, and therefore, if evil Actions be fore-told, God must be the Cause of them, and Men will not be free Agents in them. And yet it is most certain, that the Sufferings of Christ by the Wickedness of Men, were fore-told. What then? Must we make God the Author of Sin? God forbid. Will the righteous Judge of all the Earth, punish Mankind for his own Acts, which they could not avoid? Then we must yield, that there is something in the manner of the *Divine Prescience*, which is above our Comprehension. And the most Searching and Inquisitive Men have been forc'd to yield it at last, as to the Connection between the Certainty of Prescience and the Liberty of human Actions. Is it not then much better to sit down quietly at first, Adoring the Infi-

*Socin. Prae-*  
c. 11.

Cajetan in  
1. q. 22.  
art. 4.

niteness of God's incomprehensible Perfections, than after all the huffings and disputings of Men to say, *In Ignorantiâ solâ quietem invenio*, as the great Schoolman did? Surely then, here is something plainly revealed, and yet the manner of it is still a *Mystery* to us.

I shall not now insist on any more of the particular Attributes of God, but only in general I desire to know, whether they believe them to be *finite* or *infinite*? If to be *finite*, then they must have certain bounds and limits which they cannot exceed; and that must either be from the Imperfection of Nature, or from a Superiour Cause, both which are repugnant to the very Being of God. If they believe them to be *infinite*, how can they comprehend them? We are strangely puzzled in plain, ordinary, finite things; but it is madness to pretend to comprehend what is *Infinite*; and yet if the Perfections of God be not *Infinite* they cannot belong to Him.

I shall only add, in Consequence to this Assertion, *That if nothing is to be believed, but what may be comprehended, the very Being of God must be rejected*

too. And therefore I desire all such who talk so warmly against any *Mysteries in Religion* to consider whose Work it is they are doing; even theirs who under this pretence go about to overthrow all Religion. "For, say they, *Religion* is "a *Mystery* in its own Nature; not this "or that, or the other Religion; but "they are all alike, all is *Mystery*; "and that is but another Name for "Fraud and Imposture. What were the "Heathen *Mysteries* but tricks of Priest-Craft; and such are maintained and "kept up in all kinds of Religion. If "therefore these men, who talk against "*Mysteries* understand themselves, they "must in pursuance of their Principles "reject one God, as well as three Persons; "For, as long as they believe an Infinite and Incomprehensible Being, it is "Nonsense to reject any other Doctrine, "which relates to an *Infinite Being*, because it is *Incomprehensible*.

But yet these very Men, who seem to pursue the Consequence of this Principle to the utmost, must assert something more incomprehensible than the *Being of God*. For, I appeal to any man of common Understanding, whether it

be not more agreeable to Reason to suppose Works of Skill, Beauty and Order to be the Effects of a Wise and Intelligent Being, than of Blind Chance and Unaccountable Necessity ; whether it be not more agreeable to the Sense of Mankind to suppose an Infinite and Eternal Mind endued with all possible Perfections to be the Maker of this visible World ; than, that it should start out from it self, without Contrivance, without Order, without Cause ? Certainly such men have no Reason to find fault with the *Mysteries of Religion* because they are *incomprehensible*, since there is nothing so Absurd and Incomprehensible, as their darling *Hypothesis* ; And, there is nothing which can make it prevail, but to suppose Mankind to be as Dull and Insensible as the first *Chaos*.

Thus I have shewn that it is not unreasonable for *God* to require from us the Belief of something which we cannot comprehend.

(2.) I now come to consider, whether those who are so afraid of *incomprehensible Mysteries* in c *Faith*, have made

made it so much more easie in the Way they have taken. And notwithstanding all the Hectoring talk against *Mysteries* and things incomprehensible, in Religion, I find more insuperable Difficulties in point of Reason in their Way than in ours. As for instance,

(1.) It is a more Reasonable thing to suppose something *Mysterious* in the Eternal Son of God's *being with the Father before the World was made by him*; (as S. *John* expresses it in the beginning of his Gospel) than in supposing that although *John the Baptist* were born six Months before *Jesus Christ*; that yet Christ was in Dignity before him. What a wonderful *Mystery* is this? Can Men have the Face to cry down *Mysteries* in deep Speculations, and matters of a high and abstruse Nature, when they make such *Mysteries* of plain and easie things? And suppose the *Evangelist* in profound Language and lofty Expressions to prove a thing, which was never disputed, *viz.* although *Christ Jesus* were born six Months after *John*, yet he was in Dignity before him; Yet this was a *Mystery*, which, as I remember, *Fau-*

that Socinus glories in that his Uncle *Leilius* obtained by Revelation.

(2.) It is a more Reasonable thing to suppose that a *Divine Person* should assume human Nature, and so the *Word to be made Flesh*; than to say, that an Attribute of God, his *Wisdom* or *Power* is made *Flesh*, which is a *Mystery* beyond all Comprehension; There may be some Difficulties in our Conception of the other, but this is a thing beyond all Conception or Imagination; For an *Accident* to be made a *Substance* is as absurd, as to imagin it to *subsist* without one.

(3.) It is more Reasonable to suppose that the Son of God should come down from Heaven and take our Nature upon him, than that a man should be rapt up into Heaven; that it might be said that he came down from thence. For in the former Supposition we have many other places of Scripture to support it, which speak of his *being with God*, and *having Glory with him before the World was*; whereas there is nothing for the other, but only that it is necessary to make some tolerable Sense of those words.

(4.) It

(4.) It is more Reasonable to believe that *God* should become *Man* by taking our Nature upon him, than that *Man* should become *God*. For in the former, there is nothing but the Difficulty of conceiving the Manner of the Union, which we all grant to be so between Soul and Body ; but in the other there is a Repugnancy in the very Conception of a *Created God*, of an *Eternal Son of Adam*, of *Omnipotent Infirmary*, of an *Infinite finite Being*. In the former Case, an *Infinite* is united to a *Finite* ; but in the other a *Finite* becomes *Infinite*.

(5.) It is more Reasonable to believe that *Christ Jesus* should suffer as he did for our sakes than for his own. We are all agreed that the *Sufferings* of *Christ* were far beyond any thing he deserved at *God's* hands ; but what Account then is to be given of them ? We say that he made himself a voluntary Sacrifice for Expiation of the Sins of Mankind ; and so there was a great and noble End designed, and no Injury done to a willing Mind ; and the *Scripture* as plainly expresses this, as it can do in Words. But others deny this, and make him to suffer as one wholly Innocent ; for what Cause ?

Cause? To make the most Innocent Persons as apprehensive of Suffering as the most Guilty ; and the most righteous God to put no difference between them, with Respect to Suffering.

(6.) It is more Reasonable to suppose such a Condescension in the Son of God to take upon him the Form of a Servant for our Advantage ; than that a *meer Man* should be Exalted to the *Honour* and *Worship* which belongs only to God. For, on the one side, there is nothing but what is agreeable to the Divine Nature, viz. *Infinite Love* and *Condescension* and *Pity* to Mankind ; on the other, there is the greatest Design of *Self-Exaltation* that ever was in *Human Nature*, viz. for a *meer Man* to have the most *Essential Attributes* and *Incommunicable Honour* which belongs to God. And whether of these two is more agreeable to the Spirit and Design of the New Testament, let any man of understanding judge. For as it is evident, that the great Intention of it is to magnifie the wonderful Love of God in the sending of his Son ; so it is as plain that one great End of the Christian Doctrine was to take Mankind off from



from giving Divine Worship to Creatures; and can we then suppose that at the same time it should set up the *Worship* of a *meer Man* with all the *Honour* and *Adoration* which belongs to *God*? This is to me an *incomprehensible Mystery* indeed, and far beyond all that is implied in the *Mysteries* of the *Trinity* and *Incarnation*. For it Subverts the very Foundation of the Design of Christianity as to the Reforming *Idolatry* then in being; it lays the Foundation for introducing it into the World again; for since the Distance between God and his Creatures is taken away, in the matter of Worship, there is nothing left but the Declaration of his Will; which doth not exclude more *Mediators* of *Intercession* but upon this Ground, that the *Mediation* of *Redemption* is the Foundation of that of *Intercession*. And it is far more easie for us to suppose there may be some things too hard for us to understand in the Mystery of our *Redemption* by *Jesus Christ*, than that at the same it should be both a *Duty* and a *Sin* to Worship any but the *true God* with proper Divine Worship. For if it be *Idolatry* to give it to a Creature, then it is a great Sin; for  
so

so the Scripture still accounts it ; but if we are bound to give it to Christ who is but a Creature, then that which in it self is a Sin, is now become a Necessary Duty ; which overthrows the Natural Differences of Good and Evil, and makes *Idolatry* to be a meer *Arbitrary* thing. And I take it for granted, that in Matters of Religion, *Moral* Difficulties are more to be regarded than *Intellectual* ; because Religion was far more designed for a Rule of our Actions, than for the Satisfaction of our Curiosity. And upon due Examination we shall find that there is no such frightful Appearances of Difficulties in the *Mystery* of the *Incarnation*, as there is in giving *Divine Worship* to a *Creature*.

And it ought to be observed, that those very Places which are supposed to exclude Christ from being the *true God* ; must, if they have any force, exclude him from *Divine Worship*. For they are spoken of God, as the *Object* of our *Worship* ; but if he be not excluded from *Divine Worship*, then neither is he from being the *true God* ; which they grant he is *by Office*, but not *by Nature*.

But

S. Joh. 17.  
3.

1 Cor. 6.6.

Saein. ad  
Eutrop. p.  
96. c. Wick.  
c. 11. Ca-  
tech. Ra-  
cov. p. 65.

But a God by Office who is not so by Nature is a new and *incomprehensible Mystery*. A *Mystery hidden from Ages and Generations* as to the Church of God; but not made known by the Gospel of his Son.

This is such a kind of *Mystery* as the *Heathen Priests* had, who had *Gods many and Lords many*, as the *Apostle* saith, *i.e.* 1 Cor. 8. 5. many by Office although but one by Nature. But if the Christian Religion had owned *one God by Nature* and only *one by Office*, the Heathens had been to blame chiefly in the Number of their Gods by Office, and not in the divine Worship which they gave to them. But S. Paul blames the Heathens for *doing Service to them which by Nature are no Gods*; not for doing it without Divine Authority, nor for mistaking the Person who was God by Office, but in giving Divine Worship to them who by Nature were no Gods; which he would never have said, if by the Christian Doctrine, Divine Worship were to be given to one who was not God by Nature. Gal. 4. 8.

But these are indeed *incomprehensible Mysteries* how a Man by Nature can be a God really and truly by Office; how the

Smiglec. de  
Divin.  
Verb. In-  
carn. Nat.  
P. 45.

Nova Mon-  
stra, &c.  
P. 42.

the Incommunicable Perfections of the Divine Nature can be communicated to a Creature; how God should give his Glory to another, and by his own Command require that to be given to a Creature, which himself had absolutely forbidden to be given to any besides himself. It is said by a famous Jesuit (I will not say how agreeably to their own Doctrines and Practices about Divine Worship) that the Command of God cannot make him worthy of Divine Worship, who without such a Command is not worthy of it. And it is very absurd to say, that he that is unworthy of it without a Command, can become worthy by it; for it makes God to command Divine Honour to be given to one who cannot deserve it. (For no meer Man can deserve to be made God.) But it is more agreeable to the Divine Nature and Will not to give his Honour to a Creature.

(3.) But after all the Invectives of these Enemies to Mysteries, we do not make that which we say is Incomprehensible to be a Necessary Article of Faith as it is Incomprehensible; but we do assert that what is Incomprehensible as to the Manner, may be a Necessary Article as far

far as it is plainly Revealed. As in the Instances I have already mentioned of the *Creation* and *Resurrection of the Dead*; would they in earnest have Men turn *Infidels* as to these things till they are able to comprehend all the difficulties which relate to them? If not, why should this suggestion be allow'd as to the *Mysteries* which relate to our *Redemption* by *Jesus Christ*? If it be said, *the Case is not alike for those are clearly Revealed and these are not*; this brings it to the true and proper Issue of this matter, and if we do not prove a *clear Revelation*, we do not assert their being *Necessary Articles of Faith*; but my present business was only to take off this Objection, That the *Mysteries* were Incomprehensible and therefore not to be received by us.

II. And so I come to the second Way, by which we are to Examine the several Senses of *Christ Jesus coming to save Sinners*: Which of them tends more to the Benefit and Advantage of Mankind; or which is *more worthy of all Acceptation*.

And that will appear by considering these things;

(1.) Which

- (1.) Which tends most to the raising our *Esteem* and *Love* of *Christ Jesus*.
- (2.) Which tends most to the begetting in us a greater *Hatred* of *Sin*.
- (3.) Which tends most to the strengthening our *Hope* of *Salvation* by *Jesus Christ*.

(1.) As to the raising in us a greater *Esteem* and *Love* of *Christ*. We are certain that the Infinite Love and Condescension of *Christ Jesus* in undertaking such a Work as the *saving* of *Sinners* makes it most worthy of all Acceptation. Some Men may please themselves in thinking that by taking away all *Mysteries* they have made their *Faith* more easie, but I am certain they have extremely less'n'd the Argument for our *Love*, viz. the Apprehensions of the wonderfull Love and Condescension of *Christ* in coming into the World to *save Sinners*. And yet this is the great Argument of the New Testament to perswade Mankind to the *Love* of *God* and of his Son: *Joh. 3. 16. God so loved the World that he gave his only begotten Son, &c.* This is indeed a mighty

mighty Argument of Love, if by *the only begotten Son* be meant the Eternal Son of God, *who came down from Heaven*, v. 13. as S. *John* speaks just before; but if no more be meant but only that God made a *meer Man* to be his Son, and after he had preached a while here on Earth and was ill used and crucified by his own People, he Exalted him to be *God* and gave him Divine Attributes and Honours; this were an Argument of great Love to the Person of Christ, but not to the rest of Mankind. But *God's Love* in *Scripture* is magnified with Respect to *the World* in the sending of his Son. *In this was mani-* 1 Joh 4. 9.  
*fested*, saith the Apostle, *the Love of God towards us, because that God sent his only begotten Son into the World that we should live through him. Herein is love, not* v. 10.  
*that we loved God; but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be a Propitiation for our Sins.* The great Love we still see is *towards us*, i. e. towards Mankind, but according to the other Sense it must have been. Herein was the Love of God manifested to his Son, that for his Sufferings he exalted him above all Creatures. *He that spared not his own Son*, saith S. *Paul*, Rom. 8. 32.  
*but deliver'd him up for us all.* If he were the *Eternal Son of God* who came to

suffer for us, there is a mighty force and *Emphasis* in this Expression, and very apt to raise our Admiration and our Love; But what *not sparing his own Son* is there, if nothing were meant but that he designed by Sufferings to Exalt him? For *not sparing him* supposes an Antecedent Relation of the highest Kindness, but the other is only designing extraordinary Kindness for the sake of his Sufferings. Therefore, the Argument for the *Love of God* is taken from what his *Son* was, when he deliver'd him up for us all; he was his *own Son*; not by *Adoption* as others are; S. *John* calls him, his *only begotten Son*; and God himself, *his beloved Son* in the Voice from Heaven; and this before his Sufferings, immediately after his Baptism, when as yet, there was nothing extraordinary done by him, as to the great Design of his coming. Which shews, that there was an Antecedent Relation between him and the Father; and that therein the Love of God and of Christ was manifested, that being the *only begotten Son of the Father*, he should take our Nature upon him and for our sakes do and suffer what he did. This is indeed an Argument great enough to raise our Admiration, to excite our Devotion, to  
in-

John 1. 14.  
ch. 3. v. 16.  
Luk. 3. 22.



inflame our Affections; but how flat and low doth it appear, when it comes to no more than this, that there was a *Man*, whom, after his Sufferings, *God* raised from the dead and made him a *God by Office*? Doth this carry any such Argument in it for our Esteem and Love and Devotion to him as the other doth upon the most serious Consideration of it?

(2.) Which tends most to beget in us a greater *Hatred of Sin*. For that is so contrary to the Way of our *Salvation* by *Jesus Christ*, that what tends most to our *Hatred* of it, must conduce most to our Happiness, and therefore be *most worthy of all Acceptation*. It is agreed on all hands, that *Christ* did suffer very much both in his Mind and in his Body.

In his Mind, when it is said, *that he was troubled in Spirit*; that *he began to be sorrowfull and very heavy*; and soon after, *My Soul is exceeding sorrowfull, even unto death*. S. Luke saith, *that he was in an Agony*; wherein he not only prayed more earnestly, but his sweat was as it were great Drops of Blood falling to the Ground. What made this Amazement, and dreadfull Agony in the mind of the most innocent Person in the World? Was it meerly the Fear of the Pains of

Joh. 13. 21.

Matt. 26.

37, 38.

Mark 14.

33, 34.

Luk. 22. 44

Death which he was to undergo? That is impossible, considering the Assurance which he had of so glorious a Reward so soon following after; when so many Martyrs endured such exquisite Torments for his sake without any such Disturbance or Consternation. But the Apostles give us another Account of it. S. Peter saith, *1 Pet. 2. 24.* he was *to bear our Sins in his own body on the tree*; that *Christ suffered for 3. 18.* *Sins, the just for the unjust.* S. Paul, *that 2 Cor. 5. 21.* *God made him to be Sin for us who knew no Sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.* Hereby we understand how so innocent a Person came to suffer; *he stood in our Stead*; *he was made Sin for us*; and therefore was to be treated as a Sinner; and to suffer that on our Account, which he could not deserve on his own. If he suffer'd on his own Account, this were the way to fill our Minds with perplexity concerning the Justice of Providence with Respect to his dealings with the most innocent and holy Persons in this World; If he suffer'd on our Account, then we have the Benefit of his Sufferings, and therein we see how displeasing to God sin is, when even his own Son suffer'd so much by taking the guilt of our Sins upon them.

And

And what can tend more to the begetting in us a due hatred of sin, than to consider, what *Christ* himself suffer'd on the Account of it? What can make us have more dreadful thoughts of it, than that the great and merciful God, when he designed to *Save sinners*, yet would have his own Son to become a *Propitiation for the Sins of Mankind*? And unless we allow this, we must put force upon the plainest Expressions of *Scripture*; and make *Christ* to suffer meerly to shew God's Power over a most innocent Person, and his Will and Pleasure to inflict the most severe Punishment without any Respect to *Guilt*. And surely such a Notion of *God*, cannot be *worthy of all Acceptation*.

(3.) Which tends most to strengthen our *Hope of Salvation by Christ Jesus*. If we believe that he suffer'd for our Sins, then we have great Reason to hope for the Forgiveness of them; although they have been many and great, if we sincerely Repent; because the most prevailing Argument for Despair will be removed; which is taken from the *Justice of God*, and his declared *Hatred of Sin* and *Displeasure* against *Sinners*. If God be so much in earnest displeased

Rom. 5.

10.

2 Cor. 5.

19.

Heb. 9. 15.

pleased with the Sins of Mankind, and his Justice be concerned in the Punishment of Sinners, how can they ever hope to escape, unless there be a way for his Displeasure to be removed, and his Justice to be satisfied? And this the *Scripture* tells us is done by *Christ*, who died that he might be a *Sacrifice of Atonement to Reconcile us to God by his Death*; as *S. Paul* expressly affirms. And by this means, we may have strong Consolation from the Hopes of Forgiveness of our Sins. Whereas, if this be taken away, either Men must believe that *God* was not in earnest displeased with the Sins of Mankind; which must exceedingly lessen our Esteem of the *Holiness* and *Justice of God*; or if he were so displeased, that he laid aside this Displeasure, without any *Atonement* or *Sacrifice of Expiation*. And so, as many as look on *God's Justice* and *Holiness* as necessary and essential Attributes of *God*, will be in danger of sinking into the Depths of Despair, as often as they Reflect seriously on the Guilt of their Sins. But on the other side, if we believe that while we were *Enemies*, we were reconciled to *God by the death of his Son*; then we may have Peace with  
 God

*God through our Lord Jesus Christ ; and have Reason to believe that there will be no Condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus by a lively Faith and sincere Repentance ; then they may with Comfort look up to God as a Reconciled Father, through Jesus Christ our Mediator ; then they may with inward Satisfaction look beyond the Grave, and stedfastly hope for that Salvation which Christ purchased on Earth and will at last bestow on all such as Love and Obey him. To which God of his Infinite Mercy bring us all through Jesus Christ. For, This is a faithful Saying and worthy of all Acceptation, that he came into the World to save Sinners.*

F I N I S.

---

*Books published by the Right Reverend Father in God  
Edw. L. Bishop of Worcester, and sold by H. Mort-  
lock at the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-Yard.*

**A** Rational account of the Grounds of the Protestant Religion ; being a Vindication of the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury's Relation of a Conference, &c. from the pretended Answer of T. C. 2d. Edit. Fol.

*Origines Britannica*, or the Antiquities of the British Churches, with a Preface concerning some pretended Antiquities relating to Britain, in Vindication of the Bishop of St. Asaph. Folio.

*Irenicum*, A Weapon-Salve for the Churches Wounds. Quarto,

*Origines*

*Origines Sacrae*, Or a Rational Account of the Grounds of Christian Faith, as to the Truth and Divine Authority of the Script. and the matters therein contained. 4to.

A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practis'd in the Church of *Rome*, and the hazard of Salvation in the Communion of it. *Octavo*.

An Answer to several late Treatises occasioned by a Book entituled, A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practis'd in the Church of *Rome*, and the hazard of Salvation in the Communion of it; Part I. *Octavo*.

A Second Discourse in Vindication of the Protestant Grounds of Faith, against the pretence of Infallibility in the *Roman Church*, in Answer to the Guide in Controversie, by R. H. Protestancy without Principles, and Reason, and Religion; or the certain Rule of Faith, by E. W. with a particular enquiry into the Miracles of the *Roman Church*. *Octavo*.

An Answer to Mr. *Cressy's* Epistle apologetical to a Person of Honour, touching his Vindication of Dr. *Stillingfleet*. *Octavo*.

A Defence of the Discourse concerning the Idolatry practis'd in the Church of *Rome*, in answer to a Book entituled *Catholicks no Idolaters*: *Octavo*.

Several Conferences between a *Romish Priest*, a Fanatick Chaplain, and a Divine of the Church of *England*; being a full Answer to the late Dialogues of T. G. *Octavo*.

A Discourse concerning Bonds of Resignation of Benefices in Point of Law and Conscience, in *Octavo*.

A Discourse concerning the Illegality of the Ecclesiastical Commission, in Answer to the Vindication and Defence of it: wherein the true notion of the Legal Supremacy is cleared; and an Account is given of the Nature, Original and Mischief of the Dispensing Power.

The Council of *Trent* Examined and Disprov'd by Catholick Tradition, in the main Points in Controversie between Us and the Church of *Rome*; with a particular Account of the Times and Occasions of Introducing them.

The Unreasonableness of Separation, or an Impartial account of the History, Nature and Pleas of the present Separation from the Communion of the Ch. of *Engl*. 4to.

The Grand Question concerning the Bishops Right to vote in Parliament Cases Capital stated and argued, from the Parliament-Rolls and the History of former times; with an Enquiry into their Peerage, and the Three Estates in Parliament. *Octavo*.

